Culpability for Moral Ignorance and Reasonable Moral Expectations by Zinn, Carmen Michelle
UC Santa Barbara
UC Santa Barbara Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Title
Culpability for Moral Ignorance and Reasonable Moral Expectations
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6fw0g97k
Author
Zinn, Carmen Michelle
Publication Date
2016
 
Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
  
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
Santa Barbara 
 
 
Culpability for Moral Ignorance and Reasonable Moral Expectations 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the 
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy 
in Philosophy 
 
by 
 
Carmen Michelle Zinn 
 
Committee in charge: 
Professor Matthew Hanser, Chair 
Professor Aaron Zimmerman 
Professor Christopher McMahon 
 
December 2016  
  
The dissertation of Carmen Michelle Zinn is approved. 
 
  ____________________________________________  
 Christopher McMahon 
 
  ____________________________________________  
 Aaron Zimmerman 
 
  ____________________________________________  
 Matthew Hanser, Committee Chair 
 
 
September 2016 
  iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Culpability for Moral Ignorance and Reasonable Moral Expectations 
Copyright © 2016 
by 
Carmen Michelle Zinn 
  
 
  iv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
I began this project nearly seven years ago. Its completion has been sandwiched in 
between a full-time faculty position at Cuesta College and caring for my two young 
daughters, and has only been possible with the support of my dissertation committee, 
colleagues, and family members.  
I owe many thanks to Professor Matthew Hanser, my dissertation advisor. He has 
read many drafts of these specific chapters, and endured many messier earlier drafts, as I 
clarified the topic and trajectory of the dissertation. His comments have been clear and 
direct, and have struck the perfect balance of sharpening my thinking and motivating me to 
improve my arguments, without being discouraging. I have stepped away from this project 
may times over the years, sometimes for multiple years at a time, and Professor Hanser has 
always welcomed me back to it, and happily continued to work on it with me. He has helped 
me to be a better, more careful philosopher, and modeled what it is to be a mentor. For his 
patience and tenacity, I will always be grateful. 
I also wish to thank Professors Aaron Zimmerman, Chris McMahon, and the late 
Tony Brueckner. They too welcomed me back to this project after years of absence, and 
continued to work on it with me. Professor Zimmerman’s encouragement gave me the 
courage and confidence to apply for reinstatement to the Philosophy program in order to 
complete my degree. His comments on my dissertation challenged me to defend the basic 
premises of the dissertation, while also clarifying its “fringe” elements. Professor Chris 
McMahon graciously agreed to replace the late Professor Tony Brueckner on my dissertation 
committee, although the topic of this dissertation falls outside his area of expertise. And, 
although Professor Brueckner never read the content of this dissertation, his calm presence 
reassured me not only of the feasibility of the project, but also of my own abilities to 
complete it.  
My colleagues at Cuesta College, and in particular, Jane Morgan, my division chair, 
and Pamela Ralston, my dean, provided me time to work on the dissertation by allowing me 
to count the hours I spent working on it as my required 30 hours of continuing education. 
Pamela Ralston engaged me in a very honest discussion of the challenges women 
(particularly those with families) face in academia, and the ways possessing a PhD can help 
with them. Although brief, this discussion played a pivotal role in motivating me to finish 
the degree, and is one that I will never forget. 
Finally, I wish to thank many members of my family. My mom, Arlys McDonald, 
has been my cheerleader through this process, ever reminding me that a “good dissertation is 
a finished dissertation.” Her own accomplishments of completing her PhD in Psychology, at 
a time when not many women did so, of owning a thriving therapy clinic, and being a 
pioneer in her field have served as a sterling example of what can be accomplished with 
focus and discipline. I also thank my husband, Jesse Zinn, for shouldering more than his 
share of child care, especially in the final months of this project, for his unwavering 
confidence in my ability to finish it, and for completing his dissertation before me. I couldn’t 
let him be “Dr. Zinn,” while I was not! Finally, I thank my two beautiful daughters, Ivy and 
Opal Zinn. They have (reluctantly) sacrificed chunks of their time with me to the completion 
of this dissertation.  Their laughter, cuddles, and delight in simple pleasures have provided 
me with balance and perspective, and the thought that my success will provide them all the 
more reason to believe in and strive for their own dreams, has spurred me on.    
 
  v 
VITA OF CARMEN MICHELLE ZINN 
     AUGUST 2016 
 
EDUCATION 
 
University of California, Santa Barbara   Ph.D., Philosophy 2006-2016 
 
University of California, Santa Cruz  M.A., Philosophy 2002-2005 
  
California State University, Chico  B.A., Philosophy 1998-2002 
 
 
PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYMENT 
 
Part-time Philosophy Instructor, University of West Georgia, 2016-present 
 
Philosophy Instructor (tenure-track), Cuesta Community College, 2012-2014 
 
Associate (part-time) Philosophy Instructor, Mira Costa Community College, 2011  
 
Adjunct Philosophy Instructor, Miramar College, 2011 
 
Online Philosophy Instructor, National University, 2010-2012 
 
Writing Program Instructor, UC Santa Barbara, 2011 
 
Philosophy Instructor and Teaching Assistant,, 2006-2012  
 
Philosophy Instructor and Teaching Assistant, UC Santa Cruz, 2002-2005 
 
 
FIELDS OF STUDY 
 
Studies in Moral Psychology with Professors Matthew Hanser and Aaron Zimmerman 
 
Studies in Ethics with Professor Matthew Hanser 
 
Studies in Epistemology and with Professors Aaron Zimmerman and Tony Brueckner 
 
 
 
 
  vi 
ABSTRACT 
  Culpability for Moral Ignorance and Reasonable Moral Expectations 
      By 
           Carmen Zinn 
 
The focus of this dissertation is whether or not (and the conditions under which) 
agents are culpable for their moral ignorance and actions they perform from it. In recent 
years, there has been a steady interest in this topic due to its practical and theoretical import. 
We often find ourselves in the position of judging whether or not agents are culpable for 
actions they perform from moral ignorance. For example, we often hear of cases in which an 
agent has not only done something terrible, but also endorses his action as acceptable 
(thereby exhibiting moral ignorance). However, the background of these agents is sometimes 
such that we find ourselves wondering if the agent could have formed correct moral beliefs. 
If not, is he culpable for his moral ignorance? If he is not culpable for his moral ignorance, is 
he culpable for the terrible actions he performed from it? Our answers to these questions not 
only determine our responses to a significant subset of wrongdoers; they also have broader 
implications for theories of moral responsibility, and in particular theories concerning the 
epistemic conditions for moral responsibility.  
Those who weigh in on the topic of moral ignorance tend to take one of two extreme 
positions concerning it. They either hold the “skeptical view,” according to which agents are 
almost never culpable for their moral ignorance and actions they perform from it, or they 
hold “culpability views,” according to which agents are almost always culpable for their 
moral ignorance and actions they perform from it. Proponents of the skeptical view argue 
that agents are culpable for their moral ignorance only if it is the result of a knowing 
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mismanagement of their moral beliefs. Agents very rarely knowingly mismanage their moral 
beliefs, and therefore are very rarely culpable for their moral ignorance or actions they 
perform from it. Proponents of culpability views argue that agents are culpable for their 
moral ignorance if it manifests insufficient moral care or objectionable moral attitudes. 
Moral ignorance almost always does so. Agents are therefore almost always culpable for it, 
and for actions they perform from it.  
I argue that the skeptical view and the culpability views fail to capture the complexity 
of our intuitive reactions to particular cases of moral ignorance. In light of this fact, and the 
potential theoretical implications of these views, we ought to reexamine them. In Chapters 2 
and 3, I consider the skeptical view and culpability views in-depth. I argue that evaluating 
these views requires an account of the general conditions under which an agent can be 
reasonably expected to avoid X, and how this affects her culpability for X.  I offer such an 
account in Chapter 4. I use it to argue that both the skeptical view and culpability views are 
mistaken. In their place, I offer a more moderate view that vindicates what I take to be our 
intuitive responses to cases of moral ignorance: although agents often are culpable for their 
moral ignorance and actions they perform from it, there are genuine and compelling 
exceptions. 
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PART I: INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM AND THE 
SOLUTION 
     
Chapter 1 
    Moral Ignorance and Culpability 
 
There are two main (morally relevant) types of ignorance: factual ignorance and 
moral ignorance.1 Non-culpable factual ignorance releases an agent from blame. 
Imagine, for example, that Frank acts from non-culpable factual ignorance. His daughter has 
told him repeatedly that she has no desire to go to college. However, she secretly goes to 
college, paying her own way, and going to great lengths to conceal this from her father. Her 
twin brother expresses the wish to go to college, is admitted, and asks Frank to pay for his 
education. So, Frank pays for his son’s college education, but not his daughter’s. He 
justifiably believes that she does not want a college education, and is not pursing one. Frank 
does nothing blameworthy in this scenario. Imagine instead that Frank acts from moral 
ignorance. He believes that it is a sin for women to seek knowledge outside their churches 
and homes. So, he pays for his son’s college education, but not his daughter’s, although he is 
aware that she is pursuing one. Could Frank’s moral ignorance potentially release him from 
                                                 
1 Some speak of “normative ignorance” instead of moral ignorance. I take normative 
ignorance to be a broader category than moral ignorance. Normative ignorance may include 
ignorance of any “should-claims,” including claims about what would be prudent in a given 
context. Moral ignorance, on the other hand, includes ignorance about what is right or 
wrong, and how moral reasons or considerations ought to be weighed in our decision 
making processes.  
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blame? Can moral ignorance ever be non-culpable? If so, can it excuse an agent from 
knowingly, and wholeheartedly committing an action that is, in fact, wrongful? 
 Recently, there has been significant interest in these questions. Philosophers tend to 
take rather extreme positions with respect to them, with some holding that agents are almost 
never culpable for their moral ignorance and actions performed from it, and others holding 
that agents are always culpable for their moral ignorance and actions performed from it. 
Advocates for the “skeptical view” offer the “skeptical argument” in support of their 
position. They hold that moral ignorance, and actions performed from it, are culpable only if 
they are the result of the agent knowingly mismanaging her moral beliefs. Because the latter 
is very rare, the argument goes, agents are very rarely culpable for their moral ignorance, or 
actions performed from it. There are two prominent “culpability views”. Both hold that 
culpability for moral ignorance does not depend on culpability for past actions; agents can 
be, and always are, directly culpable for their moral ignorance. One thing that all parties to 
this debate share in common is the assumption that if an agent is not culpable for her moral 
ignorance, then she is not culpable for her actions performed from moral ignorance. 
Neither the skeptical nor culpability views capture the complexity of our intuitive 
responses to moral ignorance. Intuitively, agents are sometimes culpable for their moral 
ignorance and sometimes not. E.g., a physician working in 1940 in the USA might not be 
culpable for believing that routine sterilization of mentally disabled individuals is morally 
acceptable. A presently practicing physician certainly would be culpable for this false moral 
belief. And, sometimes the fact that an agent acted from non-culpable moral ignorance 
renders blame inappropriate, while other times it does not. E.g. the physician working in 
1940 arguably is not culpable for sterilizing his mentally disabled patients, insofar as he is 
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acting in a manner that he honestly and blamelessly believes is in their best interests. 
However, we sometimes judge that an agent is not culpable for holding false moral beliefs, 
but is culpable for acting from them. E.g. we sometimes think that very unfortunate 
formative circumstances render agents non-culpable for forming false moral beliefs. 
However, the fact that they act from this non-culpable ignorance does not seem to excuse 
them from seriously harming other individuals. 
Questions about culpability for moral ignorance have both practical and theoretical 
import. The answers we give to them significantly impact our judgments about, and 
reactions to, a subset of wrongdoers. They also impact our understanding of the general 
conditions under which agents are responsible for their actions. It is generally thought that 
two conditions must be met in order for an agent to be responsible for her action: a control 
condition and an epistemic condition. Much ink has been spilt over the control condition. 
Philosophers are now turning their attention to the epistemic condition. While we have a 
fairly good grip, and consensus, on the ways in which factual ignorance might undermine an 
agent’s responsibility, we lack this with respect to how moral ignorance might do so. As a 
result, we lack a clear view of the shape the epistemic condition might take. 
  
Because our intuitions concerning culpability for moral ignorance, and actions 
performed from it, are not captured by current philosophical positions, and because these 
issues are of significant theoretical and practical importance, we ought to reexamine them. 
My aim in this dissertation is to do so, in an effort to bring some clarity and consensus to 
this debate. In what follows, I argue that both the skeptical view and culpability views are 
mistaken. In Chapters 2 and 3, I consider the skeptical view and culpability views in-depth. I 
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argue that evaluating these views requires an account of the conditions under which an agent 
can be reasonably expected to avoid X, and how this affects her culpability for X.  I offer 
such an account in Chapter 4. I use it to argue that both the skeptical view and culpability 
views are mistaken. In their place, I offer a more moderate view that vindicates our intuitive 
responses to cases of moral ignorance. In particular, I argue that agents can sometimes be 
reasonably expected to avoid their moral ignorance and sometimes cannot. Because it is 
unfair to blame an agent for that which she could not be reasonably expected to avoid, 
agents are sometimes culpable for their moral ignorance, and sometimes are not. More 
surprisingly, but also in line with out intuitive judgments, I argue that agents can sometimes 
be reasonably expected to avoid their actions from moral ignorance, even if they could not 
be reasonably expected to avoid their ignorance itself. So, in some cases, agents will be non-
culpable for their moral ignorance, but not for their actions performed from it. 
 
1.1 Moral Ignorance, Actions Performed from a Position of Moral Ignorance, and 
Culpability 
 
Moral ignorance differs from factual ignorance in its content. When one is factually 
ignorant, he lacks empirical information about particular features of his situation and/or 
action. For example, he might lack the information the woman he intends to marry is his 
mother. Or, he might lack the information that petting a bird roughly might injure it, or that 
he is petting the bird in a rough manner. Moral ignorance does not concern empirical facts 
about one’s circumstances or action, but rather the moral value of the latter. A morally 
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ignorant agent knows, e.g., that he is marrying his mother, or is petting the bird roughly, but 
has false beliefs, or lacks true beliefs, about whether his action is morally acceptable. 2  
An agent acts from a position of ignorance, as opposed to merely in conjunction with 
it, when the agent would not have performed her action, had she not been ignorant. 
Consider, for example, Fred, who invested in a particular company’s stock because he 
falsely believes that the company will flourish in the future. Had Fred known that the 
company would actually flop, he would not have invested in it. Fred is rightly described as 
acting from ignorance. On the other hand, imagine that Alfred also has the false belief that 
the company will flourish in the near future, but does not base his decision to buy their stock 
on this belief. Alfred is extremely rich, and his best friend owns the company in question. 
Alfred invests in the company in order to support his friend, and although he hopes it will 
flourish, he would invest it even with the knowledge that it will not. In this case, although 
Alfred is in fact ignorant, he cannot be correctly said to act from ignorance, since its absence 
would not have affected his action.  
In what follows, I understand an agent to be culpable for X, if other agents, all things 
equal, would be not be unjustified in blaming her for it, given her relationship to X (e.g. she 
performed X, X constitutes an objectionable moral attitude on her part).3 Other factors, 
besides the agent having the right relationship to X (e.g. whether or not the blaming agents 
                                                 
2 In Chapter 2, I argue, along with Harman (2011) and Guerrero (2007), that all not 
forms of moral ignorance are potentially exculpatory. Only false moral beliefs in the 
permissibility of the act in question, or the lack of true beliefs accompanied by an 
unawareness of the unjustifiable risk of harm the action poses to others, or that the action 
has other objectionable qualities (e.g. it would be dishonest, unkind, greedy, and so on), can 
potentially exculpate. 
3 I will not offer an account of the conditions under which blame is justified. It will be 
enough for my purposes to grant that blaming an agent for X, given her relationship to it, 
can be unjustified for a number of reasons, and particularly, when it is unfair to blame her 
for X. 
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are guilty of a similar transgression), can affect whether or not agents would be justified in 
blaming her for X.4 And, there may be good reasons for blaming someone who is not in fact 
culpable for her action. E.g. doing so might bring about so some social good. I ignore these 
other factors that impact our justification in blaming agents, and focus exclusively on 
whether or not an agent could be justifiably blamed for X, based on her relation to it.  
 
1.2 The Skeptical View 
 
 I discuss the skeptical view in Chapter 2. Its main proponents are Rosen (2004) and 
Zimmerman (1997, 2008). They argue that agents can be culpable for their moral ignorance 
only if it is the result of a culpable mismanagement of their moral beliefs. An agent would 
mismanage her moral beliefs if, e.g., she failed to consider contrary viewpoints, or to pay 
attention to counter-evidence. Agents are culpable for mismanaging their moral beliefs, 
according to the skeptical argument, only if they do so knowingly. Alternatively, if they 
mismanage their moral beliefs due to moral ignorance (e.g. they do not consider other views 
because they believe they should not), they are only culpable for doing so, and thereby for 
the original moral ignorance in question, if this ignorance is the result of a knowing 
mismanagement of their moral beliefs, and so on. Rosen and Zimmerman argue that it is 
very rare for agents to knowingly mismanage their moral beliefs, and therefore that agents 
will very rarely be culpable for their moral ignorance or actions performed from it. 
 Existing objections to the skeptical argument take three main shapes. Some argue 
against (1) the broad notion of potentially exculpatory moral ignorance employed by the 
skeptical argument. Some argue against (2) the claim that agents very rarely knowingly 
                                                 
4 For a detailed discussion of such factors, see A. Smith (2007). 
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mismanage their moral ignorance. And, some argue against (3) the claim that agents are 
only culpable for their moral ignorance if it is the result of a knowing mismanagement of 
their moral beliefs. I argue that objections to (1) and (2) are successful in narrowing the 
application of the skeptical argument. However, even with their success, the skeptical 
argument still suggests that agents are non-culpable for their moral ignorance far more often 
than we typically think. Avoiding this result depends on the success of objections to (3) the 
claim that agents are only culpable for their moral ignorance if it is the result of a knowing 
mismanagement of their moral beliefs. However, (3) rests on the two further claims, (a) that 
agents cannot be reasonably expected to avoid their moral ignorance unless it is the result of 
a knowing mismanagement of their moral beliefs, and (b) that agents cannot be fairly 
blamed for that which they could not be reasonably expected to avoid. Objections to (3) are 
not successful insofar as they fail to argue against these further claims. Doing so requires an 
account of the conditions under which an agent can be reasonably expected to avoid her 
moral ignorance, and how this affects her culpability for it.  
 
1.3 Culpability Views 
 
I consider two prominent culpability views. The first, defended by Elizabeth Harman 
(2011, 2014), holds that agents are always culpable for their moral ignorance insofar as it 
always manifests a failure to care sufficiently about things of moral significance. Harman 
argues that agents are always culpable for the latter. The second view is really a family of 
views—non-volitional culpability views—which are based on non-volitional views of 
blame. The latter hold that agents are culpable for X insofar as it manifests an objectionable 
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moral attitude/quality of will/set of values.5 Because moral ignorance always manifests the 
latter, according to non-volitional culpability views, agents are always culpable for it.  
Both Harman’s view and non-volitional culpability views hold that agents can be 
blamed for their moral ignorance, regardless of how they came to develop it. According to 
Harman’s view, because the conditions under which an agent forms her moral ignorance do 
not bear on whether or not her beliefs manifest insufficient moral care, these conditions do 
not impact her culpability for her moral ignorance. According to the non-volitional 
culpability view, because the conditions under which an agent forms her moral ignorance do 
not impact the fact that it manifests an objectionable moral attitude/quality of will/set of 
values, they are not relevant to her culpability for it. 
Existing objections to Harman’s view and to non-volitional culpability views take 
two main shapes. Some argue that (1) moral ignorance does not always manifest a failure to 
care sufficiently about something of moral importance, or an objectionable moral attitude. 
Others argue that (2) moral ignorance is not always culpable, even when it manifests the 
former. I argue that objections along the lines of (1) are successfully applied to Harman’s 
view and, to a lesser degree, to the non-volitional culpability views as well.  In light of these 
objections, we can conclude that it is at most true that moral ignorance is always culpable 
when it manifests insufficient moral care or objectionable moral attitudes. I argue that 
existing objections along the lines of (2) are either implausible, or based on intuitions that 
would be rejected by proponents of culpability views.  
                                                 
5 Angela Smith (2005, 2015), Pamela Hieronymi (1994, 2006), Scanlon (1998, 2008) all 
endorse non-volitional views of blame, and non-volitional culpability views of moral 
ignorance. 
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However, I offer my own objection, along the lines of (2). I argue that it is plausible 
that given their histories (and in particular, their histories of experiencing trauma), some 
agents could not have been reasonably expected to bring it about that they care sufficiently 
about certain things of moral importance, or that they avoid holding objectionable moral 
attitudes. When this is true, agents are not plausibly culpable for their insufficient moral care 
or objectionable moral attitudes, or the moral ignorance that manifests them. Fully 
defending this objection requires a positive argument for these claims. This in turn requires a 
general account of the conditions under which a moral expectation is reasonable or 
unreasonable, and an account of how the reasonableness of an expectation that an agent X, 
bears on his culpability for X. 
 
1.4 Fairness, Reasonable Moral Expectations, and Culpability for Moral Ignorance 
  
In Chapter 4, I offer such an account. After arguing against standard approaches to 
the reasonableness of a moral expectation as tied to the difficulty of complying with the 
expectation, the capacities of the agent to whom the expectation is directed, or the fairness 
of the expectation, I argue that expectations are reasonable or unreasonable in the context of 
the relationships in which they are issued. The contexts of our relationships are defined by 
the primary characteristics of the relationship in question. The defining feature of the moral 
relationship (i.e. the relationship in which we stand to other moral agents, qua moral agents) 
is that it is a relationship of mutual regard; it is one in which all agents have equal standing, 
and in which the interests of all agents have equal relative importance. With this in mind, I 
argue that moral expectations are reasonable if they require an agent to (i) to refrain from 
acting in ways that treat other agents as lacking inherent or equal value and are also (iii) not 
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pointless, or if they require an agent (ii) to refrain from acting in ways that treat their 
interests as lacking or being of less relative importance compared to the interests of others, 
and are also (iii) not pointless.6 Moral expectations are unreasonable insofar as they meet 
neither (i) nor (ii), or insofar as they fail to meet (iii).7 
I argue that whether or not an agent can be reasonably expected to avoid X is related 
to the agent’s culpability for X insofar as, in most cases, a moral expectation that meets 
neither (i) nor (ii) requires the opposite of (i) or (ii); these expectations often require an 
agent to treat others and their interests as if they are of unequal value or relative importance. 
They are unfair insofar as they fail to treat like cases alike. When we blame an agent for X, 
we implicitly endorse a demand that she X. For example, if I blame Fred for violating my 
privacy by reading my emails without my permission, I implicitly endorse the demand that 
he not to do so.  When we blame an agent for failing to do that which she could not have 
been reasonably expected to do, we often implicitly endorse an unfair expectation; we often 
implicitly endorse an expectation that (at the relevant time in the past) she either act in a 
manner that would have treated others (including herself) or their interests as having unequal 
relative value or importance. In doing so, we treat her or others as having unequal value or 
their interests as if they are of unequal relative importance. We treat her or others unfairly. It 
                                                 
6 Moral expectations are also unreasonable insofar as they require the agent in question 
to treat the interests of others as if they are of less weight than their own. Because this is 
very unusual, I focus on expectations that are unreasonable insofar as they require agents to 
treat the interests of others as if they are greater weight than their own.  
7 Notice that the fact that an expectation is unfair in this sense is not a necessary or 
sufficient condition for its being unreasonable in other contexts. E.g. it is unreasonable to 
expect friends to donate their organs to us, but not because in doing so, we fail to treat like 
cases alike. And, it is reasonable for my children to expect me to treat their interests in 
getting a good education as if they are of more relative weight than the interests of other 
children in doing so (e.g. by expecting me to pay for them to go to a private school, but not 
to pay for other children to do so). 
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is for this reason, at least, that we are often not justified in blaming agents for that which 
they could not have been reasonably expected to avoid.  
 
I then apply this account to the skeptical view and culpability views. As noted above, 
the success of the skeptical view (and/or objections to it) depends on (3) the claim that 
agents cannot be culpable for their moral ignorance unless it is the result a knowing 
mismanagement of their moral beliefs. The main support for this claim is the further claim 
that unless an agent’s moral ignorance is the result of a knowing mismanagement of his 
moral beliefs, agents cannot be reasonably expected to avoid it, and therefore cannot be 
fairly blamed for it. I argue that this is mistaken. Expecting a moral agent to avoid his moral 
ignorance is typically reasonable insofar as it typically meets the second disjunct of (ii) and 
also meets (iii); it typically requires him to refrain from acting in ways that treat the interests 
of others as if they are of less relative importance than his own. This is true even when the 
agent develops his moral ignorance through an unknowing mismanagement of his moral 
beliefs. Given this fact, and the fact that there is no independent reason to accept the claim 
that agents are only culpable for their moral ignorance if it is the result of a knowing 
mismanagement of her moral beliefs, I argue that we ought to reject this claim, and thereby 
the skeptical argument.  
Culpability views are also mistaken. They rest on the claim that agents can be 
culpable for their moral ignorance regardless of how they come to have it. However, given 
the circumstances under which some agents form their moral ignorance, expecting them to 
have avoided it is sometimes unreasonable. This expectation sometimes meets neither (i) nor 
(ii), and often requires the opposite of the second disjunct of (ii); it often requires the agent 
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to have acted in a way that would treat the interests of others as if they are of greater relative 
importance than her own. When this is true, the agents in question could not have been 
reasonably expected to avoid their moral ignorance, and we would be unjustified in blaming 
them for it. Culpability views must be softened to account for this.  
As it turns out, a more moderate view of culpability for moral ignorance is in order. 
Agents can sometimes be reasonably expected to avoid their moral ignorance, and 
sometimes cannot. Because they are often not culpable when the latter is true, agents are 
sometimes culpable for their moral ignorance, and sometimes are not.  
The results of this dissertation are, I hope, not only a plausible and useful account of 
culpability for moral ignorance and actions performed from it, but also an account of 
reasonable moral expectations that can be applied to other types of cases and debates within 
the literature. 
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PART II: CULPABILITY FOR MORAL IGNORANCE: EXISTING POSITIONS 
      
Chapter 2 
  
           The Skeptical Argument 
 
2.1 Skepticism About Culpability for Moral Ignorance 
 
The bulk of the recent literature on culpability for moral ignorance focuses on the 
“skeptical argument,” developed primarily by Michael Zimmerman (1997, 2008 Ch. 4) and 
Gideon Rosen (2004).8 The skeptical argument claims that agents are very rarely culpable 
for their moral ignorance or actions performed from it. It does so by way of four main 
claims: (A) agents act from (potentially exculpatory) moral ignorance if they act while 
lacking an occurrent belief concerning the wrongfulness of their action, (B) agents are 
culpable for their actions performed from moral ignorance only if they are culpable for their 
moral ignorance, (C) agents are culpable for their moral ignorance only if it is the result of a 
knowing mismanagement of their moral beliefs, and (D) agents very rarely knowingly 
mismanage their moral beliefs.  
The practical implications of the skeptical argument are very unintuitive; it seems to 
release the worst of the worst from blame. For example, Zimmerman (2002) uses it to argue 
that managers of Nazi concentration camps, and officers who knowingly order attacks on 
masses of civilians, are very likely non-culpable for their actions. These individuals often 
                                                 
8  A somewhat similar argument is offered by Vargas (2005); he argues that the 
“knowledge” requirement is rarely met in tracing cases, and therefore that agents are 
culpable for their actions far less often than we typically think. 
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believe they are doing the right thing, Zimmerman claims. And, it is very unlikely that they 
developed these horrifying beliefs by knowingly mismanaging their moral beliefs. Instead, 
they likely developed them by listening to and learning from individuals that they trusted, 
and later dismissing conflicting arguments and views that they (falsely) believed to be 
unworthy of consideration. Therefore, according to the skeptical argument, they are non-
culpable for their moral ignorance, and their actions performed from it.  
Even if we take extreme cases like these to be a misapplication of the skeptical argument 
(e.g. if we think that that in such cases, agents likely act from affected ignorance, if any), the 
suggestion that most agents who act from moral ignorance are non-culpable, is still 
unsettling. After all, agents acting from moral ignorance are paradigmatically culpable: they 
do the wrong thing while wholeheartedly endorsing their action. It would be surprising if it 
turns out that most agents who fit this description are instead non-culpable. E.g. if Bill 
simply cannot understand why others believe it is wrong for him to fail to take low-cost 
measures to protect his employees from serious harm, this suggests that he is more 
blameworthy, not less.  
 
Nearly all participants in the debate concerning culpability for moral ignorance, and 
actions performed from it, accept the claim that (B) agents are culpable for their actions 
performed from moral ignorance only if they are culpable for their moral ignorance. 9 
However, a number of philosophers object to (A), (C) or (D). Harman (2011) objects to (A), 
arguing that (A) employs too broad a notion of moral ignorance; it is not a lack of true moral 
belief that is potentially exculpatory, but only false moral beliefs that one’s action is morally 
                                                 
9 A notable exception is Harman (2011, 2014). I discuss her view in detail in Chapter 3.  
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permissible. Objections to (D) offer reasons to think that agents knowingly mismanage their 
moral beliefs more often than we think, e.g. because many instances of moral ignorance are 
affected ignorance. With some modifications, I take these objections to (A) and (D) to be 
largely successful in narrowing the scope of application of the skeptical argument. However, 
even with this success, the skeptical argument still suggests that agents are non-culpable for 
their moral ignorance far more often than we typically think. To avoid this conclusion, we 
must turn to objections to (C). 
I consider three objections to (C). The first is offered by Elinor Mason (2015). She 
agrees with Rosen and Zimmerman that, in one sense of blame, agents are not culpable for 
their moral ignorance if it is not the result of a knowing mismanagement of their moral 
beliefs. However, she argues that there is another sense of blame according to which they 
are culpable for their moral ignorance, even if they developed it unwittingly. The second 
objection to (C) is offered by FitzPatrick (2008). He argues that moral ignorance is culpable 
if it is the result of actions that the agent could have been reasonably expected to avoid, even 
if the agent did not foresee that these actions might lead to his future moral ignorance, or 
that they were otherwise wrongful. The final objection to (C) is offered by Angela Smith 
(2015). She argues that culpable moral ignorance need not be traced to a past, knowing 
mismanagement of one’s moral beliefs, insofar as culpability for moral ignorance need not 
be traced at all. Typically, we trace culpability for X to culpability for past actions in order 
to determine if X reflects an objectionable moral attitude. However, we need not trace in 
order to determine if moral ignorance reflects an objectionable moral attitude; it amounts to 
an objectionable moral attitude.  
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I argue that all of these objections fail to address what I take to be the main motivation 
for (C) the claim that agents are not culpable for their moral ignorance, unless it is the result 
of a knowing mismanagement of their moral beliefs. Unless an agent’s moral ignorance is 
the result of a knowing mismanagement of her moral beliefs, one might think, agents cannot 
be reasonably expected to avoid their moral ignorance, and therefore cannot be fairly 
blamed for it. In order for objections to (C) to be successful, and therefore in order to block 
the disturbing conclusion of the skeptical argument, we must argue against the latter. Doing 
so requires an account of the conditions under which agents can be reasonably expected to 
avoid their moral ignorance, and how this affects their culpability for it. 
 
2.2 The Skeptical Argument 
 
 As noted above, the skeptical argument is developed by Gideon Rosen (2004) and 
Michael Zimmerman (1997, 2008 ch. 4). Both philosophers begin with the claim that an 
agent is culpable for her action performed from moral ignorance only if she is culpable for 
her moral ignorance. Zimmerman (1997, 2008 Ch. 4) holds that this is so because lack of 
ignorance is a “root requirement” for responsibility (424, 177).10  Rosen (2004), on the other 
                                                 
10 Zimmerman (2008) recognizes that this is not an argument for the claim that an agent 
is culpable for his action performed from moral ignorance only if he is also culpable for his 
ignorance (177). He confesses that he’s unsure how to offer an argument for it, and also 
points out that the claim is “deeply imbedded” in our blaming practices (with respect to 
factual ignorance) (178). Moreover, he argues that this cannot be a species of a more general 
claim, that an agent is culpable for an action flowing from mental state M, only if she is 
culpable M as well; if this were true, then agents would only be culpable for acting out of 
anger if they were also culpable for their anger, which seems implausible (177). The 
difference between acting from anger for which one is non-culpable, and acting from moral 
(or factual) ignorance for which one is non-culpable, is that in the former case, one can be 
aware that what one is doing is wrong (2008, 177).   
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hand, argues that it is unreasonable to blame an agent for acting wrongly from blameless 
ignorance, since this would require her to act against her (blamelessly false) all things 
considered judgment about what to do (306).11   
The remainder of the skeptical argument is focused on culpability for moral 
ignorance. Both Zimmerman (1997, 2008 ch. 4) and Rosen (2004) have a broad notion of 
potentially exculpatory moral ignorance in mind: the lack of an occurrent, true belief that 
what one is doing is morally wrong.12 Both also hold that agents are only ever indirectly 
culpable for their moral ignorance; they are only ever culpable for it by way of being 
culpable for something else. Zimmerman (1997) argues that we are only ever indirectly 
culpable for moral ignorance because we only ever have indirect control over it (414-415).13 
We can only bring it about that we have (or lack) a belief by way of doing something else. 
Because “responsibility tracks freedom,” and we only ever have indirect control over our 
moral beliefs, we are only ever indirectly culpable for them (414).14 Therefore, culpability 
for moral ignorance must be traced to some other thing, for which we are directly culpable. 
                                                 
11 In order to judge the accuracy of the claim that  agents are not culpable for their 
actions performed from moral ignorance unless they are also culpable for their moral 
ignorance, we must first determine the conditions under which the latter (if ever) is true. For 
this reason, I set aside the issue of culpability for actions performed from moral ignorance 
until Chapter 4.  
12 Zimmerman (1997) defines potentially exculpatory ignorance as failure to believe the 
truth at the time of acting (417), and in Ch. 4 of  his (2008) book, he expressly states that in 
order to be non-ignorant in the sense required for direct culpability, one must have an 
occurrent belief that what he is doing is morally wrong (191).  Rosen (2004) does not offer a 
defense of this view of potentially exculpatory moral ignorance. Zimmerman (2008) holds 
that agents are directly culpable for actions only if their beliefs play a role in their reasons 
for acting (191). And, he holds that only occurrent beliefs can play such a role (191). As I 
discuss below, Rosen (2008) adopts a slightly different view of potentially exculpatory 
moral ignorance. 
13 Zimmerman (1997) argues that we only have direct control over our decisions (421).  
14 Some challenge the claim that we only have indirect control over our moral beliefs. 
See, e.g., Montmarquet (1999). Zimmerman (2002) answers this objection directly (484-
485). 
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Rosen (2004) uses the term “derivative culpability” to refer to the similar notion that there 
are some things for which we are only culpable by way of being culpable for something else 
(299). We are only ever derivatively culpable for moral ignorance, Rosen (2004) holds, 
because we are “passive” with respect to our moral beliefs; belief formation and revision are 
things that happen to or in us, sometimes by way of our active efforts to bring them about 
(302). Rosen (2004) argues that we are culpable for something with respect to which we are 
passive only if we are directly responsible for something else which gave rise to it (302-
303).15  
 So, both philosophers hold that in order to be culpable for moral ignorance, there 
must be some past action for which the agent is culpable, of which her moral ignorance is 
the result. Rosen (2004) offers a much more detailed account of what shape these past 
actions might take. Taking a lead from negligence law, Rosen points out that agents are not 
culpable for their ignorance simply because they failed to take some measure to prevent it 
(301). This would cast the net of culpability too wide. Instead, they are culpable for it 
insofar as they failed to take reasonable measures to avoid it; i.e. the measures a reasonably 
prudent person in their circumstances would have taken.  With respect to moral ignorance, 
Rosen (2004) suggests that these measures are comprised by what he refers to as our 
“procedural epistemic obligations” (302). He suggests that these are “impossible to codify,” 
but that they include obligations to do (or to refrain from doing) certain things: to ask certain 
questions, to take careful notes, to stop and think, to focus one’s attention in a certain 
                                                 
15 Rosen does not offer an argument for this claim, and recognizes that some might reject 
it, particularly those who believe that we can be directly culpable for our characters. 
However, he maintains that if an agent has done everything an agent should do in order to 
avoid developing a bad character trait, it is unreasonable to hold him to be culpable for it 
(302-303).  
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direction, etc.” (302). If we are culpable for failing to know any truth, Rosen claims, it is 
because we are culpable for having failed to fulfill some of our procedural epistemic 
obligations. As noted above, Zimmerman’s (1997, 2008) account is not nearly as detailed, 
although he seems to have something similar in mind. He suggests that culpability for moral 
ignorance might be traced back to an agent’s carelessness or inconsiderateness 
(Zimmerman, 1997, Pp. 416). 
Rosen and Zimmerman argue that agents are very rarely culpable for their moral 
ignorance, because culpability for it can very rarely be traced to culpability for some past 
failure to manage their moral beliefs. Neither denies that agents fail to pay attention, ask 
questions, to stop and think, or to be considerate or careful. Instead, both hold that it is rare 
that agents do so while knowing they should not. If this is true, then agents are very rarely 
directly culpable for their failure to manage their moral beliefs well; they fail to do so from 
ignorance, and the argument applies all over again. Rosen and Zimmerman claim it is very 
rare for agents to knowingly mismanage their moral beliefs, and therefore, it is very rare that 
agents are culpable for their moral ignorance, and actions performed from it.16  
To illustrate this, consider the following example. Rachel believes that 
homosexuality is morally wrong. She has listened to counter arguments, and sometimes 
even felt their rational pull, but she quickly banished such thoughts, which she believes were 
put in her mind by Satan. According to the skeptical argument, Rachel is culpable for her 
false moral belief (and her actions performed from it) only if it is a result of the knowing 
                                                 
16 Rosen (2004) adds a wrinkle to his argument. He claims that not only is it rare for 
agents to act akratically in this way, but also that we are unable to reliably identify akratic 
actions, and therefore should not be confident in our judgments that an agent acted 
akratically, and is thereby culpable for her action (308). Zimmerman (2008) voices a similar 
concern (190).  
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mismanagement of her moral beliefs. However, this is not clearly the case. Rachel falsely 
believes that she ought to dismiss arguments that conflict with her beliefs about 
homosexuality. So, she mismanages her moral beliefs from ignorance. She is culpable for 
mismanaging her moral beliefs only if she is culpable for this bit of ignorance. She will be 
culpable for it only if it is the result of a knowing mismanagement of her beliefs. This line of 
inquiry will either “bottom out” in such knowing mismanagement, or, as Rosen and 
Zimmerman suggest, will not, in which case we should conclude that she is not culpable for 
her moral ignorance. The latter will be true in the preponderance of cases, according to the 
skeptical argument. 
 
2.3 Existing Objections to the Skeptical Argument: Narrowing Its Application  
The conclusion that agents are rarely culpable for their moral ignorance rests, in part, 
on the claims that (A) agents act from potentially exculpatory moral ignorance if they lack 
occurrent beliefs that their actions are morally wrong, and (D) agents rarely knowingly 
mismanage their moral beliefs. (A) offers a very broad notion of potentially exculpatory 
moral ignorance, and therefore suggests that a host of agents act from potentially 
exculpatory moral ignorance including: those who simply fail to consider the wrongness of 
their actions; those who are undecided about the wrongness of their actions; and those who 
are disposed to believe their actions are wrong, but fail to advert to these beliefs at the time 
of acting. If agents are only culpable for their moral ignorance if they knowingly mismanage 
their moral beliefs, and (D) agents very rarely mismanage their moral beliefs, then the host 
of agents captured by (A) will turn out to be non-culpable.  
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Elizabeth Harman (2011) argues against (A) the claim that lack of a true belief that 
one’s action is morally wrong constitutes potentially exculpatory moral ignorance. In 
particular, she argues that only false beliefs that one’s action is morally permissible are 
potentially exculpatory. The mere absence of an occurrent belief that one’s actions are 
wrong is not. In support of her argument, she offers examples in which agents perform a 
morally wrong action while being uncertain of the wrongness of their action, due to factual 
ignorance (448).17 She considers, e.g., a case in which an agent has .5 credence that the 
substance she is putting in another person’s coffee is poison, and .5 credence it is sugar 
(448). The agent adds the substance despite her uncertainty. Harman (2011) argues that this 
agent is obviously directly culpable for her action; we need not determine whether or not she 
is culpable for her uncertainty in order to know this; she does not act from potentially 
exculpatory ignorance (448). Therefore, Harman argues that one should hold, at most, that 
not ignorance in general, but only false moral belief of the permissibility of one’s action, can 
exculpate (448). 
 This conclusion needs to be both softened and broadened. It is very plausible that 
agents who act with the knowledge that their action poses risk of significant harm to others, 
while lacking a false belief that it is nevertheless justified, do not act from potentially 
exculpatory moral ignorance. However, it is not clear that we should conclude from this that 
false belief in the permissibility of one’s action is the only form potentially exculpatory 
ignorance can take. A proponent of the skeptical argument might argue that we should 
instead conclude that an agent acts from potentially exculpatory moral ignorance if she lacks 
                                                 
17 These examples are based on cases offered by Guerrero (2007). In his paper, Guerrero 
(2007) argues for a number of complex claims, but his overall position is that if an agent is 
unsure of the moral status of an action, and the action risks significant harm to others, then 
the agent should not perform it. 
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a true belief in the wrongfulness of her action, and is not aware that her action poses risk of 
great, unjustified harm to others. 18 There is nothing contradictory about this view, and it 
explains the examples offered by Harman.  
 At the same time, Harman’s (2011) objection can be extended. After all, there are 
many objectionable moral features, such that if an agent is aware her action may have these 
features, but lacks a true belief in the wrongfulness of her action, it is not plausible she acts 
from potentially exculpatory moral ignorance. Included amongst these features is the fact 
that an action is dishonest, unkind, cruel, unfair, and so on. Imagine, for example, that a 
waiter finds a very generous tip on one of his tables. It has been a very busy shift, and he 
cannot recall if he served the patrons at this table, or if the waiter who had the shift before 
him served them. He is aware that keeping the money might be dishonest and unfair, but he 
doesn’t think about the matter long enough to form the belief that it would be wrong to do 
so. He keeps the money. This agent would likely be culpable for his moral ignorance 
according to the skeptical argument, but we need not determine whether or not he is 
culpable for it in order to judge that he is culpable for his action; he does not act from 
potentially exculpatory moral ignorance.  
 Proponents of the skeptical argument need not accept the conclusion that the only 
form of potentially exculpatory moral ignorance is false belief in the permissibility of one’s 
action. However, they must accept a significantly curtailed understanding of potentially 
                                                 
18In a later paper, Rosen (2008) grants that agents who perform actions while being 
aware that they pose risk of great harm to others, while lacking a belief that their actions are 
morally wrong (and, presumably, also lacking a false belief that this behavior is justified), 
do not act from potentially exculpatory moral ignorance. Rosen (2008) suggests that an 
agent performs an action from (potentially exculpatory) ignorance if, at the time of acting, 
she is unaware of the wrong-making features of the action (598). In cases in which an agent 
acts while being aware that her action risks serious harm to others, she does not act in 
ignorance of the wrong-making features of her action; she acts recklessly (598, ftn. 14). 
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exculpatory moral ignorance. Moreover, this modified version of Harman’s (2011) objection 
significantly limits the scope of the skeptical argument. Only in cases in which agents act 
from a false moral belief in the permissibility of their action, or lack a true belief about the 
wrongfulness of their action, and are not aware that their action poses risk of significant 
unjustified harm to others, or that it may be otherwise vicious, do we need to determine if 
the agent is culpable for her moral ignorance in order to determine if she is culpable for her 
action performed from moral ignorance. So, the skeptical argument only applies to such 
cases. In all other cases, we need not determine whether or not an agent is culpable for her 
moral ignorance in order to determine whether she is culpable for her action performed from 
moral ignorance. 
 
 Objections to (D) the claim that agents very rarely knowingly mismanage their moral 
beliefs are similarly successful in limiting the scope of application of the skeptical argument. 
At first blush, (D) seems plausible. After all, it seems that very few individuals want to have 
false beliefs, and most agents would therefore not engage in activities that they believe 
would lead to false beliefs (or lack of true ones). However, upon reflection, it is plausible 
that many agents have a vested interest in having false moral beliefs insofar as doing so 
serves their interests. Moody-Adams (1993) argues that in many cases, agents who hold 
widespread, false moral beliefs benefit from the status quo, and therefore avoid examining 
whether or not the status quo is morally permissible, revealing “an unwillingness to entertain 
the possibility that one might be wrong” (122).19 
                                                 
19 For arguments that culture can in fact render an agent non-culpably ignorant see 
Benson (2001), and Calhoun (1989). Benson (2001) argues that some cultural influences can 
affect the abilities of some agents in such a way as to render them non-responsible for their 
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For example, she argues that agents living in cultures that endorse slavery remain 
ignorant because it is in their interest to be ignorant of the wrongness of slavery. Due to the 
fact that an agent benefits from the practice of slavery, they are reluctant to question or 
revise their beliefs concerning it (Moody-Adams, 1994, p. 301-302). This argument can be 
applied to individuals in sub-cultures as well, and not only to those who stand to gain 
materially through their ignorance (e.g. slave owners), but also to those who are otherwise 
invested in maintaining mistaken moral beliefs. Some individuals may be reluctant to give 
up or adopt a moral belief out of love, loyalty, or because they would otherwise be alienated 
from their communities. For example, an individual who is loyal to a political party, in the 
way a sports fan might be loyal to a team, might ignore arguments that point to the 
reasonableness of opposing views, in order to maintain his or her loyalty to the party. 
Similarly, individuals who are invested in the truth of a particular religion might have a 
vested interest in ignoring or hastily denying evidence that its central tenants are mistaken.  
A plausible interpretation of such agents is that they know their beliefs are, or may 
be mistaken, or that they ought to adopt a particular belief that they lack, but they 
purposefully shield themselves from evidence to this effect. As FitzPatrick points out, this is 
a type of akrasia; agents who behave in this way, act in ways that they know they ought to 
manage their moral beliefs differently, and fail to do so (604). If this is true, then even on 
Rosen’s and Zimmerman’s view, these agents are culpable for their moral ignorance. Insofar 
                                                                                                                                                      
beliefs and actions. Calhoun (1989) argues that cultural ignorance is sometimes not culpable 
due to lack of accessibility of certain advanced ideas. 
 
 
  25 
as it is plausible that many instances of moral ignorance are instances of affected ignorance, 
the skeptical argument applies to a smaller set of cases than Rosen and Zimmerman claim. 
  
 There are perhaps other plausible objections to (A) and (D) that would further 
narrow the scope of application of the skeptical argument. However, on its own, this is not a 
satisfying response to the skeptical argument. Even if we narrow the scope of the argument 
so that it only applies to a small subset of morally ignorant agents, its conclusion is still 
likely to be repugnant. It will still suggest, e.g. that Nazi’ sending Jews to their deaths under 
the false belief that they are complying with their moral duties are potentially non-culpable 
for their actions. To block this possibility, we must consider objections to (C) the claim that 
agents are culpable for their moral ignorance only if it is the result of a knowing 
mismanagement of their moral beliefs. 
 
2.4 Existing Objections to the Skeptical Argument: Culpability and Knowing 
Mismanagement of Moral Beliefs 
There are three main existing objections to the claim that (C) agents are only 
culpable for their moral ignorance if it is the result of knowing mismanagement. (1) Mason 
(2015) argues that agents can be culpable in a special sense for their moral ignorance even if 
they did not develop it knowingly. (2) FitzPatrick (2008) argues that Rosen’s and 
Zimmerman’s condition is too strong, and instead argues that agents can be culpable for 
their moral ignorance if it can be traced back to any act/omission that the agent could have 
been reasonably expected to avoid. (3) Angela Smith (2015) argues that culpability for 
moral ignorance need not be traced back to a knowing mismanagement of one’s moral 
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beliefs, because culpability for moral ignorance does not need to be traced at all. We employ 
tracing, she argues, in order to determine whether or not an agent’s action reflects an 
objectionable moral attitude. In the case of moral ignorance, we need not trace in order to 
determine this; moral ignorance is itself an objectionable moral attitude. I argue that none of 
these objections will be successful unless they are accompanied by an account of what can 
be reasonably expected of an agent, and an argument that agents can be reasonable expected 
to avoid, and fairly blamed for their moral ignorance, even if it was not developed through a 
knowing mismanagement of their moral beliefs. 
 
(1) Mason’s (2015) Objection 
 
Mason (2015) argues that there are two types of blameworthiness: ordinary 
blameworthiness and objective blameworthiness. She agrees with Rosen and Zimmerman 
that agents are not culpable for their moral ignorance, in the sense of ordinary 
blameworthiness, unless the agent developed it by knowingly mismanaging her moral 
beliefs. However, she argues, agents can be culpable for their moral ignorance in the 
“objective sense,” even if they developed it through an unwitting mismanagement of their 
moral beliefs.  
Mason (2015) contrasts objective blameworthiness to ordinary blameworthiness, and 
to the objective attitude (outlined by Strawson (1962)). In order to be blameworthy for some 
action in the ordinary sense, an agent must be a member of the moral community, and must 
be aware, at some level, of the fact that he is doing something wrong at the time of acting 
(Mason, 2015, Pp. 12). Agents who are blameworthy in the ordinary sense have the right 
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moral goals, but do not try hard enough to attain them (Mason, 2015, Pp. 16). When we 
blame someone in the ordinary sense, we set aside considerations of how an agent came to 
be the way she is, and instead focus on her actions, and demand amends for wrongdoing 
(Mason, 2015, Pp. 18-19). In order to be blameworthy for an action in the objective sense, 
an agent must display a “morally obnoxious” attitude that is attributable to him, i.e. that 
“stems from and is connected in some loose (not necessarily conscious) way to the agent’s 
evaluative judgments” (Mason, 2015, Pp. 13). When we blame someone in the objective 
sense, we think of the agent as bad insofar as he is “warped, or deranged, or morally 
twisted”; we do not judge them by how well they conform to our values, but instead, we 
focus “on what they, and their attitudes are like” (Mason, 2015, Pp. 17-18).20 We alienate 
ourselves from them; “we stand back and disapprove, despise, disavow, we do not engage” 
(19). This is in contrast to agents with respect to whom we take up what Strawson (1962) 
coined the “objective attitudes.” We adopt objective attitudes, such as pity and disgust, when 
we consider an agent to be entirely outside the moral community, and a proper target of 
management as opposed to blame. Mason (2015) suggests that we adopt the objective 
attitude when we judge the individual’s actions and attitudes to be a product of their 
circumstances, and therefore not things with respect to which they exercise agency. 
                                                 
20 Mason (2015) distinguishes her notion of objective blame from traditional accounts of 
attributability insofar as on traditional accounts, attributability cannot be undermined by an 
agent’s unfortunate formative circumstances. E.g. on traditional accounts, Robert Harris is 
blameworthy for his actions, insofar as they are attributable to him, regardless of whether he 
became who he was through a history of abuse, or by his own will. Mason (2015) argues 
that objective blame is undermined by unfortunate formative circumstances insofar as such 
circumstances undermine our judgments that the agent is in fact an agent; objective blame is 
a response to agents, and is therefore undermined by unfortunate formative circumstances 
(18).  
  28 
 On Mason’s (2015) view, morally ignorant agents will sometimes be culpable for 
their moral ignorance, and actions performed from it, even if they developed it through an 
unknowing mismanagement of their moral beliefs. They will not be culpable in the ordinary 
sense, since they do not knowingly do wrong. However, she argues that they will sometimes 
be culpable in the objective sense. In particular, agents whose moral ignorance is not 
explained by their formative (or current) circumstances will be culpable for it, and for their 
actions performed from it. Many morally ignorant agents will fit this description. For 
example, contemporary individuals with racist and sexist attitudes will likely fit this 
description; their bad moral attitudes are unexplained by any past or current circumstances, 
and therefore objectively blameworthy. So, while Rosen and Zimmerman might be right that 
such agents are not blameworthy for their actions in the ordinary sense, they are not entirely 
non-culpable for their beliefs and actions, as Rosen’s and Zimmerman’s arguments suggest. 
 
  There are a couple of main concerns one might have with Mason’s (2015) argument. 
Some might argue that Mason’s view lets too many agents off the hook, while others would 
argue that it is unjustifiably stringent. Mason suggests the following relationship between an 
agent’s culpability and her past and/or present circumstances. Sometimes an agent’s past or 
present circumstances render it extremely difficult for her to adopt the correct moral view 
(Mason, 2015, Pp. 20). When this is true, we judge that the agent is not actually an agent 
with respect to this subset of moral beliefs/attitudes; instead she is just a product of her 
environment (Mason, 2015 Pp. 19-20). Mason does not give us a more principled reason to 
accept that unfortunate circumstances undermine agency. While it certainly seems true that 
biological conditions such as disease or mental illness might do so, I think many would balk 
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at the idea that, e.g., widespread cultural acceptance of a practice can render individuals 
non-agents with respect to their beliefs and attitudes concerning the practice.21 At the very 
least, Mason (2015) owes us an explanation of why this would be so.22  
 Alternatively, Rosen would likely reject the notion that agents can be culpable in any 
way for their moral ignorance, or actions performed from it, if they developed it through an 
unwitting mismanagement of their moral beliefs. Indeed Rosen (2008) argues that it is unfair 
to blame an agent for his objectionable moral attitudes (and actions that flow from them) if 
he has done nothing blameworthy (i.e. knowing) to develop them (607). There is no reason 
to think that Rosen would accept that it is fair to blame agents in a different way (i.e. 
objectively) for their moral ignorance and actions performed from it, even if they have not 
knowingly brought it about. Unfortunately, Mason (2015) does not argue otherwise. She 
suggest that we do blame such agents, as long as we do not view them as victims of their 
circumstances, but does not argue that we are justified in doing so. Rosen and Zimmerman 
take themselves to demonstrate that our present blaming practices are misguided, and 
therefore would not be surprised that we blame agents for their moral ignorance, even if they 
developed it unknowingly; they deny that it is fair to do so. We need an argument that it is 
not.  
 
(2) FitzPatrick’s (2008) Objection 
                                                 
21 Mason (2015) holds that it can, and argues that the cultural circumstances of ancient 
slave owners, and sexists in the USA in the 1950’s, rendered them non-agents with respect 
to some of their moral beliefs (19).  
22 Whether or not Mason (2015) is correct about this point does not impact her argument 
against the skeptical argument. Whether agents who face unfortunate formative 
circumstances are rightly understood as agents, does not impact their conclusion that agents 
are almost always non-culpable for their moral ignorance.  
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 FitzPatrick (2008) also rejects the claim that an agent is culpable for his moral 
ignorance, and actions performed from it, only if he developed his ignorance through a 
knowing wrongdoing. Instead, FitzPatrick argues that agents are culpable for their moral 
ignorance, and actions performed from it, if they could have been reasonably expected to 
avoid it. He takes this to be a less demanding requirement for culpability for moral 
ignorance.  
…we do not need to find some relevant past failure done “in full  
knowledge of every pertinent fact or norm”—some akratic episode 
in which the agent knowingly acts with “negligence or recklessness 
in the management of his opinion.” The true condition for culpable  
normative ignorance is weaker…Our question is whether he is culpable 
for the moral ignorance that leads to his bad actions. The natural and 
non-question-begging way to address this question is to ask…What, if 
anything, could the agent reasonably (and hence fairly) have been expected 
to have done in the past to avoid or to remedy that ignorance? (FitzPatrick, 2008, 
pg. 603) 
 
 FitzPatrick (2008) suggests that an agent can be reasonably expected to avoid his 
moral ignorance if he had the mental capacities required for doing so, and did not face any 
significant social or personal obstacles in doing so. If these conditions are met, and the agent 
develops moral ignorance anyway, FitzPatrick (2008) suggests that this is due to “…akrasia 
or due to the culpable, nonakratic exercise of vices such as overconfidence, arrogance, 
dismissiveness, laziness, dogmatism, incuriosity, self-indulgence, contempt, and so on” 
(609).  
 He illustrates his view, and contrasts it to Rosen’s, through an example of Mr. Potter 
from It’s a Wonderful Life. Potter is a ruthless businessman who takes advantage of the 
desperate situation of the poor in his town by leasing crumbling homes to them at high rents. 
Potter sees no problem in doing this, and throughout the film celebrates and savors his gains 
at the expense of others. On the skeptical view, it is likely that Mr. Potter is not culpable for 
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his moral ignorance of fair and acceptable business practices. Potter falsely believes that his 
actions are justified, and it is unlikely that he developed these false beliefs through some 
action which he fully understood to be a wrongful mismanagement of his moral beliefs. 
However, FitzPatrick (2008) argues that the skeptical view is mistaken. Potter is culpable for 
his moral ignorance and actions performed from it, not because he developed it through 
some past akratic action, but because: 
Potter could reasonably have been expected, in the circumstances, 
to take steps that would have corrected his moral ignorance and  
improved his character but that he instead chose to behave in ways  
that merely indulged and reinforced his character defects. By doing  
so, he thus incurred responsibility both for continued exercises of 
those dispositions (as well as their becoming hardened in his character) 
and for the normative ignorance that was preserved or grew and eventually 
led to the bad business practices we were originally concerned with 
(FitzPatrick, 2008, pg. 608).  
 
 A number of philosophers have responded to FitzPatrick’s argument. Harman (2011) 
argues many agents may do everything that they could be reasonably expected to do in order 
to avoid their moral ignorance, and yet fail to avoid it (455). In fact, she thinks this is true 
with respect to most cases of moral ignorance. Ethics, as Harman (2011) puts it, is hard 
(455). If she is right, even if we grant that agents are culpable for their moral ignorance if 
they could have been reasonably expected to avoid it, this condition will not be met in most 
cases, and FitzPatrick’s argument would not seriously challenge the skeptical argument. 
It is possible that this objection could be addressed by a better, more detailed account 
of the conditions under which an agent can be reasonably expected to avoid her moral 
ignorance. Such an account would, I think, suggest that agents in the cases Harman has in 
mind could be reasonably expected to avoid their moral ignorance. However, even if such an 
account were offered, FitzPatrick’s (2008) general view faces a significant objection from 
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Rosen (2004) and Levy (2009). 23 They hold that as long as an agent has not knowingly 
mismanaged her moral beliefs, she could not be reasonably expected to avoid her moral 
ignorance. Such agents do not do anything they believe to be morally wrong when managing 
their moral beliefs, nor do they fail to do anything they believe they ought to do with respect 
to them. Instead, they manage their moral beliefs in exactly the way they believe they ought. 
In order to avoid developing their moral ignorance, they would either have to act against 
their own best judgment, or they would have to do something they see no reason to do. It is 
not reasonable to expect an agent to act in either manner, and therefore it is not reasonable to 
expect an agent to avoid her moral ignorance, unless she developed it unknowingly. If this is 
right, then even if FitzPatrick is right that agents are culpable for their moral ignorance as 
long as they could have been reasonably expected to avoid it, Rosen and Zimmerman are 
also right that all culpable moral ignorance must “bottom out” in an akratic action/knowing 
mismanagement of one’s moral beliefs.  
In fact, I think this argument is mistaken; it is not unreasonable to expect an agent to 
do what seems irrational from her own perspective. However, in order to argue for this 
claim, we need a specific account of the conditions under which an agent can be reasonably 
expected to avoid X.  
 
(3)Angela Smith’s (2015) Objection 
                                                 
23 See Rosen (2004), pgs. 602-603. Levy (2009) argues for these claims at length, in 
response to FitzPatrick’s (2008) argument that agents are culpable for their moral ignorance 
if it can be traced to some past action which they could have been reasonably expected to 
avoid. Levy (2009) accepts this claim, but argues that agents cannot be reasonably expected 
to avoid their moral ignorance unless it was developed through a knowing mismanagement 
of their moral beliefs.  
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I’d like to consider one final objection to the claim that (C) agents are culpable for their 
moral ignorance only if it is the result of a past, knowing failure to manage their moral 
beliefs well. This objection is raised by Angela Smith (2015). Unlike the other two 
objections considered to this claim, Smith (2015) does not focus on the claim that agents 
must knowingly mismanage their moral beliefs in order to be culpable for their resulting 
moral ignorance, but on the more general claim that culpability for moral ignorance must be 
traced to culpability for some past action. Her target is not Rosen’s and Zimmerman’s 
argument, but the more general view that an agent’s culpability for her moral attitudes must 
be traced to her culpability for some past voluntary act or omission. However, her objection 
is easily applied to the skeptical argument. 
  
Typically, we employ tracing to explain why agents are culpable for their actions 
over which they lacked voluntary control. For example, we trace culpability for drunk 
driving to culpability for drinking recklessly. Smith (2015) argues that the justification for 
tracing in such cases is that actions over which an agent lacks voluntary control, do not 
obviously reflect her practical judgments; it is as if the movements of one’s body just 
happens to her (124).  In order for an agent to be culpable in a case in which he lacks 
voluntary control over his actions, it must be possible to trace in order to “find a judgment-
sensitive locus of responsibility that links the agent to the thing for which he is being 
morally criticized” (Smith, 2015, pg. 124). E.g. in the case of a drunk driver, we hold the 
agent to be culpable because her action of deciding to drink without ensuring in advance that 
she will not harm others while drunk, reflects an objectionable attitude (i.e. a lack of concern 
for others). Smith (2015) argues that this justification for tracing does not apply to attitudes. 
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Attitudes, “by their very nature, are judgment-sensitive states, so there is no need to try to 
‘trace back’ to some other judgment-sensitive locus of responsibility” (124).  
 The skeptical argument holds that we must trace culpability for moral ignorance to 
past, knowing mismanagement of one’s moral beliefs. Rosen’s and Zimmerman’s support 
for this claim rests on the claim that we can never be directly culpable for our moral beliefs, 
but only for the actions that result in them. Smith’s (2015) argument can be taken as an 
objection to the latter claim. On her view, our moral beliefs (or lack thereof) constitute or 
embody objectionable practical judgments, so there is no need to trace culpability for them 
to culpability for past actions. It is certainly be true that false moral beliefs, and some 
instances of moral ambivalence, constitute objectionable moral attitudes. E.g., a false belief 
that it is permissible to torture animals constitutes an objectionable practical judgment, and 
ambivalence over whether or not it is permissible to torture animals embodies our practical 
judgments, particularly about the worth of non-human animals. This is less clear with 
respect to the lack of a true moral belief. E.g. it seems like we must trace in order to 
determine what the lack of a true belief that one’s discipline methods are too harsh, reflects 
about him.24 However, even if we only grant that we need not trace in order to determine 
that an agent is culpable for false moral beliefs, or for some instances of moral ambivalence, 
Smith’s (2015) argument still presents a powerful objection to the skeptical argument. Many 
cases of moral ignorance are ones in which an agent acts from either a false moral belief or 
moral ambivalence. 
                                                 
24 If, e.g., it just never occurred to a mother to question the appropriateness of her 
discipline methods, we might think this reflects a lack of due care for her children, but, 
depending on the circumstances, we may not. 
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 A proponent of the skeptical argument might argue that this understanding of the 
justification of tracing is mistaken. Instead one could offer an alternative account, drawn 
from Rosen’s (2004) and Levy’s (2009) argument discussed above. One could argue that the 
reason we must trace culpability for moral ignorance, to culpability for a past action, is not 
to locate a judgment-sensitive locus of responsibility, but instead to determine whether or 
not an agent could have been reasonably expected to avoid her moral ignorance. The agent 
is culpable for her moral ignorance only if the latter is true.25 If we must trace culpability for 
moral ignorance to a past, culpable action, then we must trace in cases of moral ignorance, 
and moreover, as the skeptical argument suggests, we must trace culpability to a past, 
knowing mismanagement of one’s moral beliefs. 
 Defending either this view or Smith’s (2015) view, again, requires that we have an 
account of the conditions under which agents can be reasonably expected to avoid their 
moral ignorance, and its relationship to their culpability for it. 
 
2.5 Moving Forward 
 I have not argued in this chapter that the skeptical argument (and thereby the 
skeptical view) is mistaken. Instead, I have argued that we either must settle for narrowing 
its scope of application, or we must effectively argue against that claim that agents are 
culpable for their moral ignorance only if it is the result of a knowing mismanagement of 
their moral beliefs. Objections to the latter fail insofar as they fail to address the claims on 
                                                 
25 As noted above, Rosen (2004) argues that we must trace culpability for moral 
ignorance to a knowing mismanagement of one’s moral beliefs because, if the latter is 
impossible, then an agent could not have been reasonably expected to avoid her moral 
ignorance (302). In a later article, Rosen (2008) argues that it is unfair to hold agents 
culpable for what happens to them, in absence of previous (knowing) wrongdoing (609). So, 
I think this understanding of the justification of tracing is consistent with his view.  
  36 
which the latter rests: agents can be reasonably expected to avoid their moral ignorance only 
if it is the result of a knowing mismanagement of their moral beliefs, and agents are only 
culpable for their moral ignorance if they could have been reasonably expected to avoid it.  
Evaluating these claims, I hold, requires an account of the conditions under which an agent 
can be reasonably expected to avoid X, and how this affects their culpability for X. 
 Some might wonder if such an account is in fact necessary. Some might argue that 
the claim that an agent could not be reasonably expected to avoid X, simply amounts to the 
claim that she is not culpable for not X’ing. If this is true, then it is a mistake, of course, to 
attempt to build an account of culpability for moral ignorance on an account of the 
conditions under which an agent could be reasonably expected to avoid it. However, the 
reasonableness of an expectation, and an agent’s culpability with respect to it are distinct. If 
the claim that an agent could not be reasonably expected to avoid X, simply amounts to the 
claim that he is not culpable for Xing, it should also be the case that if an agent can be 
reasonably expected to avoid X, she is culpable for Xing. But, this is not true. We can be 
non-culpable for doing that which we could be reasonably expected to avoid. For example, 
we can reasonably expect a fully-abled adult to avoid eating so much that his stomach aches. 
However, it does not follow from this that he is culpable for eating that much, if he has no 
obligation not to do so, and doing so is not otherwise morally wrong. Moreover, non-moral 
expectations can be reasonable or unreasonable. E.g. it might be unreasonable to expect 
students to refrain from all spelling and grammar mistakes. But, this does not amount to 
saying that they are not morally culpable for failing to do so.  
Alternatively, one might wonder why we need to spell out the conditions under 
which an agent can be reasonably expected to avoid X. One might think we have a good 
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intuitive grasp of what can be reasonably expected of an agent, or that we could look to the 
legal literature for an account of reasonable expectations. However, we are often conflicted 
concerning what an agent could be reasonably expected to do. E.g. it is not clear whether we 
can reasonably expect an agent to do something that seems irrational to her, or that we can 
reasonably expect agents with very unfortunate formative backgrounds to avoid false moral 
beliefs. The account of reasonable expectations offered from the legal perspective relies on 
our intuitions about what a reasonable person, in the specific circumstances of the agent in 
question, would do. Moreover, it is not clear that an account of what can be reasonably 
expected of a member of a political community is the same as what can be reasonably 
expected of a moral agent. 
I argue in Chapter 3 that evaluating culpability views also requires an account of 
reasonable moral expectations and their relationship to culpability. Such an account is the 
proper focal point of the debate, and moving forward requires that we offer one.  
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Chapter 3 
                  Culpability Views 
 
3.1 Unwavering Culpability for Moral Ignorance 
Participants in the moral ignorance debate tend to take up one of two extreme 
positions concerning agents’ culpability for their moral ignorance. They either claim that 
agents are almost never culpable for their moral ignorance (skeptical view), or that agents 
are almost always culpable for it (culpability views). In the last chapter, I argued that the 
skeptical view fails to capture our intuitions concerning culpability for moral ignorance, and 
is inadequately defended. In this chapter, I focus on culpability views, and argue that they 
face similar problems. 
Proponents of culpability views argue that agents are almost always directly culpable 
for their “pure” moral ignorance—i.e. moral ignorance not rooted in non-culpable factual 
ignorance. Culpability for pure moral is independent of culpability for any acts or omissions 
that contributed to it. This is because pure moral ignorance almost always manifests an 
objectionable moral attitude, and we are always directly culpable for such attitudes and the 
beliefs (or lack thereof) through which they are manifested.  
In what follows, I consider two prominent culpability views. The first is offered by 
Elizabeth Harman (2011, 2014). She argues that pure moral ignorance always manifests a 
failure to care sufficiently about things of moral significance. We are always directly 
culpable for failing to care sufficiently about things of moral significance, and for beliefs (or 
lack thereof) which manifest this failure. We are therefore always directly culpable for our 
pure moral ignorance. The second culpability view, the non-volitional culpability view, is 
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drawn from non-volitional views of blame (defended by Scanlon (1998), Hieronymi (2004), 
and Angela Smith (over a series of papers)). Proponents of these views endorse one of the 
two following views of blame. (A) Blame is comprised of a judgment that an agent has an 
objectionable moral attitude (or holds beliefs that manifest an objectionable moral attitude). 
Or, (B) when we blame an agent for X, we demand that the agent defend the moral attitudes 
manifested by X. On (A), blame is justified if it is true that the agent has an objectionable 
moral attitude, or manifested an objectionable moral attitude in her actions or beliefs, and 
given our evidence, we are justified in making this judgment. On (B), blame is justified if 
the agent cannot defend the moral attitudes manifested by X, which will be true if they are, 
in fact, objectionable. Proponents of non-volitional views of blame are committed to non-
volitional culpability views concerning moral ignorance. Because pure moral ignorance 
almost always manifests an objectionable moral attitude, agents are almost always 
justifiably blamed for it.  
I take it that much is appealing about culpability views’ position that agents can be 
directly culpable for their moral ignorance. In holding this, culpability views accommodate 
our intuitions that agents are culpable for their moral ignorance, not only because it is the 
result of mismanagement of their moral beliefs, but because of the nature of their moral 
ignorance itself. For example, we might rightfully blame an agent who holds racist beliefs in 
the face of obvious countervailing evidence. However, she is culpable not only because she 
has mismanaged her moral beliefs, but because her beliefs are morally offensive—they 
manifest a failure to respect other human beings. Moreover, barring any abnormal 
circumstances (e.g. that the agent was brainwashed and holds her beliefs as a result), it is 
plausible that she would be culpable for her racist beliefs even if they were not the result of 
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a mismanagement of her moral beliefs; she is culpable for them simply in virtue of their 
offensive nature. 
At the same time, the claim that agents are almost always culpable for their pure 
moral ignorance insofar as it manifests an objectionable moral attitude, is not as appealing. 
Many tend to think that how an agent came to hold her false moral beliefs (or to lack true 
ones) is relevant to her culpability for it. In particular, given the circumstances under which 
an agent forms her moral ignorance (e.g. against the backdrop of very unfortunate formative 
circumstances), she is sometimes non-culpable for it. This is not something that proponents 
of culpability views can accept. The circumstances under which an agent came to be morally 
ignorant do not bear on the fact that pure moral ignorance manifests a failure to care 
sufficiently about something of moral significance. Therefore these circumstances do not 
bear on an agent’s culpability for her moral ignorance, according to Harman’s view. 
Similarly, the circumstances under which one came to be morally ignorant do not bear on 
whether or not her moral ignorance manifests objectionable moral attitudes. They therefore 
do not bear on the truth of our judgment that an agent’s moral ignorance manifests 
objectionable moral attitudes, or on the ability of the agent to defend these attitudes. So too, 
according to non-volitional culpability views, the circumstances under which an agent came 
to be morally ignorant do not bear on her culpability for her moral ignorance. 
 
In what follows, I neither defend nor object to the claim that agents can be directly 
culpable for their moral ignorance. Instead, I argue against the claim that agents are almost 
always culpable for their pure moral ignorance, insofar as it almost always manifests an 
objectionable moral attitude or failure to care sufficiently about things of moral significance. 
  41 
In particular, I challenge the imbedded claims that (1) pure moral ignorance always 
manifests a lack of sufficient care or an objectionable moral attitude, and (2) that when pure 
moral ignorance manifests a lack of sufficient care or an objectionable moral attitude, it is 
thereby always culpable.  
I argue that Harman is mistaken in holding that pure moral ignorance always 
manifests a failure to care about things of moral significance. On a sufficiently complex 
understanding of human psychology and the phenomenon of caring for something, agents 
may care sufficiently about things of moral significance, but fail to form true moral beliefs 
about them. At best, it is the case that pure moral ignorance very often manifests a failure to 
care sufficiently about things of moral significance. Proponents of non-volitional culpability 
views are not committed to the claim that pure moral ignorance always manifests an 
objectionable moral attitude, and I argue that they are in a good position to defend the claim 
that moral ignorance almost always does so. But, even they must grant that there are more 
exceptions to this rule than they might originally be apt to admit.  
Of much greater concern is (2) the claim that when pure moral ignorance manifests 
an insufficient care or an objectionable moral attitude, it is thereby always culpable.  
Harman and proponents of non-volitional culpability views fail to fully defend (2). I argue 
that it is plausible that some agents cannot be reasonably expected to care sufficiently about 
things of moral significance, or to refrain from holding objectionable moral attitudes. When 
this is true, it is plausible that agents are non-culpable for their lack of sufficient care, or 
objectionable moral attitudes, and for beliefs (or lack thereof) which manifest them.  
In order to defend (2) against these objections, proponents of culpability views must 
defend one of two further claims. They must either defend (i) the claim that agents can 
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always be reasonably expected to care sufficiently about things of moral significance or to 
avoid holding objectionable attitudes, or (ii) the claim that agents can be culpable for that 
which they could not be reasonably expected to avoid. Defending either claim requires an 
account of the conditions under which an agent can be reasonably expected to X, and the 
relationship between whether or not an agent can be reasonably expected to X and her 
culpability for X’ing (or for not X’ing). I offer such an account in Chapter 4, where I argue 
that (i) and (ii) are indefensible, and therefore that culpability views are also indefensible in 
their current formulations. 
 
3.2  Harman’s Culpability View 
Elizabeth Harman (2011, 2014) develops her culpability view in response to the 
skeptical views of Rosen and Zimmerman, discussed in Chapter 2.26 She rejects the notion 
that agents are only ever indirectly culpable for their moral ignorance, and instead holds that 
false moral beliefs can be the loci of original culpability. There are moral norms that govern 
not only the management of our beliefs, but also norms that govern our beliefs themselves 
(Harman, 2011, p. 459). The core premises of Harman’s argument are (1) “Beliefs (and 
failures to believe) are blameworthy if they involve inadequately caring about what is 
morally significant [and also relevant to our actions],” and (2) pure moral ignorance always 
involves inadequately caring about what is morally significant.27 From these two premises, 
Harman concludes (3) that pure moral ignorance is always culpable. 
                                                 
26 In both articles, Harman defends a complex view concerning culpability for moral 
ignorance, and culpability for actions performed from moral ignorance. I discuss only the 
former in this chapter.  
27 See Harman (2011) p. 460, and Harman (2014), p. 13. Harman does not believe we are 
blameworthy for lacking beliefs about things that are not at all relevant to our actions. E.g., I 
  43 
 Premise (1) involves two separate claims: (a) beliefs (and lack thereof) sometimes 
involve a failure to care sufficiently about things of moral significance, and (b) agents are 
culpable for their beliefs when they involve such a failure. In support of (a), Harman (2011, 
2014) argues that holding a belief by way of some consideration, is a way of caring about 
that consideration (460, 14). For example, believing that it is wrong to use animals to test the 
safety of cosmetics, based on the consideration that doing so causes animals undue 
suffering, is a way of caring about the undue suffering of animals. We form (or fail to form) 
moral beliefs based on our consideration of features of the moral landscape. Because of this, 
our moral beliefs (or lack thereof) can involve a failure to care sufficiently about these 
features.  
It is not clear what Harman has in mind by a belief “involving” a failure to care 
sufficiently about something of moral significance. There are at least three things she might 
have in mind. She might have in mind that a belief (or lack thereof) is caused by a failure to 
care sufficiently about something of moral significance. E.g., she argues that Huck Finn 
does not care sufficiently about Jim’s humanity because his care for it does not move him to 
form a true moral belief about it (Harman, 2014, p. 20). It is also possible that she holds that 
a belief (or lack thereof) reflects or expresses a failure to care sufficiently. Alternatively, she 
may hold that a belief (or lack thereof) is an instantiation of a lack of sufficient care. E.g. in 
her example of a Mafioso who believes it is morally right to kill an innocent shop keeper 
(discussed directly below), she states that to hold this false moral belief is “to hold that the 
                                                                                                                                                      
have no belief concerning the morality of a senator reading every letter of every bill that 
comes across her desk. Because this is not at all relevant to my own actions, on Harman’s 
view, I am not blameworthy for lacking a moral belief with respect to it. For the remainder 
of the dissertation, I will assume this qualification when discussing Harman’s view, and will 
not explicitly reference it.  
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shop owner’s life is cheap and can permissibly be sacrificed to his family’s own goals,” i.e. 
it is to care insufficiently about it (Harman, 2014, p. 14). Her view that believing something 
based on a consideration is “way of caring about it,” also suggests a reading on which our 
beliefs about something are instantiations of our care about it. I refer to beliefs as 
“manifesting” insufficient care, in order to capture all of these senses in which a belief might 
“involve” a lack of sufficient care about something of moral significance.  
When a belief (or lack thereof) does manifest a lack of sufficient care, Harman holds 
we are culpable for it insofar as we are always culpable for failing to care sufficiently about 
things of moral significance, and for manifestations of this lack of care. Harman does not 
offer a defense of this claim, but she does point out that our intuitions suggest that agents are 
always culpable for failing to care sufficiently about things of moral significance. E.g., she 
points out that we are inclined to hold psychopaths to be culpable for failing to care 
sufficiently about others, even if we grant that they are unable to do so, given their 
psychological constitution (Harman, 2014, p. 20).28  
 Harman also does not offer a sustained defense of (2) the claim that pure moral 
ignorance always manifests a failure to care sufficiently about things of moral significance.29 
However, she offers examples in support of it. As noted above, in one of her examples, a 
mafia member kills a shop owner who refuses to pay a weekly extortion fee (Harman, 2014, 
p. 10-11). The Mafioso falsely believes he is doing the right thing insofar as he is acting to 
                                                 
28 Harman argues that if psychopaths are non-culpable for their lack of sufficient care, 
this is because there may be a requirement on responsibility (i.e. for counting as a 
responsible agent) which they fail to meet—“the ability to be moved by any moral 
considerations at all” (20). 
29 This will of course be true if Harman holds that in order to care sufficiently about 
something of moral significance, we must hold true moral beliefs with respect to it. It is not 
completely clear that she does in fact hold this to be true. See my discussion of her analysis 
of Huck Finn below. 
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protect the financial well being of his own group. This man’s beliefs manifest a failure to 
care sufficiently about something of moral significance, i.e. the shopkeeper’s life. She 
believes that all pure moral ignorance will manifest such a failure. This is in contrast to 
moral ignorance that is based on non-culpable factual ignorance, which Harman (2014) 
holds will not manifest a failure to care sufficiently about something of moral significance 
(13-14). E.g., if it is someday established that even embryos experience pain, then the belief 
that it is permissible to perform very early term abortions without administering embryonic 
anesthesia or other pain relief, may turn out to be false. However, this false moral belief will 
not manifest a failure to care sufficiently about fetal pain.   
If Harman is right, then whether or not an agent is culpable for his pure moral 
ignorance is not, as proponents of the Skeptical Argument claim, simply a matter of whether 
or not he has fulfilled his obligations to manage his moral beliefs well. On her view, agents 
are culpable for their moral ignorance (at least) because it manifests a failure to care 
sufficiently about something of moral significance, and this is true even if one has managed 
her moral beliefs well, since one can manage his beliefs well, and still arrive at the wrong 
conclusion. In fact, Harman (2011) argues that this happens quite often. She holds that it is 
true of “most (if not all) ordinary moral claims” that an agent may do everything we could 
reasonably expect of him in order to avoid moral ignorance (i.e. he may manage his moral 
beliefs well), and yet “come to deeply false moral views” (455). For example, “for many 
business practices that are in fact reprehensibly ruthless, we can find plenty of 
businesspeople ready to offer elaborate, sustained, and serious moral defenses of them” 
(Harman, 2011, p. 454). Moreover, these individuals often, “have thought carefully about 
the questions at issue and they have not violated any procedural norms” (Harman, 2011, p. 
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454). However, the fact that one has thought carefully about whether or not his ruthless 
business practices are justified does not entail that his beliefs do not manifest a failure to 
care sufficiently about things of moral significance.  
 
3.3 Objections to Harman’s View 
 Existing objections to Harman’s argument target both premises of it: (2) pure moral 
ignorance always manifests a failure to care about things of moral significance, and (1) 
beliefs (and lack thereof) are culpable when they manifest a failure to care sufficiently about 
things of moral significance. Wieland (2015) argues against (2) the claim that pure moral 
ignorance always manifests a failure to care about things of moral significance. Existing 
objections to (1) are grounded in claims about an agent’s epistemic situation. Harman (2014) 
points out that some might argue that sometimes false moral beliefs are justified and 
therefore non-culpable, even if they do reflect a failure to care sufficiently about things of 
moral significance. Others (e.g. Wieland (2015)) argue that not all agents are in an epistemic 
position that enables them to form true moral beliefs; some agents lack access to evidence 
that counts in favor of true moral beliefs. If this is right, some might argue that such agents 
are non-culpable for failing to form true moral beliefs, even if this manifests a failure to care 
sufficiently about things of moral significance.  
 I think Wieland (2015) is right to reject (2); pure moral ignorance does not always 
manifest a failure to care about things of moral significance. However, I do not think the 
example he offers to motivate this objection is convincing. Instead, I argue that it is 
plausible that agents who are morally ignorant due to justifiable confusion or ambivalence 
about what actions they ought to perform, do not thereby manifest a failure to care 
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sufficiently about things of moral significance. Additionally, psychological conditions (e.g. 
self-deception) can interfere with an agent forming a true moral belief about things for 
which she cares sufficiently. In light of this, I argue that at best, it is the case that moral 
ignorance very often manifests a failure to care sufficiently about things of moral 
significance. 
 I argue that objections to (1) that focus on the epistemic situation of the agent are 
largely unsuccessful. Although some agents do hold justified false moral beliefs, it is not 
obvious that they are non-culpable for doing so. And, I argue it is implausible that agents 
ever lack access to evidence that would enable them to form true moral beliefs. However, 
(1) is likely mistaken for a different reason. Sometimes agents cannot be reasonably 
expected to care sufficiently about things of moral significance, and thereby to hold moral 
beliefs which manifest sufficient care. When this is true, it is not plausible that agents are 
culpable for their pure moral ignorance, even if it does manifest a failure to care sufficiently 
about things of moral significance. 
  
Objections to (2)  
Wieland (2015) argues that Harman is mistaken in claiming that pure moral 
ignorance always manifests a failure to care sufficiently about something of moral 
significance. To motivate this claim, he offers the following example of an Ancient Greek 
slave holder. 
  Case 3** Cleo keeps two slaves and forces them to work for 
her without pay. Cleo is ignorant that this is wrong because  
she is ignorant that slavery is wrong. She has made a serious  
attempt to determine whether slavery is wrong, and collected  
all the non-moral facts about the issue (she knows that they suffer,  
that she could have been a slave herself if she were unlucky enough,  
  48 
etc.). It is not the case that Cleo keeps slaves because she wants  
them to suffer. Nor is she indifferent to their suffering: she is aware  
of it and feels sympathy with the slaves. Still, she did not succeed in  
drawing the inference that slavery is wrong because of the limited  
social context, and concluded that it was permissible (Wieland, 2015, p. 8-9). 
 
Wieland’s example is not fine-grained enough to be a counter-example to Harman’s 
view. In order for this example to be a counter-example to Harman’s view, Cleo’s failure to 
draw the conclusion that slavery is wrong must not be based on non-culpable factual 
ignorance. E.g. it must not be the case that she non-culpably believes that given the fact that 
slaves are barbarians, they are not fit for anything other than servitude, or that the suffering 
slaves experience in virtue of being slaves is relatively minor—e.g. that it is comparable to 
the suffering that anyone who works in a service sector might experience.30 Additionally, in 
order to be a counter-example to Harman’s view, Wieland’s example must be fleshed out so 
that it is plausible that Cleo cares sufficiently about the suffering of her slaves. E.g. it cannot 
be the case that she thinks to herself that slaves are just as fit for self-determination as any 
free person, that slavery imposes serious suffering on slaves, but that it promotes the 
prosperity of Athenian Elite, and frees her from the burdens of housework, so it is 
justified.31 Were this the case, then her failure to conclude that slavery is wrong would 
                                                 
30 It is plausible that some Greeks may have been non-culpable in holding this belief. 
Vlassopoulos (2010) points out that a large portion of the Ancient slave population: 
engaged in professional activities that took them out of the household,  
whether they were working with their masters or on their own. We  
know of slaves who worked together with their masters as potters or  
builders and others who worked on their own as bankers, perfume  
makers or shoemakers. These slaves participated in joint activities  
together with other free and slave persons (11).  
31 I am assuming here that Cleo would wholehearted endorse her conclusion. This line of 
reasoning would not be outlandish for an Ancient Athenian. Finely (1998) and Scheidel 
(2005) hypothesize that economic reasons were the driving force behind slavery in Athens, 
and in particular that labor shortage and demand motivated the practice. Finely (1998) 
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suggest that she believes that the economic ease and prosperity of the Athenian Elite 
justifies the imposition of serious suffering upon slaves. It would then be implausible that 
she cares sufficiently about slaves’ suffering.  
Below is a rendering of Wieland’s example in which Cleo’s moral ignorance is not 
rooted in non-culpable factual ignorance, and in which it is at least initially plausible that 
she cares sufficiently about the suffering of slaves. 
Cleo4: Cleo knows all the relevant non-moral facts about slavery. She knows that 
slaves are generally captured in war, and are forced to leave their homes and perform 
free labor. She believes that slaves are just as fit to live a life of self-determination as 
any free individuals, and while she believes that slavery contributes to the economic 
prosperity of Athens, she does not believe that it is required for it. She believes that 
slavery causes slaves to suffer, and she deeply sympathizes with their suffering. She 
wishes for their sakes that slavery did not exist. She has made a serious attempt to 
determine if slavery is permissible. While she believes it is morally wrong to harm 
slaves in ways other than forcing them to perform free labor (e.g. beating them, 
berating them, denying them food or water, and so on), she ultimately agrees with 
the prevailing view. As long as some people have power, and others lack it, the 
powerless will be exploited by the powerful. Being a slave is a result of bad luck, 
and is unfortunate for slaves, but the practice of slavery is not unjust or otherwise 
wrongful. 
 
 Cleo4’s moral ignorance concerns whether or not it is permissible to kidnap, forcibly 
subjugate a group of individuals, and exploit them for their labor (in foreign lands), much to 
their own suffering. When put in these terms, it is difficult to accept the characterization of 
                                                                                                                                                      
argues that the abolition of debt-bondage in the early 6th century resulted in slavery being 
the sole source of exploitable labor (157-158). Scheidel (2005) argues that as Athenian 
citizens gained more civic and military responsibilities,  
the combination of high time-commitments of fairly closed citizen- 
populations, commercial and/or expansionist  opportunities, maritime  
access to slave markets in Asia Minor, the northern Aegean (Thrace)  
and the Black Sea region, and the lack of readily exploitable neighbors  
may well have been instrumental in precipitating the intrusion of chattel  
slavery into all sectors of the economy (11). 
In Politics 1253b24−54a13, Aristotle emphasizes the importance of slavery in 
making leisure possible. 
  50 
Cleo4 as caring sufficiently about the suffering of slaves while failing to draw the 
conclusion that slavery is wrong. This is particularly true given Wieland’s stipulation that 
Cleo has thought seriously about the permissibility of slavery. 
 A sympathetic reading of Wieland may be that he believes that our cultural and 
historical settings can limit our moral imaginations in ways that cause us to form false moral 
beliefs (or to fail to form true ones), even when we care sufficiently about things of moral 
significance. But, I am not convinced that this is a plausible explanation of Cleo4’s moral 
ignorance.32 The most plausible reason that Cleo4’s imagination with respect to slavery 
                                                 
32 Whether or not cultural and historical contexts ever limit our moral imaginations is an 
empirical question, and not one I will explore at length here. This is mainly because I think 
that if cultural and historical contexts sometimes limit agents’ moral imaginations in a way 
that renders them non-culpable for their moral ignorance, this is likely because they limit an 
agent’s access to factual knowledge. If this is right, then moral ignorance that is the result of 
one’s moral imagination being limited by her cultural and historical contexts will be rooted 
in non-culpable factual ignorance, and will therefore not pose a problem for Harman’s 
account. E.g. given our historical context, we may be limited in our ability to imagine the 
possible future uses and effects of nanotechnology, and therefore may lack true moral 
beliefs concerning it. But, in this instance, our moral ignorance would be based in non-
culpable factual ignorance and would therefore be non-culpable even on Harman’s view. 
Alternatively, sometimes our position within a culture limits our moral imaginations in other 
ways that render us non-culpably factually ignorant, and this factual ignorance sometimes 
results in non-culpable moral ignorance. E.g. perhaps individuals of the middle, upper 
middle, and upper economic classes in the United States must experience the stress and 
insecurity of being poor in order to fully appreciate the urgency of addressing economic 
inequality in the U.S. However, individuals in higher economic classes in the U.S. are 
shielded from the realities of poverty in the U.S. due to their economic privilege. So, one 
might think that the evidence these individuals need in order to form true moral beliefs about 
the urgency of addressing poverty is inaccessible to them. If such agents are non-culpable 
for their moral ignorance, this is because they are non-culpable for their factual ignorance. 
Again, this is consistent with Harman’s view. Calhoun (1989) argues that there are other 
types of situations in which our cultural or historical contexts may render agents non-
culpably morally ignorant due to the fact that they render agents non-culpably factually 
ignorant. She focuses on cases in which members of disenfranchised groups in a society 
(e.g. women, people of color) make significant moral advances (based on factual 
revelations—e.g. that science has a male bias) that take time to reach the broader population.  
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might be limited by her cultural and historical context, is explained by Vlassopoulos (2010). 
He argues that, despite their impressive imaginations, many Ancient Greeks could not 
imagine a world without slavery (2). He argues that this was because  
  Douleia [a main Greek term for the relationship between slaves and  
masters] for them was not a relationship of property which could be 
abolished by legislative fiat; rather it defined a situation in which  
an individual or a community was under the power of another  
individual or community. Douleia is the pragmatic result of the 
fact that there exists inequality of power and wealth among individuals  
and communities. Some people are douloi, because there are others  
who have the wealth and power to force people to execute their orders  
or to afford not to do things on their own but to have other people do them 
on their behalf. The Greeks understood clearly that as long as there were  
people who, because they had more wealth and power, were able to make  
others to obey their orders, douleia could not be extinguished (Vlassopoulos, 
2010, p. 6).  
 
However, even if we stipulate that Cleo4 finds it unimaginable that slavery be abolished, 
this doesn’t explain her moral ignorance. One need not be able to imagine the abolition of a 
practice in order to judge the practice to be wrong. And, it is still very difficult to accept that 
Cleo4 cares sufficiently about the suffering of slaves if, despite thinking very hard about the 
matter, she concludes it is permissible to kidnap them and force them to perform free labor 
in a foreign land. 
 I’m not convinced that Wieland can succeed in offering an example in which an 
agent cares sufficiently about the suffering of slaves, has all the non-moral facts straight, has 
thought hard about a the morality of the practice of slavery, and has still failed to form a true 
moral belief about it. However, regardless of whether or not this true, his general point that 
an agent can care sufficiently about something of moral significance while remaining 
(purely) morally ignorant with respect to it, is quite plausible. This may happen when an 
agent is justifiably confused about what she ought to do in a given scenario, or when an 
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agent has psychological conditions (e.g. self-deception, fear) that interfere with her forming 
true moral beliefs about things for which she cares sufficiently. Consider the following 
examples. 
Confused Environmentalist: Sarah is deeply concerned about the environment. She 
donates regularly to conservation groups, stays informed about global warming, and 
shares her knowledge and concern about the environment with others. She also 
believes that if every human being consumed as many natural resources as she does, 
this would be unsustainable. However, she is unsure whether or not she ought to 
substantially alter her lifestyle. This would require significant, on-going sacrifices on 
her part, and would have negligible effects, given the rate of consumption of other 
human beings. Let’s stipulate that it’s true that Sarah ought to change her lifestyle. 
However, she fails to form this belief. Sarah’s failure to form an accurate moral 
belief is due to genuine confusion about her moral obligations, and not to self-
interest. I.e. she does not resist this conclusion because she does not want to have to 
substantially change her lifestyle; she would gladly do so if she believed it was the 
right thing to do.  
 
Cleo5: Cleo thinks to herself that slaves are just as fit for self-determination as any 
free person, and that slavery imposes serious suffering on slaves. It also promotes the 
prosperity of the Athenian Elite, and frees her from the burdens of housework. She 
avoids thinking very hard about the permissibility of slavery (the truth about her 
actions would be too much to bear). However, she feels extreme guilt for owning 
slaves (though she would not describe her feelings in these terms), and has recurring 
nightmares about their experiences, is depressed due to keeping slaves, keeps a diary 
about the suffering she imposes on her slaves and the ways they have been wronged, 
acts so as to ease their burden whenever she can, dreams of one day releasing them 
from slavery, and so on.  
 
Sarah fails to form a true moral belief that she ought to substantially change her 
lifestyle, but it is not plausible (given my description of the case) that this failure manifests a 
failure to care sufficiently about the environment or her duty to protect it. She isn’t sure 
whether or not she ought to make large sacrifices that have little impact. I take it that this is 
a genuinely difficult moral issue—i.e. one about which professional ethicists might be 
ambivalent. That Sarah is wrestling with this issue, and that she considers making 
significant, on-going sacrifices for the good of the environment, suggests how seriously she 
takes her responsibility to do her part, and how much she does in fact care about the 
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environment, despite failing to form true moral beliefs with respect to it. It is plausible that 
many morally ignorant agents fit this description—they may care sufficiently about things of 
moral significance (as revealed by other aspects of their psychology, behavior, and actions), 
but fail to form true moral beliefs because it is very difficult to do so insofar as this would 
require them to form true moral beliefs about genuinely difficult moral issues. 
It is plausible that Cleo5 cares sufficiently about the suffering of slaves, despite 
failing to form true beliefs about the permissibility of slavery. The psychological strife 
Cleo5 experiences due to the suffering she imposes on slaves, her attempts to ameliorate 
their suffering, and her dreams of freeing them, all manifest her care for the suffering of her 
slaves.33 However, some psychological conditions prevent her from reaching true moral 
beliefs about their suffering. E.g. she might unconsciously avoid reaching the conclusion 
that slavery is wrong because doing so would result in greater guilt on her part, result in her 
thinking ill of others whom she holds in high esteem (and who think slavery is 
unproblematic), or require her to act in ways that will have serious negative consequences 
for her. 34  
If I am right about these cases, then Harman’s claim that pure moral ignorance 
always manifests a failure to care sufficiently about things of moral significance ought to be 
significantly curtailed. Many cases of moral ignorance are likely to be ones in which the 
agent fails to form true moral beliefs despite caring sufficiently about things of moral 
                                                 
33 Of course, one might insist that Cleo does believe that slavery is wrong and simply 
does not admit this to herself. We may have good evidence for believing this to be the case. 
If this were the case, Cleo5 poses no problem for Harman’s view since Cleo5 would not be 
morally ignorant. But, Harman would owe some explanation concerning how we can 
determine what someone’s real belief is, if not by her own testimony. 
34 Note that I am not here claiming that Cleo5 is non-culpable for her moral ignorance, 
but only that it is plausible that she cares sufficiently about the suffering of slaves, despite 
holding false moral beliefs about the permissibility of slavery. 
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significance (as revealed by her other actions, behaviors, emotional reactions, and so on), 
either because she is grappling with genuinely difficult moral issues, or because 
psychological conditions interfere with her forming true moral beliefs about the objects in 
question. In light of such cases, it is more plausible that moral ignorance very often 
manifests a failure to care about things of moral significance, than that is always does so. 
Harman would likely resist my analysis of these cases. (A) She might resist my 
analysis of both cases by arguing that an agent cares sufficiently about things of moral 
significance only if she forms true moral beliefs with respect to them. (B) She might reject 
my analysis of Cleo5 by resisting the claim that psychological conditions can interfere with 
an agent forming true moral beliefs about something for which he cares sufficiently. Neither 
response is convincing. 
(A) 
Harman may resist my analysis of Cleo5 and Sarah (and agents like them) by 
arguing that if they cared sufficiently about the environment and the suffering of slaves, they 
would hold true moral beliefs with respect to these things. This response is suggested by 
Harman’s discussion of Huck Finn. 
Huck believes that he is morally required to turn Jim in, but 
at a crucial moment when he could easily do so, Huck does not.  
He “resolves to be bad” instead. One version of the case is this:  
Huck does genuinely believe that it is morally required to turn Jim in,  
but despite this he is moved by Jim’s humanity, and this is why he 
refrains from turning Jim in. It has been asked: is Huck praiseworthy  
for acting? I have not offered an account of praiseworthiness, but the  
following sits nicely with the view I have proposed:  
An agent is praiseworthy for a morally good action  
just in case the agent’s action resulted from caring  
about the features of the situation that make the 
action a morally good action. 
On this view, Huck is praiseworthy for refraining from  
turning Jim in. This is a conclusion that I can happily embrace.  
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But on my view, Huck is also blameworthy for something: his 
moral belief that he should turn Jim in. Huck’s psychology, in  
my view, involves his both caring about Jim’s humanity – it moves  
him to refrain from turning Jim in – yet also not adequately caring  
about Jim’s humanity – it does not move him to believe that Jim  
deserves to not be a slave; it does not prevent his false moral belief.  
There are two ways we could understand Huck’s psychology, in both 
of which he is somewhat blameworthy on my view. One possibility is  
that Huck does care about Jim’s humanity, but not fully. The other  
possibility is that Huck simultaneously has two conflicting attitudes,  
two conflicting levels of care toward Jim’s humanity: he cares about it  
fully, but he also cares very little about it. (Compare the way that a 
person might have two conflicting beliefs: I believe I will be off  
campus on Tuesday, and I also believe I’ll have lunch in the cafeteria 
 with Adam on Tuesday) (Harman 2014, p. 14-15). 
 
Harman’s view, as revealed in this analysis of Huck Finn, seems to be that an agent can 
be said to care sufficiently about something of moral significance only if she is moved to 
form a correct moral belief with respect to it. If this is her position, it would allow her to 
reject the claim that Sarah and Cleo5 care sufficiently about the environment or the suffering 
of slaves, despite failing to hold true moral beliefs about them. However, the claim that 
agents care sufficiently about things of moral significance only if they are moved to form 
true moral beliefs about it seems to me to be a mistake.35  
 Whether or not we ought to accept this principle depends on the conception of care 
that we adopt. Harman does not offer an account of care, and I do not intend to do so here. 
However, I think it would at least be very challenging for Harman to offer an account of 
care, according to which an agent cares sufficiently about something of moral significance 
                                                 
35 Wieland (2015) also raises this concern, but does not defend it (8-9). If Harman does 
not mean to suggest here that, as a general principle, an agent cares sufficiently about 
something of moral significance only if she is moved to form a true moral belief with 
respect to it, then it is not clear how she could avoid describing agents like Sarah and Cleo5 
as caring sufficiently despite being morally ignorant. So, whether she holds this to be a 
general principle or not, my point stands that Harman is likely mistaken in holding that all 
pure moral ignorance manifests a failure to care sufficiently about things of moral 
significance.  
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only if she forms a true moral belief with respect to it. Any plausible account of what it is to 
care about something must grant that caring involves having or being disposed to have 
certain feelings, desires, beliefs, and patterns of deliberation and attentiveness with respect 
to the object of care. For example, because I care about my daughter, I am disposed to feel 
distress when she is hurt, and joy when she succeeds or is happy. I am disposed to desire her 
wellbeing and to be near her. I believe that I ought to sometimes sacrifice my own interests 
for her sake. I often take her interests to be reasons for acting, and I attend to her general 
behavior and well being (e.g. does her behavior suggest that she is happy at school? Is she 
learning at music class? Is she adjusting well to a friend moving away?). Forming certain 
beliefs are only one element of the complex phenomenon of caring. It is plausible that if the 
other elements are in place, but the belief is missing with a good explanation (e.g. the agent 
has strong unconscious motivation for not holding the belief), an agent can be said to care 
about the object in question.  
Perhaps caring about “things of moral significance”, e.g. the suffering of sentient 
beings, dignity, autonomy, rights, and so on, is more like caring about an end in which one 
is not personally invested, than it is like caring about individual persons. However, I am not 
convinced that these are distinct phenomena, or that they are sufficiently distinct to ground 
the claim that an agent cares sufficiently about something of moral significance only if she 
forms a true moral belief with respect to it.36 E.g., I care about freedom of speech. My care 
                                                 
36 Shoemaker (2003) makes a similar distinction between “caring for” and “caring 
about” (94).  He points out that some might think that:  
caring for certain others, as many feminist thinkers have shown,  
and as my dog example reveals, is a rather thick concept, involving as 
it does a personal concern for the object of care for its own sake,  
whereas caring about things (like peace on earth, say) is a more general,  
or much thinner, concept and does not seem to involve such personal  
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for it bears much resemblance to the care I have for my daughter, though the emotions 
involved in my care for freedom of speech are comparatively very mild. I am disposed to 
feel outraged when this freedom is violated. I am disposed, when it is in my power, to take 
some actions to prevent such violations and to restore freedom of speech when it has been 
denied. I am disposed to take the fact that something would violate someone’s freedom of 
speech as a reason for acting (or not). Because I care about freedom of speech, I pay 
attention to things I otherwise would not (e.g. presidential candidates whose remarks suggest 
they would favor legislation that limits freedom of religion). Again, the phenomenon of 
caring is complex, and belief is only one aspect of it. It is plausible that one could care about 
an end in which she is not personally invested, even if she lacks true moral beliefs with 
respect to it (with good explanation). 
Another possibility is that by “caring sufficiently about things of moral significance” 
Harman has in mind that we fully appreciate the moral value of the thing in question. But, 
this cannot be right. To fully appreciate a thing’s value is primarily to correctly judge its 
value.37 Understanding pure moral ignorance to be culpable insofar as it manifests a failure 
to make a correct judgment with respect to a thing’s moral value would be circular. 
 
 (B) 
                                                                                                                                                      
concern (94). 
Like me, he concludes that a distinction along these lines is “overdrawn” since both 
types of caring involve a certain investment on the part of the agent who cares (95). 
 
37 We might also aim to protect and preserve something if we fully appreciate its value. 
However, if we do not also correctly judge its value, these actions suggest that the thing is 
valuable to us, but not that we fully appreciate its value.   
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Alternatively, Harman might only reject my analysis of Cleo5 by arguing that 
psychological conditions cannot interfere with agents forming true moral beliefs with 
respect to things for which they care sufficiently. However, it would be somewhat puzzling 
for Harman to make such a claim. She grants that psychological conditions such as 
depression may interfere with an agent’s actions manifesting what she really cares about 
(Harman, 2014, p. 19). It is not clear why she would not also grant that this can happen with 
respect to beliefs. Moreover, there is good reason to believe that psychological conditions do 
interfere with agents forming true moral beliefs about things for which they care 
sufficiently. Psychological conditions such as anxiety and trauma prevent agents from 
forming true factual beliefs.38 There is good reason to think that psychological conditions 
can also interfere with an agent forming true moral beliefs.39 If psychological conditions can 
interfere with an agent forming true moral beliefs, at least some of the time, this may cause 
her to form false beliefs, or to avoid forming true moral beliefs, that do not manifest what 
she really cares about.  
There are numerous first-hand accounts of this happening. For example, Ishmael 
Beah (2007) describes how, shortly after he and fellow child soldiers were rescued in Sierra 
Leon, and detoxed from drugs, they “now had time to think; the fastened mantle of our war 
memories slowly began to open. We resorted to more violence to avoid summoning 
                                                 
38 E.g. according to James and Gilliand (2012), soldiers with PTSD often form false 
factual beliefs such as that they are invincible, or that they are in ever-present danger (at 
home) (159).  
39 Tsang (2002) explains that in one form of this phenomenon—“moral 
rationalization”—agents distort the morality of an action they have committed or are about 
to commit in order to “perceive that their actions are consistent with their valued moral 
standards” (11).  In a highly influential article, Skykes and Matza (1957) describe ways in 
which some criminals similarly distort the moral nature of their crimes in order to be able to 
commit them and live with having done so.  
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thoughts of our recent lives.” Beah (2007) also explains that he and his fellow child soldiers 
were angered by relief workers’ assurances that none of it was their fault. They did not view 
themselves as helpless victims, but as ferocious warriors who had done what they had to do. 
Reflecting on his reckoning with his silence as Jews and ethnic minorities in Danzig were 
deported, Grass (2007) describes the difficulty he faced in arriving at an objective moral 
assessment of his own actions: 
  …because many kept silent, the temptation is great 
  to discount one’s own silence, or to compensate for 
  it by invoking the general guilt, or to speak about 
  oneself all but abstractly, in the third person: he was,  
  saw, had, said, he kept silent…and what’s more, silent 
  within, where there is plenty of room for hide and seek. 
   As soon as I summon up the boy I was at the 
  age of thirteen, subject him to the third degree, and feel 
  tempted to judge him as I would a stranger to whose needs I 
  am indifferent, to condemn him, I see a kid of average height 
  in shorts and kneesocks constantly grimacing, running to his 
  mother and crying, “I was just a child, just a kid…” (28-29). 
 
Even as Grass (2007) confesses his complicity with the Nazi regime, he reports his 
struggle with coming to terms with his actions: 
  They want accurate information about other things, about 
 what else has been encapsulated [in his novels], about what  
has been swallowed in shame, about secrets in varying disguise,  
about nits nesting in sackhair. Eloquently avoided words. Slivers  
of thought. Things that hurt. Even now…(62). 
 
Both Beah and Grass, at one point in time, avoided forming true moral beliefs about 
their past actions.40 However, it is implausible that even at the time that they did so, this 
                                                 
40 Of course, neither Beah nor Grass is fully culpable for his actions. Beah is arguably 
not at all culpable. He was a desperate child, alone in a war zone. He was brainwashed, 
drugged, and traumatized. Grass too was a child when he joined Hitler’s Youth (and as a 
testament to his youthful mindset) describes himself as being seduced by the glamour of 
being part of the movement. However, it is also not the case that their actions were morally 
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manifested of a lack of care about things of moral significance on their part. Their words do 
not reveal that they failed to care sufficiently, but that they cared so deeply that they had 
difficulty reckoning with the moral reality of their actions. Their future actions testify to this 
care. Beah has written two novels about his experience as a child soldier, and is a human 
rights activist, fighting to end the exploitation of children in violent conflicts. Grass has been 
called “the conscience of Germany” for a literary and political career dedicated to calling 
out the German public and politicians for their collective forgetfulness of the atrocities 
committed the Nazi regime, and their compliance with it.41  
Still, one might argue that agents like Cleo5, Grass, and Beah are not accurately 
described as caring sufficiently about things of moral significance while failing to hold true 
moral beliefs with respect to them. Instead, one might argue that they have true moral 
beliefs, but intentionally fail to acknowledge or focus on them. Or, one might grant that they 
were unintentionally self-deceived, but deny that this entails that they lacked true moral 
beliefs about their actions at some point, if one understands self-deception to be a situation 
in which one believes both P and not-P.42  
I grant that these are possibilities. It may very well be that I have not accurately 
characterized the psychology of Grass and Beah, or that my analysis of Cleo5 is implausible. 
It may also be the case that some self-deceived agents do not lack true moral beliefs, but 
instead bury or ignore them. However, psychologists grant and observe cases of self-
deception in which agents do not believe P and not-P. von Hippel and Trivers (2001) explain 
that in some forms of self-deception,  
                                                                                                                                                      
unproblematic. I take it that both, initially, resisted the truth about the moral gravity of their 
actions. 
41 See Buruma (2006). 
42 Lynch (2016) reports that this understanding of self-deception has waned (513-514).  
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the individual need not have two representations of reality  
to self-deceive. Rather, people can self-deceive in the same  
way that they deceive others, by avoiding critical information 
and thereby not telling (themselves) the whole truth (2). 
 
While Beah, Grass, and Cleo5 may not meet this description, their cases hopefully 
motivate the claim that human psychology (and life) is sufficiently complex that some moral 
agents likely meet this description, and as a result, fail to form true moral beliefs about 
things for which they care sufficiently. 
 
 Through the above arguments and examples, I have tried to motivate the claim that 
pure moral ignorance does not always manifest a failure to care sufficiently about things of 
moral significance, and to argue against what I take to be Harman’s potential responses to 
this move: (A) forming a true moral belief about something is a necessary condition for 
caring sufficiently about it, and (B) psychological conditions cannot interfere with one 
forming a true moral belief with respect to something for which she cares sufficiently. If 
what I have said is convincing, I think it is a best the case that pure moral ignorance often 
manifests a failure to care sufficiently about things of moral significance. 
 However, even if Harman weakens her claim that pure moral ignorance always 
manifests a failure to care sufficiently about things of moral significance, if she is right that 
when it does so, it is always culpable, her view still amounts to a very strong position 
concerning culpability for moral ignorance. I.e. it still amounts to the view that pure moral 
ignorance very often culpable, simply in virtue of the fact that it manifests insufficient care. 
There are a number of possible objections to this more constrained view as well. 
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Objections to (1)  
 As noted above, objections to (1) the claim that moral ignorance is always culpable 
when it manifests a failure to care about things of moral significance, mainly focus on 
agents’ epistemic situations. As Harman (2014) points out, some might reject (1) on the 
grounds that sometimes agents are justified in holding false moral beliefs, and that agents 
are not culpable for holding justified false moral beliefs, even when these beliefs manifest a 
failure to care sufficiently about things of moral significance.43 Alternatively, Wieland 
(2015) argues that some agents are not in an epistemic position to form true moral beliefs 
due to the fact that they lack evidence for doing so. When this is true, one might think that 
agents are not culpable for their resulting moral ignorance. I argue that while is plausible 
that some agents are justified in holding false moral beliefs, Harman’s position that they are 
nevertheless culpable for doing so is not as unintuitive as it may at first seem. I argue against 
Wieland’s (2015) claim that some agents are not in an epistemic position to hold justified 
true moral beliefs, though it may be the case that, given their epistemic position, some 
agents cannot be reasonably expected to do so. Finally, I argue that there is another, non-
epistemically based reason for doubting the claim that moral ignorance is always culpable 
when it manifests a failure to care about things of moral significance; sometimes it is not 
reasonable to expect agents to care sufficiently about things of moral significance. 
  
                                                 
43 Harman also considers the objection that some agents form their moral ignorance as a 
result of bad luck—they are unfortunate to suffer poor formative circumstances or 
constitution. Some may think that agents cannot be culpable for something that is merely a 
result of luck. Harman (2014) dismisses this worry, explaining that she believes we can be 
and are culpable for things that are the result of bad luck (16). Because the existence of 
moral luck is controversial, it is unproductive basis for a culpability view, or an objection to 
one. For this reason, I do not discuss this objection above. 
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 Justified False Moral Beliefs 
Harman offers a number of responses to the potential objection that some agents are 
epistemically justified in holding false moral beliefs, and are thereby non-culpable for these 
beliefs, even if they manifest a failure to care sufficiently about things of moral significance. 
First, she holds that it is plausible that moral ignorance is never epistemically justified 
insofar as experience provides agents with ample evidence for accurate moral beliefs, and 
against false ones (Harman, 2011, p. 461; Harman, 2014, p. 22). Second, Harman (2014) 
argues that even if agents are epistemically justified in holding false moral beliefs, they are 
also in a position to have epistemically justified, true moral beliefs (21). Finally, Harman 
(2014) suggests that it is possible for epistemically justified, false beliefs to be blameworthy 
(21). She points out that it is plausible, e.g., that we owe it to our friends to give them the 
benefit of the doubt, even when evidence supports thinking ill of them (Harman, 2014, P. 
21). If we instead (justifiably) believe ill of them, we would arguably be culpable for doing 
so.  
I’ll consider possible objections to Harman’s first and third responses first. I take 
Harman’s claim that false moral beliefs are never epistemically justified to be the weakest of 
her three responses to the justified false belief objection. Consider the following example.44 
Debating Doctors: 
Two physicians are treating a 14 year old girl for stomach pain. She has internal 
bleeding, and is also pregnant. The girl has not told her mother about her pregnancy, 
and requests that the doctors not tell her either. The doctors disagree about the best 
course of action. Both doctors believe that they will violate their patient’s right to 
privacy if they disclose her pregnancy to her mother. Both doctors believe it is in the 
patient’s best interests for her mother to know about the pregnancy; the child needs 
her mother’s support, and the mother needs to know that her daughter is pregnant in 
order to make an informed decision about how to treat her daughter’s internal 
                                                 
44 This example is based on episode 17 (“I Wear the Face”) of season 12 of Grey’s 
Anatomy.  
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bleeding. Moreover, the mother will eventually learn about the pregnancy if they do 
not tell her. Both doctors also believe that the patient is foolish for not telling her 
mother about her pregnancy.45  
 
Doctor A believes that they ought to reveal the patient’s pregnancy to her mother. 
Acting in the patient’s best interests is more important than respecting her right to 
privacy. Doctor B believes that they should not reveal the patient’s pregnancy 
mother; it is more important to respect her right to privacy than it is to act in her best 
interests. 
 
The doctors agree on the non-moral facts of this case; their disagreement is purely moral. 
I it that take their evidence (e.g. their past experiences, moral reasoning, judgments derived 
from empathy, and so on) justifies both doctors in holding their respective beliefs. One of 
the doctors is mistaken about the comparative value of respecting the patient’s right to 
privacy and acting in her best interests. This doctor holds a justified false (purely) moral 
belief. Given this example, and many others we could think of, it is highly plausible that 
Harman mistaken in holding that pure moral ignorance is never epistemically justified. 
 Harman allows for the possibility that she may be wrong, and that some false moral 
beliefs may be justified. She argues that they are nevertheless culpable. One might balk at 
this, insisting that an agent cannot be culpable for holding justified false beliefs. There are 
two possible responses to ease the counter-intuitiveness of Harman’s suggestion. First, 
agents will often hold justified false beliefs concerning genuinely difficult moral issues. As I 
argued earlier, it is plausible that false beliefs about such issues do not manifest a failure to 
care about things of moral significance, in which case, on Harman’s own view, they may be 
non-culpable. So, Harman may be able to grant that many justified false moral beliefs are 
non-culpable. Additionally, the claim that we can be culpable for justified false moral beliefs 
                                                 
45 I am assuming there that there are no federal or state laws that either require the 
doctors to inform the mother, or prohibit them from doing so.  
  65 
(within the context of Harman’s view) is not as problematic as it may at first seem. Harman 
grants that culpability comes in degrees, and is proportionate to the lack of care manifested 
by an agent.46 In many cases, an agent who holds justified false moral beliefs will not 
manifest a significant failure to care about things of moral significance, and will therefore 
only be slightly culpable for her false belief. Moreover, agents who hold justified false 
moral beliefs are not culpable for mismanaging their moral beliefs (because they have not 
done so).  E.g. in the above case, the doctor who holds the false moral belief cares very 
much about her patient’s wellbeing and her right to privacy, but misjudges their relative 
importance. If we grant that her false belief manifests a very slight deficient care for things 
of moral significance, Harman would hold that she is only very slightly blameworthy for her 
false belief, and not at all culpable for mismanaging her beliefs. In other cases, where an 
agent holds a more egregiously false justified moral belief, this will manifest a more serious 
failure to care about things of moral significance on her part. She will therefore be more 
culpable on Harman’s view. But, this does not strike me as being as counter-intuitive as the 
claim that agents can be culpable for holding justified false moral beliefs initially seems. 
 
 Accessibility 
 Still, one might object to Harman’s claim that agents are culpable for their pure 
moral ignorance, even when it constitutes a justified false moral belief, insofar as agents are 
always in a position to form justified true moral beliefs. Harman (2014) does not say much 
to elaborate this point, but does offer an example to illustrate it: 
  My college friend Moon and I studied math together. She 
                                                 
46 See again Harman’s (2014) discussion of Huck Finn, who she holds is “somewhat” 
blameworthy (20). 
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likes to talk to me about math, though it has been years since  
I studied it. She tells me that a certain mathematical claim is true;  
I believe her. In fact, that claim is false, and if I thought about it  
I might figure that out – I remember enough math to figure it out.  
In this case, I am epistemically justified in believing the claim  
though I am also capable of becoming epistemically justified in  
believing it is false (22). 
Harman’s thought seems to be that if we are in a position to hold justified true beliefs, 
and yet hold justified false beliefs, this is manifests a lack of care about the object in 
question. In the example above, the fact that Harman does not access available evidence to 
form a justified true belief manifests a lack of care about the truth of the mathematical claim 
in question; she doesn’t care enough about its truth to think seriously about it.47  Although 
Harman would not be culpable, in this example, for failing to care sufficiently about the 
truth of the math claim, an agent would be culpable for manifesting a similar lack of care 
with respect to the truth of a moral claim.48 
 There are a couple of possible objections one could raise to this suggestion. First, 
one might argue that agents are not always in an epistemic position to hold justified true 
moral beliefs. Alternatively, one could argue that they fact that they are in such a position 
                                                 
47 Alternatively, one might think that if one is in a good position to hold justified true 
beliefs, but instead holds justified false beliefs, this is because she has mismanaged her 
beliefs. She is thereby culpable for the false beliefs she holds. I do not think that this is 
Harman’s point since she rejects the notion that culpability for false moral beliefs depends 
on culpability for mismanaging them. 
48 Mason (2015) objects to Harman’s claim that agents are culpable for holding justified 
false moral beliefs because they are in a position to hold justified true moral beliefs. She 
argues that this claim commits Harman to the more general, and highly implausible principle 
that the mere fact that an agent could have avoided a moral wrong implies that she is 
culpable for it (Mason, 2015, p.8). Instead, in order to be blameworthy for X, Mason (2015) 
holds, the agent’s having X’ed must reflect something about the quality of the agent’s will, 
and in particular, it must show a lack of moral concern (Mason, 2015, p. 8-9). However, I 
think this is a misinterpretation of Harman’s claim. As noted above, I do not think that 
Harman’s point is that agents are culpable for holding justified false moral beliefs simply 
because it was possible for them to avoid doing so. Instead, the fact that they hold justified 
false moral beliefs when they are in a position to hold justified true moral beliefs manifests a 
failure to care sufficiently about things of moral significance.  
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does not entail that they are thereby culpable for failing to hold true moral beliefs, insofar as, 
given their epistemic situation, some agents cannot be reasonably expected to do so.  
 Wieland (2015) argues that some agents are not in a position to hold epistemically 
justified true moral beliefs insofar as agents do not always have access to evidence that 
would enable them to form justified true moral beliefs. 49 He argues that there are three 
potential sources of evidence supporting true moral beliefs: testimony, mere reflection, and 
direct experience (Wieland, 2015, p. 9). It is not always the case that agents have access to 
evidence via these sources. Testimony does not always provide one with evidence that tells 
against the morality of a practice. E.g., it may not do so in cases in which an immoral 
practice is widely accepted (Wieland, 2015, p. 10).  Some agents simply lack the capacity to 
conclude, through mere reflection, that a practice is wrong (10). Wieland (2015) holds, e.g. 
that not everyone has the capacity to see “by mere reflection that the suffering of slaves 
outweighs the benefits of slavery for a given society (such as Athens)” (11). This is because 
not everyone “is in a position to make such rather philosophical inferences” (Wieland, 2015, 
p. 11). Finally, not everyone will have access to direct experience that provides evidence for 
true moral beliefs (e.g. not all Athenians will have direct contact with slaves). 
 While I grant that some agents may lack access to evidence in favor of true moral 
belief via testimony and direct experience, I am not convinced that (fully-abled, adult) 
agents (of average intelligence) ever lack access to evidence in favor of true moral beliefs 
via mere reflection. Consider Wieland’s (2015) own example of an agent who purportedly 
lacks access to evidence supporting the true moral belief that slavery is impermissible. 
                                                 
49 Wieland (2015) does not make the further claim that agents are non-culpable for 
holding false moral beliefs when they lack access to evidence that would support true moral 
beliefs.  
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Wieland (2015) suggests that this agent is unable to make the philosophical inference, via 
mere reflection, that “the suffering of slaves outweighs the benefits of slavery for a given 
society (such as Athens)” (11). Let’s think about what evidence one might access through 
mere reflection, in favor of this belief. One might reflect that it would be truly terrible to be 
a slave. She might think about how, were she a slave, the fact that she was contributing to 
the economic well being of Athens would do little to console her. More abstractly, she might 
consider that the fact that it’s generally unacceptable to harm others for one’s own economic 
gain (e.g. it’s wrong to steal, cheat, manipulate, and so on). Or, she might think about 
whether or not she wants to live under a government that is willing to exploit the few in 
order to promote the welfare of the many. Even more abstractly, she might consider the 
value of money and economic stability in comparison to the value of freedom from suffering 
and the exercise of autonomy. I see no reason to assume that fully-abled, adult agents of 
average intelligence could not engage in reflection of this sort, and thereby access evidence 
that supports true moral beliefs about the permissibility of slavery via mere reflection. 
 Of course, some people might be better at accessing evidence for moral beliefs via 
mere reflection than others. Moral reflection arguably involves capacities that some might 
have in greater abundance, and skills that are improved by practice. Some agents might 
simply be more empathetic or imaginative, and therefore be better at arriving at the right 
conclusions through moral reflection. Alternatively, some agents might be better at basic 
reasoning (e.g. recognizing X as a member of some larger set, Y) due to natural ability or 
practice. But, the mere fact that some agents are better at accessing evidence for true moral 
beliefs, and thereby in a better position to form justified true moral beliefs via mere 
reflection, does not suggest that some agents are not able to do so at all. 
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 Still, one might argue that even if an agent could form epistemically justified true 
moral beliefs on the basis of evidence that is available to them, and even if their pure moral 
ignorance manifests a failure to care sufficiently about things of moral significance, they are 
nevertheless non-culpable for it insofar as they cannot be reasonably expected to form true 
moral beliefs, given their epistemic situation. This might seem to be true, e.g., if through no 
fault of one’s own, one is not very good at accessing evidence in favor of true moral beliefs 
through mere reflection, and the agent has evidence for false moral beliefs in the form of 
testimony or direct experience. Consider the following fictionalized example.50 
 Mr. S is from a rural pocket of Malawi. He falsely believes that  
women and girls are of less moral value than men and boys. His belief is 
similar to the rather widely held belief that non-human animals have less 
moral value in virtue of being members of a different species; Mr. S believes 
that women and girls have less moral value in virtue of being a different sex. 
This is the prevailing belief in Mr. S’s community, where women and girls 
are widely accepted to be similar in value to livestock. Some men in Mr. S’s 
community treat their wives and daughters with great love and respect, but 
Mr. S and other men in his community do not take this to be evidence that 
they are equals. Instead they understand these men to have a particularly 
strong emotional attachment to their wives and daughters, similar to the 
attachment that some individuals have to pets. Mr. S isn’t very empathetic or 
imaginative, and therefore is not very good at arriving at moral truths via 
mere reflection. 
 
 One might argue that Mr. S could not be reasonably expected to avoid holding his 
false moral belief that women and girls are of less moral value than men and boys. 
Testimony confirms this belief. Direct experience arguably does not provide evidence for or 
                                                 
50 This example is based on an actual agent, Mr. Simbeye, discussed by LaFrainere 
(2005). Mr. Simbeye offered his twelve year old daughter as a sexual and domestic servant 
to his much older neighbor in order to repay a debt. He was genuinely surprised to learn that 
this practice is illegal in Malawi, and considered by many outside his geographic area to be 
abusive. It is a common practice in his village, and in neighboring villages. In offering an 
explanation for his behavior, he explained that he did not know he was abusing his daughter, 
and also that he had underestimated her monetary worth. 
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against it. Just as there is not much evidence via direct experience that counts for or against 
a view that moral value depends on one’s species membership, there is not much that counts 
for or against a view on which moral value depends on one’s sex. If Mr. S is poor at arriving 
at moral truths via mere reflection, due to his diminished capacities, one might argue that 
Mr. S cannot be reasonably expected to avoid his false moral belief about the moral value of 
women and girls.  
 I think it is very doubtful that many agents cannot be reasonably expected to form 
true moral beliefs, given their epistemic situation, and that they are thereby non-culpable for 
holding false moral beliefs that manifest a failure to care sufficiently about things of moral 
significance. However, arguing for this claim requires an account of the conditions under 
which an agent can be reasonably expected to X. Therefore, an argument for this will have 
to wait until chapter 4. 
 
 Caring Sufficiently 
 There is a remaining objection to (1) the claim that pure moral ignorance is always 
culpable when it manifests a failure to care sufficiently about things of moral significance. If 
some agents cannot be reasonably expected to care sufficiently about things of moral 
significance, then it is plausible that they cannot be culpable for failing to do so, or for 
holding beliefs which manifest a failure to do so. I think it is quite plausible that some 
agents cannot be reasonably expected to care sufficiently about things of moral significance. 
 Some agents who have suffered traumatic events may not be reasonably expected to 
care sufficiently about things of moral significance. As a response to traumatic events, some 
agents engage in “emotional numbing”; they suppress the normal emotions they might feel 
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about actions or events. This can become habitual, in which case, it will sometimes manifest 
a failure to care sufficiently about things of moral significance. For example, in a recent 
study of delinquent youth, Kerig et. al. (2012) found that youth who experience a traumatic 
event perpetrated by someone they trusted (e.g. sexual abuse by a trusted adult) were more 
likely to engage in “habitual emotional numbing,” which contributed to “withdrawal of 
empathy and the cultivation of callousness toward others” (277). This is echoed in self-
reports and reports of agents who have experience trauma. Consider the following self-
report from a veteran, Billie Mac, cited in Gilliand and James (2013).  
  Looking back on it, I cannot believe how callous 
I have become. SOP [standard operating procedure] 
was “It don’t mean nothin’, screw it, drive on.” This 
would be right after a B-40 round had blown your  
buddy’s brains all over you. You had to put it behind 
you to survive. A guy fell off the construction site 
I was working on last fall and splattered himself all 
over the pavement. I sat on a steel beam about 30  
feet above the guy and just kept eating my lunch. No 
   big deal (160)! 
 
Consider also the following report of a young woman, charged with assault, who has a 
history of trauma. 
Sadhanna is a 22-year-old woman mandated to outpatient  
mental health and substance abuse treatment as the alternative 
to incarceration. She was arrested and charged with assault  
after arguing and fighting with another woman on the street.  
At intake, Sadhanna reported a 7-year history of alcohol abuse  
and one depressive episode at age 18. She was surprised that  
she got into a fight but admitted that she was drinking at the  
time of the incident. She also reported severe physical abuse at  
the hands of her mother’s boyfriend between ages 4 and 15. Of 
particular note to the intake worker was Sadhanna’s matter-of-fact 
way of presenting the abuse history. During the interview, she clearly 
indicated that she did not want to attend group therapy and hear other 
people talk about their feelings, saying, “I learned long ago not to 
wear emotions on my sleeve.” 
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Sadhanna reported dropping out of 10th grade, saying she never                   
liked school. She didn’t expect much from life. In Sadhanna’s                   
first weeks in treatment, she reported feeling disconnected from           
other group members and questioned the purpose of the group.            
When asked about her own history, she denied that she had any  
difficulties and did not understand why she was mandated to        
treatment. She further denied having feelings about her abuse                
and did not believe that it affected her life now. Group members                
often commented that she did not show much empathy and            
maintained a flat affect, even when group discussions were             
emotionally charged (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration, 2014, p. 62). 
 Two things are highly plausible about the above cases. (i) The agents in question fail 
to care sufficiently about things of moral significance. (ii) The agents are not culpable for 
this failure. Billie Mac fails to care sufficiently that another human being fell to his death 
before his eyes. Sadhanna fails to care sufficiently about the suffering experienced by the 
members of her therapy group. Both lack the types of beliefs that would be indicative of 
care. Billie Mac reports that the death of another human being was “no big deal.” Sadhanna 
reports that she doesn’t see the point of discussing the suffering of the members of her 
therapy group. Both also lack the affective and behavioral responses indicative of care. 
Billie Mac calmly eats his lunch above the splattered remains of his coworker. Sadhanna 
shows a lack of empathy and “flat affect.” Billie Mac does nothing to help, nor does 
Sadhanna. Perhaps at one point, these individual would have cared about such things, and 
perhaps through therapy they will come to care about these things again. But it is 
implausible that, at the relevant point in time, they cared sufficiently about them. 
 It is equally implausible that they are culpable for failing to care sufficiently about 
these things, or for any pure moral ignorance that may manifest this failure. This is because 
it is highly plausible that neither Billie Mac nor Sadhanna could be reasonably expected to 
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avoid their lack of care. It is arguably the result of them habitually tuning out their emotional 
responses, of them learning to not care. This is an activity from which we arguably could not 
reasonably expect them to refrain. As Billie Mac states, engaging in it was a matter of 
survival.  
 If agents sometimes cannot be reasonably expected to care sufficiently about things 
of moral significance, and therefore are not culpable for failing to do so or for forming 
beliefs that manifest this lack of care, the Harman is mistaken in claiming that moral 
ignorance is always culpable when it manifests a failure to care sufficiently about things of 
moral significance.  
 
3.4 Non-volitional Culpability Views 
  
Non-volitional culpability views reach the same conclusion as Harman’s view by a 
different route. They are based on non-volitional views of blame, according to which 
voluntary control is not necessary for culpability. Instead, proponents of non-volitional 
views of blame argue that the proper target of blame is our objectionable moral attitudes. 
According to some non-volitional views, blame consists of a judgment that an agent has or 
has displayed an objectionable moral attitude, and as is the case with any judgment, it is 
justified as long as this judgment is accurate and we are justified in reaching it, given our 
evidence.51 E.g. when we blame someone for driving recklessly, we judge him to have 
                                                 
51 For example, Scanlon (1998) argues that blame is a judgment that an agent has failed 
to govern herself according to principles which no one can reasonably reject (1998 p. 268-
269). Blame is justified in case the aforementioned judgment is true. Hieronymi (2004) 
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displayed a lack of respect for the lives and safety of others. This judgment is justified if he 
in fact displayed a lack of respect and we have sufficient evidence for judging him to have 
done so. According to other non-volitional views of blame, when we blame someone for X, 
we implicitly demand that she justify the moral attitudes reflected by X, and if she cannot, 
we blame her for them.52 For example, when I blame Sam for cheating on an exam in my 
class, I demand that Sam justify this action. To do so, he must defend his evaluation of the 
reasons for and against cheating. Perhaps he can do so. Perhaps, e.g., he had good reason to 
believe his life depended on passing this exam, and rightfully judged his life to be more 
valuable than being honest in this particular scenario. If so, I ought to rescind my blame. 
But, if he cannot do so—if he knows he behaved badly, or he falsely judges that getting 
good grades is more valuable than being honest—my blame is justified.53 
                                                                                                                                                      
argues that when we blame an agent, we simply acknowledge that the agent has exhibited an 
attitude of disrespect towards us or a fellow agent. Because blame simply consists of the 
observation that an agent has exhibited an attitude of disrespect, it will be justified just in 
case this observation is true and we have adequate reasons for believing it to be true 
(Hieronymi, 2004, p. 128-129). 
52 This is Angela Smith’s view, which she develops over a series of papers. See, e.g. 
Smith (2005), Smith (2008), Smith (2012), and Smith (2015).  
53 The description of non-volitional views of blame offered in this paragraph captures the 
most prominent non-volitional views, but does not capture all non-volitional views. E.g. 
Sher (2001) also argues for a non-volitional account of culpability. His view is that we’re 
culpable for our character traits even though he believes that we often cannot be reasonably 
expected to avoid them, or reform them. He also does not rely on the fact that these traits 
were developed through our voluntary actions to support his view. He instead suggests that 
the connection between an agent’s ability to avoid X (i.e. the agent’s control over X) is not 
as intimately linked to warranted blame as we typically think. Robert Adams (1985) argues 
for a similar view as well, suggesting that we can be rightfully blamed for that over which 
we lack any type of control. His reasoning for this is two-fold. First, he holds that morality is 
not only action guiding, but also correctional and therefore moral criticism applies even 
when the thing for which we are criticized is something over which we lacked power. 
Second, he thinks that it is important that agents accept responsibility for things (mental and 
emotional states in particular), even though they lacked control over them, insofar as doing 
so is necessary to repair moral relations amongst agents after wrongdoing. 
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On either non-volitional view of blame, we are directly culpable for our 
objectionable moral attitudes. Our culpability for them need not be traced to culpability for 
past actions which led to them, or to a failure to perform actions that would have eliminated 
or mitigated them and their effects. In fact, how we came to have the objectionable attitudes 
in question is largely irrelevant to our culpability for them. Facts about the formation and 
maintenance of our attitudes do not affect whether or not our judgments that agents in 
question hold objectionable attitudes are true and justified, or whether or not their attitudes 
are defensible. E.g. the fact that Carol grew up in a very abusive household is not relevant to 
the accuracy or justification of my judgment that she is cruel. If blame simply amounts to 
such a judgment, and is justified if the judgment is true and we are justified in making it, 
then the fact that Carol grew up in a very abusive household is not relevant to whether or not 
she is blameworthy for being cruel and exhibiting her cruelty. Similarly, her background is 
not relevant to whether or not her cruelty is defensible. What if she defends this cruelty by 
asserting that the feelings of those she is harming are not important? If the parties in 
question (or their surrogate) were to object to this claim by asserting that their feelings are 
indeed important, it would not be appropriate for her to cite the abuse she endured in 
response.  
Although proponents of non-volitional views do not directly address or focus on the 
issue of culpability for moral ignorance, their views are nevertheless a very important part of 
this discussion insofar as they entail some kind of culpability view with respect to moral 
ignorance. The latter is a fact that has been observed by a number of participants in the 
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moral ignorance debate.54 Pure moral ignorance in the form of a false moral belief, almost 
always manifests an objectionable moral attitude. And ignorance of a moral truth often does 
so as well55 According to non-volitional views of blame, then, moral ignorance is almost 
always culpable. Moreover, the conditions under which an agent formed her moral 
ignorance are not relevant to her culpability for it. The objectionable nature of ignorance 
entails that an agent is culpable for it, and these conditions do not do not bear on whether or 
not the content of the moral ignorance is objectionable or defensible.  
 
3.5 Objections to the Non-volitional Culpability View 
 
One could object to the non-volitional culpability view by arguing that voluntary 
control is, in fact, required for culpability. This, of course, would be a large project that 
would take us far a field from the issue of culpability for moral ignorance. Fortunately we 
                                                 
54 E.g. see Rosen (2003), pg. 73-74 (he refers to non-volitional views as “quality of will 
accounts”); Mason (2015) (who refers to non-volitional views as “attributionist” views); 
Levy (2009), pg 740; and Wieland (2015).  Björnsson (forthcoming) brings non-volitional 
accounts directly into the discussion concerning moral ignorance by arguing that they imply 
that there are no epistemic conditions for culpability, and therefore that the skeptical 
argument rests on a mistake.  
55Imagine, e.g., that Bethany loves fur coats and owns many of them. She loves how soft 
and pretty they are. She knows that they are made from the fur of animals that would not be 
killed if there were no demand for fur coats. She is also aware that animals suffer in order 
for fur coats to be made. But, Bethany lacks beliefs about whether or not it is permissible to 
kill animals to make fur coats. It has never occurred to consider the matter because it has 
never occurred to her that the fact that animals must suffer and be killed in order for fur 
coats to be made, possibly counts against the permissibility of manufacturing fur coats. 
Bethany’s lack of a true moral belief manifests an objectionable moral attitude toward the 
value of the lives of non-human animals, and their suffering. This is only the case with 
respect to issues that directly intersect with our lives E.g. I might lack true moral beliefs 
about who is responsible for paying for the demolition of dangerous buildings in Nigeria 
insofar as I have never considered the matter. But, this does not reflect objectionable moral 
attitudes on my part insofar as this issue does not intersect with my life in any way. 
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need not take on this issue in order to argue that non-volitional culpability views are flawed. 
I argue that even if we grant that agents can be directly culpable for their moral ignorance 
insofar as it reflects an objectionable moral attitude, it does not follow that agents are 
therefore always culpable for their ignorance. I argue for this claim by first examining three 
existing objections to the non-volitional culpability view. (1) Some argue that moral 
ignorance does not always reflect an objectionable moral attitude. (2) Some argue against 
the claim that agents are always culpable for their objectionable moral attitudes by arguing 
that treating the objectionable nature of an attitude as sufficient for its blameworthiness, fails 
to recognize the difference between being bad and deserving blame. (3) Others argue against 
the claim that agents are always culpable for their objectionable moral attitudes by arguing 
that this view implausibly suggests that agents are culpable for their moral ignorance, even 
when they have done everything they could be reasonably expected to do in order to avoid 
it.  
I argue that (1) is true only with respect to a restricted set of cases of moral 
ignorance, and therefore does not pose a significant problem for non-volitional culpability 
views. Both (2) and (3) are based on intuitive responses to particular cases, which 
proponents of the non-volitional culpability view are happy to reject. But, we need not 
accept that there is simply a clash of intuitions here. Instead, I argue that these objections 
can be supported by two further claims. (A) Agents are not culpable for that which they 
could not be reasonably expected to avoid, and (B) sometimes agents cannot be reasonably 
expected to avoid their objectionable moral attitudes, or the moral beliefs which manifest 
them, due to the circumstances under which they were shaped and carried into the present. If 
this is right, the non-volitional culpability view is mistaken. The mere fact that moral 
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ignorance constitutes or reflects an objectionable moral attitude does not itself render the 
ignorance culpable. The conditions under which moral ignorance is formed do affect the 
agent’s culpability for it. 
 
 (1) Moral ignorance and objectionable moral attitudes 
Wieland (2015) argues against the claim that moral ignorance almost always 
manifests objectionable attitudes, and in particular, rejects the view that ignorance almost 
always manifests ill will. He does so by considering a couple of ways of understanding ill 
will, and arguing that according to those understandings, it is not true that moral ignorance 
almost always reflects it. First, he suggests that moral ignorance may reflect ill will if it is 
the result of a failure to make a serious attempt to discover if X is morally wrong (Wieland, 
2015, p. 6). However, on this interpretation of ill will, many instances of moral ignorance 
will not reflect it. Many agents think very hard about moral questions, and still arrive at very 
objectionable conclusions regarding them. Alternatively, moral ignorance about X may 
manifest ill will if it manifests, “an indifference for the fact that makes X wrong” (7). On 
this view, e.g., moral ignorance about slavery might manifest ill will if it manifests 
indifference for the fact that slaves suffer from being enslaved. However, Wieland (2015) 
argues that not all cases of moral ignorance will display ill will on this view, either. In many 
cases, agents are not indifferent towards the features that make X wrong, but still fail to 
draw the conclusion that X is wrong (recall, e.g., Cleo). 
 It is not clear that we should accept either of these characterizations of ill will. One 
might instead suggest that ill will amounts to a failure to adequately respect moral agents or 
sentient beings. Even on this understanding of ill will, it may be that there are a some of 
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cases in which pure moral ignorance does not manifest it. However there is no reason why 
proponents of the non-volitional culpability view could not accept this, and acknowledge 
that in such cases, agents are not culpable for their moral ignorance.56 They would likely 
need to adopt this strategy, e.g., with respect to some cases in which agents make a sincere 
effort to come to the right conclusion about a genuinely difficult moral issue, but arrive at 
the wrong conclusion. E.g., recall Sarah the confused environmentalist, and the debating 
doctors. Sarah is uncertain if she ought to make significant sacrifices that will fail to have 
any significant impact. Just as this uncertainty  does not plausibly manifest a failure to care 
sufficiently about the environment, it also does not plausibly manifest other objectionable 
                                                 
56 Relatedly, one might worry about cases in which an agent’s moral ignorance 
constitutes objectionable moral attitudes, but where these attitudes are only slightly 
offensive, and therefore the agent does not seem to be culpable for them. For example, many 
of us have friends who are chronically late. Some may feel very bad about this tendency, 
while some are shocked when others are annoyed by it. Let’s stipulate that the latter hold 
that it is no problem to be 10-15 minutes late to a meeting, and thereby fail to adequately 
value other people’s time. However, they do not grossly fail in this respect. They simply 
think that avoiding the stress of being rushed, or of better organizing their activities, is more 
important than the minor inconvenience being late causes those with whom they associate. 
Because this is such a minor failing, we might be inclined to simply tolerate this about them, 
and not blame them for it. One might wonder if proponents of the non-volitional view can 
satisfactorily accommodate cases like this. I think they can. It is open to them to argue that 
blame can come in degrees (reflected, perhaps, by the strength of the attitudes we adopt on 
account of our blame, or the degree to which we judge the agent to have shown a lack of 
regard), and that the appropriate degree of blame is proportional to the offensiveness of the 
attitude in question. So, they might argue, we do blame our chronically late friend, but to 
such a small degree that it registers as tolerance rather than blame. There may be other ways 
to handle cases like this. E.g. Holly Smith (2011) argues that an objectionable attitude can 
constitute a moral fault without being blameworthy if the attitude fails to capture an agent’s 
overall evaluative assessment of a moral situation (e.g. of the comparative value of other 
people’s time and their own interests) (140). This might apply here. It is possible that as 
long as the agent above shows that he cares about other people’s time in other ways, his 
chronic tardiness does not reflect his full assessment of the value of other people’s time, and 
is therefore a moral fault rather than something for which he is culpable.  
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moral attitudes (as I have described the case).57 However, proponents of non-volitional 
views would be likely to accept that such agents are an exception to the rule that pure moral 
ignorance always manifests an objectionable moral attitude, and that they are therefore non-
culpable (at least in this respect) for their moral ignorance. To suggest otherwise would be to 
insist we’re blameworthy unless we hold perfectly accurate moral beliefs, even with respect 
to genuinely difficult moral issues. But, again, it does not seem problematic for proponents 
of non-volitional culpability views to grant that in some cases, pure moral ignorance does 
not manifest an objectionable moral attitude, and is (in this respect), therefore non-
culpable.58 
 Of much greater concern for non-volitional culpability views are objections to the 
claim that an agent is always culpable for her moral ignorance if it manifests an 
objectionable moral attitude. Levy (2005) and Rosen (2002) raise objections to the latter by 
pointing to cases in which X clearly reflects objectionable moral attitudes but the agent of X 
is not obviously culpable for X on account of this. Levy (2005) argues that some agents are 
bad, and not also blameworthy, in virtue of the fact that it is not their fault that they have 
their objectionable attitudes. Rosen (2002) argues that some agents are not culpable for their 
moral ignorance, even though it manifests objectionable moral attitudes, insofar as they have 
                                                 
57 Again, it is possible to interpret Sarah’s confusion as a form of affected ignorance (i.e. 
she does not conclude that she should make significant sacrifices because she does not want 
to make such sacrifices). However, as I am imagining her, she would happily make such 
sacrifices if she judged this to the best course of action. 
58 Non-volitional culpability views will have to grant fewer exceptions to their view than 
Harman. This is because it is less plausible that many instances of pure moral ignorance fail 
to manifest an objectionable moral attitude than it is that many fail to manifest a failure to 
care sufficiently about things of moral significance. E.g. agents like Cleo5 and Grass are 
likely exceptions to the former, but not the latter. It is plausible that these agents care 
sufficiently about things of moral significance, but not that their failure to hold true moral 
beliefs does not manifest objectionable moral attitudes.  
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done everything they could have been reasonably expected to do in order to avoid their 
ignorance and/or the attitudes in question.  
 Levy’s (2005) objection is not directed against non-volitional stances towards moral 
ignorance in particular, but to a non-volitional stance toward culpability for attitudes more 
generally. He argues that, contrary to non-volitional views, the fact that X 
reflects/constitutes an objectionable moral attitude does not imply that an agent is culpable 
for it, and that how an agent came to have his attitudes is relevant to his culpability for them. 
In rejecting the non-volitional stance, Levy argues that it is committed to saying that agents 
whose objectionable moral attitudes are the result of traumatic brain injury, or poor 
formative circumstances, are nevertheless culpable for them. This, he claims, is highly 
unintuitive. In support of this, he discusses the well known cases of Phineas Gage and 
Robert Alton Harris (Levy, 2005, p. 5-9). According to Levy (2005), before the accident in 
which a tamping iron punctured his skull and damaged his brain, Gage was "sober and 
hardworking” (8). After this accident, Gage was “dissolute,” “anti-social” and had a 
diminished “ability to control his impulses” (Levy, 2005, p. 8).  These changes were 
permanent.59 Assuming that Gage’s new attitudes (as Levy describes them) can be properly 
                                                 
59 Macmillian (2000) argues that common accounts of Gage’s injury and the 
psychological changes he suffered as a result depart largely from the only detailed first-hand 
accounts we have of Gage (from the physician who treated him and from Gage’s mother). 
Of particular interest, Macmillian (2000) suggests that changes in Gage’s personality may 
not have been permanent. According to Gage’s physician and Gage’s mother (as reported by 
Macmillian), once Gage regained his strength after his injury, he held was employed on a 
horse farm in Chile for eight years (and returned due to illness), and was reported to have a 
special fondness for, and gentleness with his nieces and nephews, and animals (66). 
However, it is not important for Levy’s purpose that his description of Gage is accurate. It 
isn’t even important that some agents do, in fact, suffer significant, permanent negative 
changes in character as a result of traumatic brain injury or illness. Levy could simply point 
out that if an agent did suffer such changes as the result of a traumatic injury or illness, non-
volitionists would claim that they are culpable for their new objectionable attitudes. It is, 
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described as his own, proponents of non-volitional views will insist he is culpable for them; 
they constitute objectionable moral attitudes, and how he came to have them does not alter 
this fact.60 However, this is highly implausible. Robert Alton Harris suffered a horrible, 
emotionally and physically abusive upbringing. As an adult, he unapologetically murdered 
two teenagers in cold blood, calmly ate their lunch, and then bragged about the murder to 
others. Levy (2005) suggests that it is plausible that “Harris may not have had a genuine 
chance to become a better person; nevertheless the attitudes he expresses in his awful 
actions are genuinely his” (5). Both Gage and Harris, according to Levy (2005), are not 
blameworthy for their objectionable attitudes because it is not their fault that they have 
them; they are simply bad in virtue of having them (5). 
 Levy’s (2005) argument is directly applicable to non-volitional culpability views 
about moral ignorance. Many of the cases in which we are inclined to excuse an agent for 
her moral ignorance are ones in which their moral ignorance seems to be the result of some 
                                                                                                                                                      
however, plausible that some agents do suffer permanent negative changes in their character 
as a result of traumatic injury and illness. E.g. Burns et. al. (2003) describe a patient who 
acquired pedophilia and a inability to suppress sexual urges as the result of an orbitofrontal 
brain tumor. The patient’s tumor was noticed after he was sent to the hospital (from a 
treatment center) complaining of a headache. After his tumor was resected, his symptoms 
resolved. However, had he not been treated, his condition would have been persisted. 
60 As noted above, Levy (2005) likely mischaracterizes Gage. However, it we grant that 
some agent, Gage*, could exist and meet the description offered by Levy, it is likely that 
proponents of the non-volitional view would grant that Gage*’s new attitudes, at least at 
some point in time, are properly described as his own. Smith (2005) argues that the notion of 
an attitude being an agent’s own should be “spelled out in terms of the very network of 
beliefs and attitudes which I am suggesting ground our attributions of responsibility. . . A 
reasonable account of the conditions of responsibility should preserve our sense of the 
rational interrelations among our attitudes . . . (262). Assuming Gage*’s shift in attitudes 
was fairly global (i.e. most of his new attitudes reflected a lack of regard), it seems like this 
condition is met. Scanlon (1998) suggests in order for an attitude to be properly described as 
one’s own, it must bear “the right kind of stable and coherent connections between what one 
says, does, and how things seem to one at one time, and what one says, does, and how things 
seem to one at later times. . .” (278). At some point in time, this will arguably be true of 
Gage*’s new attitudes.  
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unfortunate circumstance(s). So, if Levy is right about Gage and Harris, this would suggest 
that in relevantly similar cases of moral ignorance, agents are not culpable for their moral 
ignorance even if it reflects/constitutes objectionable moral attitudes. Moreover, it would 
suggest that the conditions under which an agent formed her moral ignorance are relevant to 
her culpability for it. 
 Of proponents of non-volitional accounts of blame, Angela Smith has been the most 
outspoken with respect to cases like Gage and Harris, and more generally with respect to 
cases in which it seems that an agent is not culpable for his objectionable attitudes because it 
not his fault that he has those attitudes in the first place. She argues that in such cases, either 
the “agents” are not really agents at all, or they are, in fact, culpable for their attitudes. Smith 
(2005) argues that few of us are fully responsible for acquiring our particular values, but that 
this does not impact whether or not we are culpable for these values, for retaining them, and 
for displaying them (268-269).61 She cautions us against ever holding that agents are non-
culpable for their attitudes; doing so suggests that they are the passive victim of their own 
judgments, which in turn suggests that they are not agents at all (Smith, 2008, P. 390-391). 
The latter is true only if the agent’s upbringing or circumstances have “damaged their very 
capacity to critically evaluate and respond to reasons” which in turn inform the attitudes 
they adopt (Smith, 2015, P. 125). Otherwise, the agent’s attitudes accurately reflect her own 
moral values, and if they are objectionable, she is culpable for them. Smith (2005, 2008) 
                                                 
61 Miller (2014) argues that Smith ought to accept a historical condition on culpability: 
“(HB’) An agent S is blameworthy for an attitude (or value) A only if it is not the case that 
(a) A was acquired in a way that bypassed S’s rational capacities completely and that (b) A 
is  unsheddable” (Miller, 2014, P. 484). Such a condition would help Smith explain why 
agents like Gage* are not culpable for their attitudes, since his new attitudes likely met (a) 
and (b). It won’t help explain our reactions to cases like Harris’ which are more relevant to 
the topic of culpability for moral ignorance. 
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does allow that the conditions that contributed to an agent’s attitudes can affect the degree to 
which we blame her (268, 390). If, e.g., an objectionable attitude has been strongly 
reinforced by an agent’s culture, it might be very difficult for the agent to revise it, in which 
case we may blame her less harshly for it (Smith, 2005, p. 268). 
 Aside from this last response, none of Smith’s comments are likely to be particularly 
convincing to those who, like Levy, find it to be very odd to claim that an agent might be 
culpable for her objectionable moral attitudes even if they are the result of a traumatic brain 
injury or abuse that no human being should have to endure. Smith’s first two responses are 
reiterations of her view that agents are culpable for their objectionable moral attitudes 
(unless they are not agents at all). Levy rejects this. Her suggestion that how an agent came 
to have her attitudes (and the difficulty of shedding them) can lessen the degree of blame 
that is justified, might go some way towards lessening the counter-intuitiveness of holding 
that how an agent came to have an attitude is not relevant to his culpability for it. However, 
it is not clear how a non-volitional view of blame could support this claim. If blame 
constitutes a judgment that an agent has objectionable moral attitudes, or a demand that he 
defend those attitudes, it is not clear why facts about how he came to have those attitudes 
should affect the degree to which we blame him. Only facts about the degree to which an 
attitude is objectionable or defensible should do so.  
 
 So, we are faced with a clash of intuitions. Proponents of non-volitional views will 
insist that an agent is culpable for her objectionable moral attitudes (including moral 
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ignorance) regardless of how she came to have them, while Levy (2005) insists she is not.62 
However, it is possible to offer a different defense of Levy’s claims. If the conditions under 
which an agent forms his attitudes, or the conditions that explain why he persists in his 
moral ignorance, make it unreasonable to expect him to have avoided these deficiencies, it is 
plausible that he is not culpable for them. This is the objection Rosen raises to non-volitional 
culpability views. 
 
 Rosen (2003) argues that in some cases, agents are morally ignorant, and while their 
moral ignorance reflects or constitutes an objectionable moral attitude, they are nevertheless 
not culpable for these things insofar as they have done everything they could have been 
reasonably expected to do in order to avoid them. In support of this, he offers the example of 
an Ancient Hittite slave owner (Rosen, 2003, p. 65-66, 72-73). The slave owner buys and 
sells slaves, and separates families for his own material gain. He believes he is entitled to do 
so. Like others during this time period, he does not believe that the slaves are inferior. 
Instead, he thinks the fact that they are slaves is just bad luck. But though he acknowledges 
that slavery is a misfortune that could befall anyone, this does not lead him to question the 
warrant with which he buys and sells slaves, despite the misery he observes in the wake of 
these behaviors. Because slavery is socially accepted by all (or almost all) of those who 
whose opinions he care about, he doesn’t question the permissibility of the practice. Rosen 
                                                 
62 Levy (2005) does rely on the intuitive pull of his examples. However, he thinks that 
they point to the truth of a volitional view of blame, for which one could offer a more 
principled defense. As I noted above, I am not interested in taking up the issue of whether or 
not voluntary control is require for culpability. Moreover, I am not convinced that examples 
like that of Harris, at least, support volitional views. Our reluctance in blaming Harris is not 
due to the belief that no voluntary actions or omissions of his led him to hold his attitudes, 
but due to the belief that, given his past, he could not have been reasonably expected to 
avoid his attitudes.  
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(2003) argues that there is nothing the Hittite slave owner could have been reasonably 
expected to do in order to avoid his moral ignorance regarding slavery. Rosen (2003) argues 
that “one is normally under no obligation to rethink the uncontroversial normative principles 
that form the framework for social life,” but even if we stipulate that the Hittite man did 
reflect, “Given the intellectual and cultural resources available to a second millennium 
Hittite lord, it would have taken a moral genius to see through to the wrongness of chattel 
slavery” (65-66). So, Rosen (2003) argues that even if we grant that the Hittite’s moral 
ignorance reflects objectionable moral attitudes, due to what it would have taken for him to 
avoid this ignorance (i.e. that it would have required him to behave in ways we could not 
reasonably expect), he is not culpable for it (73). 
 Rosen’s claim that we are under no obligation to question uncontroversial moral 
principles, even if such principles endorse the intentional imposition of suffering upon one 
group of individuals for the benefit of another group, is certainly not uncontroversial. And, 
one might certainly reject Rosen’s description of the Hittite’s epistemic situation.  As I 
argued previously, it is implausible that such agents lack access to evidence via mere 
reflection that would count in favor of the conclusion that the practice of slavery is morally 
wrong. However, Rosen’s claims may be more plausible with respect to other cases. They 
may be plausible, e.g. with respect to agents like Harris, who form deformed moral beliefs 
as a result of very unfortunate formative circumstances. Like Billie Mac and Sadhanna, 
discussed earlier in the chapter, it is possible that Harris (and others with similar 
backgrounds) responded to the unrelenting abuse he faced as a child and adolescent by 
“numbing” himself so that he did not experience the emotions one might typically 
experience when subject to such abuse. As discussed earlier, habitual numbing like this can 
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sometimes result in callous, uncaring attitudes towards others (which certainly describe 
Harris). Expecting him to avoid these attitudes, and thereby to avoid moral ignorance that 
manifests them, would require him to take action (i.e. to refrain from engaging in emotional 
numbing) that we could not reasonably expect him to take (since emotional numbing may 
have been the only resource Harris had to endure the abuse he suffered). It is therefore not 
clear that we could reasonably expect Harris, and others like him (e.g. Billie Mac, 
Sadhanna) to avoid his objectionable attitudes or resulting moral ignorance.  
Because it is plausible that it is unfair to blame agents for that which they could not 
be reasonably expected to avoid, and it is plausible that some agents cannot be reasonably 
expected to avoid their moral ignorance, it is plausible that even if moral ignorance reflects 
or constitutes an objectionable moral attitude, agents are not always thereby culpable for it. 
It is also plausible that the conditions that explain why an agent is ignorant are indeed not 
irrelevant to her culpability for that ignorance. 
 
 Proponents of non-volitional views are not without resources to respond to this 
objection. Hieronymi (2004) argues that the claim that it is unfair to blame agents in such 
cases rests on the view that blame carries a particular force and that it is only fair to subject 
an agent to this force if her action/attitude meets certain historical conditions. This is a claim 
that she rejects. Many hold that the characteristic force of blame rests in the negative 
consequences it imposes upon the wrongdoer, and that it is fair to impose negative 
consequences upon an agent on account of X only if the agent had a reasonable opportunity 
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to avoid X.63 However, Hieronymi argues that the characteristic force of blame does not lie 
in any negative consequences we impose as a result of blaming an agent, but instead lies in 
the judgment of blame itself; i.e. in the judgment that the agent has show a disregard or ill 
will. “That judgment—even if incorrect—makes it the case that you no longer stand in 
relations in which your good will is recognized on all sides” (Hieronymi, 2004, P. 124). 
Standing in relations of mutual regard is very important to us, and so blame carries a painful 
force. Because the force of blame is explained by the content of the judgment and its 
implication, blame cannot be rendered unfair by the fact that an agent could not have been 
reasonably expected to avoid that for which she is blamed. Judgments are only unfair if they 
are unjustified, and the historical conditions under which one came to have a certain attitude, 
or which led one to perform a particular action never render the judgment that an agent 
showed disregard or ill will unjustified all on their own (Hieronymi, 2004, p. 124). 
I do not wish to take issue with Hieronymi’s argument that blame cannot be rendered 
unfair by its force; I take this argument to be highly plausible. However, it does not resolve 
the worry that blame might be rendered unfair in some other manner, and that for this 
reason, it might be unfair to blame agents for things we could not reasonably expect them to 
avoid. It is plausible that when we blame an agent for failing to show proper regard, we 
implicitly endorse the demand that she show proper regard.64 But, if the demand is not itself 
                                                 
63 For example, Wallace (1996) agues that the reactive attitudes associated with blame 
are painful for the recipient, Watson (1996) argues that to blame someone involves taking a 
stance that certain negative responses to them would be appropriate, and Wolf (1990) argues 
that to blame someone involves assessing something that is a deep aspect of their agency, 
and therefore to assess them in a particularly deep and painful manner. For Hieronymi’s 
(2004) discussion, and rejection of each particular, view see p. 119-121, 120-122, and 122-
124. 
64 I have in mind demands in the sense of a claim one or more agents makes against 
another. We often do demand that agents fulfill their moral obligations, but obligations are 
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fair, we are treating the agent under judgment unfairly by endorsing it. For example, Susan 
is a stock broker. She works for another broker, Stan. If the market is open, either Stan or 
Susan must be in the office. Stan takes all major holidays off, and has done so for the past 10 
years while he has worked with Susan. On his way out of the office, he informs Susan the he 
will, once again, be taking Christmas Eve off. Susan refuses this arrangement. Stan reports 
this to his wife, who blames Susan for refusing. In doing so, Stan’s wife endorses the 
demand that Susan work on Christmas Eve. Because the demand that Susan work (yet again) 
on Christmas Eve is unfair, Stan’s wife treats Susan unfairly in endorsing it (i.e. in blaming 
Susan for refusing the arrangement). 
 Something similar may be thought to occur when we blame agents for things they 
could not be reasonably expected to avoid. Consider an example offered by Hieronymi 
(2004). 
Suppose that a coworker is both extremely competitive and  
extremely insensitive, due to untoward formative circumstances  
beyond her control. As a result, she is constantly putting others down  
and manipulating people and circumstances so as to gain the best of  
limited goods. As presently constituted, she is unable to respond to others  
in ways that show proper regard for them (Hieronymi, 2004, P. 126). 
 
Hieronymi (2004) argues persuasively that it is not unfair to blame this agent due to the 
force of the judgment of blame. However, even if the judgment that this agent has shown ill 
will is accurate, it is not clear that it is fair to blame her if we take seriously the claim that 
she could not avoid her actions (e.g. manipulating others, putting others down), due to her 
constitution, and that she could not be reasonably expected to avoid her constitution due to 
                                                                                                                                                      
not themselves demands. E.g. I might demand that my husband fulfill his obligation to 
assume equal responsibility for our children, but his obligation to do so is not itself a 
demand. Therefore, on the view I sketch above, a demand that an agent fulfill his obligation 
might be unfair, while the obligation itself is not. I am not convinced that obligations can be 
unfair, but holding others to them certainly can be. 
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her poor formative circumstances. In blaming her, we endorse the demand that she show 
proper regard to others. If she cannot be reasonably expected to do so, then it is arguable that 
this demand is unfair, as is endorsing it.65  
 If this is right, then Rosen’s (2003) objection to non-volitional culpability views is a 
powerful one. It is highly plausible that some agents cannot be reasonably expected to avoid 
their moral ignorance, and it is highly plausible that it is therefore unfair to blame them for 
it. This is true even if we grant that it is not unfair to impose the force of blame upon an 
agent on account of X, despite the fact that she could not have been reasonably expected to 
avoid X. If an agent cannot be reasonably expected to avoid her moral ignorance, it is 
arguably unfair to demand that she do so, and thereby unfair to blame her for failing to do 
so. This suggests that the non-volitional culpability view is mistaken in holding that the 
mere fact that an agent’s moral ignorance manifests an objectionable moral attitude implies 
that she is culpable for it, and in holding that the conditions under which an agent formed 
her moral are irrelevant to her culpability for it 
 
3.6 Moving Forward 
 I have argued that Harman’s culpability view and the non-volitional view face the 
same main problem. It is plausible that agents sometimes are not culpable for their moral 
ignorance because they could not be reasonably expected to avoid it. This is true even when 
an agent’s moral ignorance manifests an objectionable moral attitude, or a failure to care 
sufficiently about things of moral significance. As noted above, it is open to proponents of 
culpability views to argue either (i) that agents can always be reasonably expected to avoid 
                                                 
65 Hieronymi (2004) grants that “issuing a demand to someone unable to meet it seems 
not only pointless but also unfair” (118).  
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their moral ignorance, or (ii) that agents can be culpable for that which they could not be 
reasonably expected to avoid (e.g. that it is not, in fact, unfair to blame agents for that which 
they could not be reasonably expected to avoid). As also noted above, arguing for either 
claim requires an account of the conditions under which an agent can be reasonably 
expected to avoid her moral ignorance, and the relationship between whether or not an agent 
can be reasonably expected to avoid X and her culpability for Xing (or not X’ing). I offer 
such an account in the following chapter, where I argue that (i) and (ii) are implausible.  
However, I also argue that we should not abandon culpability views altogether on 
these grounds. Proponents of culpability views could accept that agents are not culpable for 
their moral ignorance if they could not have been reasonably expected to avoid it, and 
therefore give up the claim that the conditions under which an agent formed her moral 
ignorance are irrelevant to her culpability for it, without relinquishing the view that, when 
agents are culpable for their moral ignorance, they are directly culpable for it. In doing so, 
they would retain the core elements of their view while adopting a more moderate, and 
intuitive stance towards culpability for moral ignorance. 
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PART III: REASONABLE MORAL EXPECTATIONS, THE MORAL 
IGNORANCE DEBATE, AND CULPABILITY FOR MORAL 
IGNORACE 
 
Chapter 4 
   
   Reasonable Moral Expectations and Culpability  
for Moral Ignorance 
 
4.1 Reasonable Moral Expectations and the Moral Ignorance Debate 
 In Chapters 2 and 3, I argued that skeptical arguments against blameworthiness, and 
strict culpability views of moral ignorance, depend for their success on a general account of 
the conditions under which an agent can be reasonably expected to X, and the relationship 
between what can be reasonably expected of an agent, and her culpability. So far, no 
account like this has been offered. In this chapter, I develop one, and apply it to the moral 
ignorance debate. I then argue, on the basis of this discussion, that the skeptical argument 
against blame ought to be rejected entirely, and that strict culpability views of moral 
ignorance must be significantly revised.  
 After considering and rejecting common assumptions concerning the conditions 
under which a moral expectation is reasonable in section 4.3, I argue for an account of 
reasonable moral expectations (in section 4.4) comprised of the following sufficient and 
necessary conditions. A moral expectation is reasonable if it either requires an agent (i) to 
refrain from acting in ways that treat other agents as lacking inherent or equal value and (iii) 
is not pointless, or it if requires an agent (ii) to refrain from acting in ways that treat their 
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interests as lacking or being of less relative importance compared to the interests of others 
and (iii) is not pointless. A moral expectation is unreasonable if it meets neither (i) nor (ii), 
or if fails to meet (iii).  
After considering and answering a number of objections to this account of 
reasonable moral expectations in section 4.5, in section 4.6, I argue that on this account of 
reasonable moral expectations, blaming an agent for failing to do that which she could not 
have been reasonably expected to do, is often unjustified. Moral expectations that are 
unreasonable on my view, it turns out, often also fail to treat like cases alike. When we 
blame an agent for failing to meet some expectation, we implicitly endorse the expectation. 
If the expectation itself is unfair, because it fails to treat like cases alike, in implicitly 
endorsing it, we fail to treat like cases alike. So, on my view, in blaming agents for failing to 
meet a demand they could not be reasonably expected to meet, we treat them or others 
unfairly.   
In section 4.7, I apply this view of reasonable moral expectations and their relation to 
culpability to the moral ignorance debate. I argue that, given my account of reasonable 
moral expectations, proponents of skeptical arguments cannot defend a key premise of their 
argument: moral ignorance is culpable only if it is the result of a knowing mismanagement 
of one’s moral beliefs. In Chapter 2 I argued that this premise is only plausible if it is also 
true that agents can be reasonably expected to avoid their moral ignorance only if it is the 
result of a knowing mismanagement of their moral beliefs. Using the account of reasonable 
expectations that I defend in section 4.4, I argue that this further claim is implausible. If this 
is right, proponents of the skeptical argument lack the resources to defend one of their 
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central premises. Given this, I argue, we ought to reject the skeptical argument, and thereby 
the view that agents are almost never culpable for their moral ignorance.  
In Chapter 3 I argued that it is plausible that given their epistemic or cultural 
circumstances, some agents could not be reasonably expected to avoid their moral 
ignorance, and that some agents could not be reasonably expected to avoid the insufficient 
moral care or objectionable moral attitudes manifested by their moral ignorance. In this 
chapter, I offer a positive argument for both claims. In light of them, I argue that proponents 
of culpability views should not hold that agents are always culpable for their moral 
ignorance insofar as it manifests insufficient moral care or objectionable moral attitudes. 
Instead, they ought to hold that agents are culpable for their moral ignorance if it manifests 
these objectionable states and they could have been reasonably expected to avoid both their 
moral ignorance and the states in question. While this constitutes a significant alteration of 
culpability views, it does not require their proponents to abandon their main aims and 
claims. They can still maintain that agents are very often culpable for their moral ignorance. 
The result of this discussion is what I hope will be a highly useful account of 
reasonable moral expectations, and a highly intuitive approach towards agents’ culpability 
for their moral ignorance. Although I do not take a stance on when agents are culpable for 
their moral ignorance, I argue that, whatever view one adopts concerning the latter, one must 
accept the condition that agents are only culpable for their moral ignorance, if they could 
have been reasonably expected to avoid it. This condition prevents participants in the moral 
ignorance debate from taking up the extreme positions that have characterized it up until this 
point. When one accepts this condition, one arrives at a more moderate view: although 
agents are culpable for their moral ignorance more often than not, there are real exceptions.  
  95 
 
4.2 Moral Expectations: A general description 
Before turning to my main arguments, it will be helpful to outline the general notion 
of moral expectation with which I will be working. I understand having an expectation of 
another agent in terms of holding the agent to a demand.66 I’ll unpack this view in a 
moment, but first notice that expecting something of an agent, in the sense of holding her to 
a demand, is different from holding a predictive expectation about how she will act, or 
judging that she ought to act in a particular way. I can hold an agent to a demand without 
also predicting that she will act so as to fulfill it. E.g. I might hold all of my students to the 
demand that they complete the reading for the course; my course might be intentionally 
designed such that students who read tend to do well in many ways that students who do not 
read cannot (e.g. on reading quizzes). This can be true even if I predict that many of my 
students will not complete the reading. Similarly, I might hold drivers in the Atlanta metro 
to the demand that they not look at their cell phones while driving. I may give them 
disapproving looks when I see them doing this, or I may toot my horn and wag my finger at 
them, or even report their activity to the police. And, again, this might be true even if I 
                                                 
66 This is Wallace’s (2008) understanding of expectations. However, Wallace 
understands holding an agent to a demand to be captured by being susceptible to the reactive 
attitudes if the demand is flouted, or at least being disposed to believe these attitudes to be 
appropriate if the demand is flouted. I part ways with him here. My own view of what is 
involved in holding an agent to a demand is heavily influenced by MacNamara’s (2011) 
account of “holding demands.” A holding demand “second-personally imposes normative 
burdens” on another agent… “with the aim of inducing in her first-personal practical uptake 
of the ought that binds her” (MacNamara, 2011, p. 92). These demands are, “the forward-
looking analogue of punishments and reproofs” (MacNamara, 2011, p. 92). Tognazzini 
(2015) briefly discusses interactions aimed at “enforcement of a standard” which he 
characterizes as attempts to provide forward-looking motivation to act as one ought (40). He 
suggests these interactions are something like holding demands, but that they do no only 
involve moral obligations (as MacNamara suggests). My view also bears similarities to this 
idea. 
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predict that the majority of drivers in the Atlanta metro will look at their phones while they 
drive. Moreover, when we hold an agent to a demand, we do something besides judging that 
they ought to comply with the demand. For example, I might tell my husband, for the 
millionth time, that our daughter really should practice piano more often. He might reply 
“well, do something about it. Hold her to it.” If holding her to the demand that she practice 
the piano more often involved nothing more than judging that she ought to comply with the 
demand, his suggestion that I hold her to it would not make sense.67 
When we have an expectation of an agent in the sense in which I am concerned, we 
hold her to a demand. When we hold an agent to a demand, we guard against her future 
infractions of it. This might involve taking proactive measures to guard against her 
infractions, or responding to her infractions of the demand with measures intended to guard 
against her future infractions of it. 68 These “measures” might take the shape of threats of 
negative consequences, negative reinforcement, penalties, and reproof or rebuke, all aimed 
at the prevention of future infractions. Suppose, for example, that I demand that my 
daughter practice piano more often. I might guard against her (future) infraction of this 
demand by asserting a rule: that she cannot play with her friends until she has practiced 
piano, and demanding that she follow this rule on pain of suffering some negative 
                                                 
67 I borrow this type of example from MacNamara (2011), who makes a similar point 
(about holding an agent to a demand being non-reducible to moral appraisal) with a similar 
example (90).  
68 I have no position about how to judge whether, in a particular instance, we in fact hold 
an individual to a demand. It seems that in some cases (e.g. cases in which we recognize a 
high probability that the individual in question will violate the demand), in order for it to be 
plausible that we actually hold the individual to the demand, we must take proactive actions 
to guard against infraction. In other cases, we plausibly hold an agent to a demand simply by 
reacting to its infraction in ways intended to guard against future infraction. It is sufficient 
for my purposes here that we can be said to hold an agent to a demand if we are ready to 
guard against its infraction, while acknowledging this requires different things in different 
circumstances. 
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consequence. If enforcement proves necessary, I might withhold her allowance if she does 
not practice. Or I might reprove her if she does not practice, “It’s only 20 minutes! You can 
spare 20 minutes to learn a skill that you will value for the rest of your life.”69 
To hold a moral expectation of an agent is to hold the agent to a moral demand, i.e. a 
demand targeted to an agent qua moral agent (as opposed to as a friend, boss, husband, and 
so on) and one the issuer takes to be primarily supported by moral reasons. E.g., a 
shopkeeper might expect others not to steal from his store. The demand that they not do so is 
moral insofar as it is addressed to moral agents qua moral agents, and the shopkeeper (as I 
am imagining him) takes it to be primarily supported by moral reasons, e.g. that stealing is 
dishonest, unjust, disrespectful, and so on.70 The means through which we guard against the 
infraction of moral demands (by those to whom our expectations are directed), are similar to 
the means through which we guard against the infraction of non-moral demands. We guard 
                                                 
69 As this paragraph suggests, I think the activity of holding an agent to a demand 
involves imposing (or being ready to impose) a negative consequence if the demand is 
infracted. We do often encourage desired behavior through positive means. E.g. I would 
likely be more successful in getting my daughter to practice piano if I praised her lavishly 
for doing so, offered her rewards for doing so, or figured out a way to make practicing really 
fun for her. However, while employing these forms of positive reinforcement are likely to 
bring about increased practicing on her part, I do not think that in employing them, I could 
be said to be holding my daughter to the demand that she practice piano more often. 
Offerings of positive reinforcement invite and encourage a behavior. Demands insist on a 
behavior. So, I am not convinced that we can hold an agent to a demand through positive 
reinforcement. This line of thought is echoed in the work of other philosophers. E.g. Watson 
(1996) argues that holding agent responsible involves holding an agent to a requirement by 
responding to her violation of this requirement with “sanctions” and “unwanted or adverse 
treatment” (237). 
70 I do not mean to suggest that all moral demands are sufficiently supported by moral 
reasons, but that whatever reasons the issuer takes to support them, are primarily moral 
reasons. E.g. an anti-abortion activist might demand that fellow activists make women feel 
terrible about their decision to obtain an abortion, in the hopes that these women will change 
their minds. I take it that this is a moral demand, even if it is not sufficiently supported by 
moral reasons. The reasons that the activist takes to support this demand are mostly moral, 
e.g. that this will protect a fetus’ right to life, or prevent innocent children from being 
harmed.  
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against infractions of moral demands by threatening negative consequences for those who 
violate them, and by responding to infractions by imposing these negative consequences.71 
Imagine, e.g., that Augie is in her 90’s and though she still gets around, she uses a walker, 
and is obviously a bit weak and unsteady on her feet. She boards a bus on which all the seats 
are taken. She scans the passengers and notices that with the exception of a healthy young 
woman, who is focused on a book she is reading, all of the passengers in the front seats are 
also elderly or disabled. Augie politely asks the young woman for her seat. The woman 
briefly looks up, indicating that she has heard Augie’s request, but ignores her and continues 
to read. I take the demand that the young woman give her seat to Augie to be a moral 
demand. It is issued to the young woman qua moral agent, and Augie (or someone else) 
issuing it would likely take it to be supported by moral reasons; to give up her seat involves 
no significant sacrifice on the part of the woman, and would prevent risk of significant harm 
to Augie (from standing during the ride). Augie might hold this young woman to this moral 
demand in ways similar to those we saw above. She might try to persuade the bus driver to 
give the woman the option of giving up her seat or getting off the bus. Or, Augie might 
verbally rebuke the woman, informing her that “Common decency calls for you to move. 
You are being disrespectful and inconsiderate. Get up.”   
                                                 
71 We are often not in a position to threaten or impose penalties upon moral agents, qua 
moral agents. E.g. I am in no position to penalize another agent for taking my parking spot, 
or for failing to help as I am scrambling to pick up my spilled belongings. For this reason, I 
think we most often guard against infractions of moral demands through verbal rebuke and 
reproofs. My discussion will focus on these forms of enforcement. One might worry that 
verbal rebuke and reproofs that are responses to anticipated or actual violations of moral 
demands are simply expressions of the negative reactive attitudes, and are therefore properly 
characterized as forms of blame rather than attempts to guard against future infractions of 
demands. While verbal rebukes and reproofs aimed at preventing future infractions of a 
moral demand might “air” our negative reactive attitudes, they do not aim at doing so; their 
aim is forward-looking, not backward looking. I therefore do not think they are properly 
construed as forms of blame. 
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On the view I have sketched, expecting an agent to X—holding her to the demand 
that she X—is a forward looking activity. When we wonder whether or not an expectation is 
reasonable, on my view, we are questioning whether this forward looking activity, of 
holding an agent to a demand, is justified. Is it appropriate to hold this agent (or set of 
agents) to this demand; is it appropriate to guard against their present and future infractions 
of it? Our answer to this question will depend on at least three things: (1) the 
appropriateness of the demand itself, (2) the relationship between the demand and the 
recipient (e.g. what is required for this agent to comply with the demand), and (3) the 
relationship between the agent holding to the demand, and the agent being held to it. Notice 
that we might also wonder whether the means through which we hold an agent to a demand 
are justified. While there surely are norms that govern the appropriateness of the means 
through which we hold agents to demands, it is the question of whether or not it is 
appropriate to hold an agent to a particular demand at all that is relevant to an agent’s 
culpability. And, this is the question on which I will exclusively focus. 
It might at first seem puzzling that the reasonableness of holding an agent to a 
demand (a forward looking activity) could impact the legitimacy of blame (a backward 
looking activity or judgment). Along similar lines, one might wonder if moral expectations 
as I have described them above, are the same expectations that philosophers typically have 
in mind when they claim that agents cannot be culpable for that which they could not be 
reasonably expected to avoid. I can offer a few initial words of reassurance.  
When we blame an agent, we often do so insofar as she has failed to live up to some 
a demand we have placed upon her. E.g. we blame agents for failing to respect other agents, 
or for failing to be fair or honest. If it was inappropriate to issue a demand, this will 
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undermine the propriety of blaming the targeted party for failing to meet that demand. It is 
unreasonable of me to demand that my neighbor pay my rent. And it would be similarly 
inappropriate for me to hold her to this demand by imposing or threatening negative 
consequences (e.g. reproof). It is plausible that this has implications for whether or not I am 
justified in blaming her for failing to pay my rent.  
However, when trying to determine whether or not an agent is culpable for X, by 
way of considering whether or not he could be reasonably expected to avoid X,  we are 
typically faced with a situation that is much more complex. Instead of wondering if we 
would be justified in blaming an agent for an action that she might perform or fail to 
perform (e.g. not paying my rent), we are in the position of wondering if she is culpable for 
an action or omission that has already taken place. In even more complicated cases, we are 
considering whether or not an agent is culpable for something she did in the distant past 
(perhaps before we even existed), or whether she is culpable for something that cannot be 
done differently in the future. Consider the following examples. (1) We wonder whether 
Luis is culpable for lying to his wife last night about the nature of one of his former 
relationships. (2) We wonder whether or not Luis is culpable for lying to his wife, years ago, 
about the nature of one of his former relationships. (3) We wonder whether or not Luis is 
culpable for chopping down his wife’s beloved apricot tree without her consent. In the first 
case, one might rightfully wonder what the appropriateness of guarding against Luis’s future 
infractions of the demand that he not lie to his wife about his former relationships, has to do 
with whether or not he is culpable for having lied last night. This may seem even more 
puzzling in the second case, when more time has elapsed between the past misdeed and the 
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present expectation. In the third case, there is no relevant present demand to which to hold 
Luis. The deed is done; the apricot tree is gone.  
In fact, I do not think these cases are as complicated as they seem. In some cases in 
which we are wondering whether or not an agent is culpable for something she has already 
done, the fact that we could (now) reasonably hold her to the demand that she not X, is 
plausibly relevant to her culpability for Xing. This is true when nothing significant has 
changed in an agent or her situation, between the time she performed the act in question, and 
the present. For example, if nothing has changed about Luis or his situation since last night, 
then whether or not we can now reasonably hold him to the demand that he be honest with 
his wife about his past relationships is relevant whether or not we can justifiably blame him 
for violating this demand last night. If it would be inappropriate to reprove Luis for lying to 
his wife, with the aim of preventing his future infractions of the demand that he not do so, 
then plausibly bears on whether or not he is blameworthy for having lied to her. Cases in 
which a lot of time has elapsed, or there is no relevant demand to which we could now hold 
the agent are, admittedly, a bit more complicated. In these cases, the fact that we could (or 
could not) now reasonably hold the agent to a demand that she X may not bear on her 
culpability for ~Xing. But, the fact that we (or others) could have (or could not have) 
reasonably done so at the time that she ~Xed, is relevant to her culpability. For example, it is 
possible that much about Luis’ situation when he lied to his wife years ago is different from 
his present situation. Perhaps he had just met his wife, and had no idea he would marry her. 
Perhaps he thought she was a one-night-stand, and did not see the point of honestly 
discussing his past with someone he would never see again. Under these circumstances, 
whether or not we could now reasonably hold Luis to the demand that he not lie to his wife, 
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is irrelevant to whether or not he is culpable for lying to her all those years ago. However, 
whether or not we (or someone else, perhaps his wife) could have then held him to this 
demand, is plausibly relevant to his culpability for violating it.72 In cases in which there is 
no relevant demand to which we could now hold the agent, the question of whether or not 
we could reasonably do so is obviously not relevant to the agent’s culpability for her past 
action. For example, we cannot hold Luis to the demand that he not chop down his wife’s 
favorite apricot tree without her consent; the tree is gone. But, it is either the case that we (or 
others) could or could not have reasonably held Luis to the demand that he not chop it down 
without her consent, at the time that he did. And if, for some reason, it would have been 
inappropriate to guard against Luis’ infractions of this demand, at the time he chopped down 
the tree, surely this is relevant to his culpability for violating this demand. 
 
4.3 Towards a General Account of Reasonable Moral Expectations: Common 
Assumptions 
To my knowledge, although philosophers often appeal to reasonable expectations, 
and assume that agents cannot be blamed for that which they could not be reasonably 
expected to avoid, no one has attempted to offer a general account of the conditions under 
which a moral expectation is reasonable. However, there are common themes in the remarks 
and arguments that philosophers make with respect to what can be reasonably expected of 
an agent. Philosophers tend to hold that whether or not an expectation is reasonable, depends 
on the capacity of the agent to whom the expectation is communicated, the difficulty an 
                                                 
72 It may, of course, be difficult for us to determine whether we or others could have 
reasonably held an agent to a demand at some time in the past. But, this does not impact the 
claim that the fact that we (or others) could or could not have done so is plausibly relevant to 
whether or not the agent is culpable for his past violation of the demand. 
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agent faces in meeting it, and the fairness or unfairness of expecting her to act in the manner 
demanded of her.73 In this section, I consider whether any of the latter are conditions on the 
reasonableness of moral expectations, and argue that none of them are. To arrive at a general 
account of reasonable moral expectations, by identifying the conditions under which moral 
expectations are reasonable or unreasonable, we must abandon these traditional approaches. 
 
Capacity and Reasonable Expectations 
A number of philosophers hold that, in order for a moral expectation to be 
reasonable, (i) the agent to whom it is communicated must have the capacity to meet it.74 
Some also hold (ii) that the agent must have a fair opportunity to exercise this capacity.75 I 
argue that in its current formulation, (i) is implausible, but does point to an important related 
condition on the reasonableness of an expectation: in order for an expectation to be 
reasonable, it must not be pointless for us to hold an agent to the demand in question. I argue 
(ii) is better understood as a claim about the difficulty or fairness of an expectation. 
 
                                                 
73 E.g., Wolf (1986) argues that it is unreasonable to expect agents with extremely 
deprived backgrounds to see anything wrong with their immoral actions insofar as they lack 
the capacity to do so (232). Levy (2009) argues that agents can be reasonably expected to 
conform their behavior to normative standards “only if they have the capacity to behave 
accordingly” (735). Ciurria (2014) defends an account of reasonable expectations according 
to which an agent can be reasonably expected to avoid X only if she has the capacity to do 
so, and a fair opportunity to exercise this capacity. Wallace (1996) argues that agents cannot 
be reasonably expected to avoid their actions if they lack “powers of reflective self-control,” 
or the powers to grasp moral reasons and to control one’s behavior in light of them (215-
217). Benson (2001) argues that we sometimes cannot reasonably expect an agent to do 
something if it “would be so extremely difficult that we could not fairly hold her to the 
demand that she do so” (614). Fricker (2016) argues that moral expectations are only 
reasonable if they are not excessively demanding (168). 
74 E.g. Wolf (1986), Ciurria (2014), and Wallace (1996) 
75 E.g. Ciurria (2014) 
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There are two ways to interpret (i). One might understand it to amount to the claim 
that an expectation is reasonable only if the agent does not lack the very general capacities 
required to comply with it, such as, e.g., the capacities to form beliefs in response to reasons, 
alter those beliefs in response to new evidence, form intentions, act on those intentions, and 
so on. Alternatively, one might interpret it as the claim that an expectation is reasonable only 
if the agent does not lack the personal capacity to comply with it, determined by the 
particular psychology of the agent, at the relevant time. Imagine, e.g., that Carol witnesses a 
brutal attack. She is paralyzed by fear—she is frozen, unable to think or move—and does 
nothing to aid the victim. This reaction is a non-voluntary, physiological reaction that is the 
result of a malfunction of her cerebellum.76 Carol has lived a sheltered life, and has never 
truly believed herself, or someone nearby, to be in serious danger. She was therefore not 
aware that she would have this reaction to perceived danger. While Carol has the general 
capacities required to aid the victim (e.g. the ability form beliefs and intentions, to act on 
those intentions, and so on), she lacks the personal capacity to do so. Given her psychology 
and physiology at the time of witnessing the attack, she cannot help her.  
 If anything, the reasonableness of an expectation depends on the personal capacities 
of the agent to whom it is addressed. While an agent must have the general capacities of 
moral agency in order for it to make any sense to hold her to a moral demand, it is not 
plausible that this is a condition on the reasonableness of a particular moral expectation. The 
fact that an agent lacks the general capacities to comply with a moral expectation indicates 
that no moral expectations (and not just this one in particular) ought to be addressed to her.  
                                                 
76 For a discussion of the physiological responses (and in particular, the neural 
pathways) involved in the phenomenon of being frozen with fear, see Koutsikou et. al. 
(2014).  
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So, the question is whether we should accept the personal capacity claim: in order for 
a moral expectation to be reasonable, an agent must not lack the personal capacity to fulfill 
it.77 Recall that in having a moral expectation of another agent, we hold her to a moral 
demand; we guard against her future infractions of the demand. So, our question is whether 
or not we should accept the claim that if an agent lacks the personal capacity to comply with 
a demand, this entails that it is unreasonable to guard against her infraction of it, by 
threatening and imposing negative consequences aimed at preventing such infractions. I 
argue that there is insufficient support for this claim.  
 
One might argue that it pointless to hold an agent to a demand if she lacks the 
personal capacity to comply with it. However, I am not convinced that this is true, except in 
a very small minority of cases. In many instances, an agent temporarily lacks a personal 
capacity to comply with a demand. In such cases, it is not pointless to nevertheless hold the 
agent to the demand. For example, drunk drivers temporarily lack the capacity to comply 
with the demand that they not drive recklessly. In holding a drunk driver to the demand that 
he not drive recklessly, we might verbally rebuke him for doing so. “How could you have 
been so stupid? Don’t you realize that you could have killed someone or yourself? You 
could have killed a child! You cannot take risks like that.” Such a rebuke, aimed at 
preventing the agent’s future infractions of the demand that he not drive recklessly, it is a 
way of holding him to this demand. While this might be unsuccessful in preventing future 
infractions on his part, it certainly isn’t pointless. It makes good sense to try, with whatever 
                                                 
77 This is what most philosophers have in mind when they suggest that an agent’s 
incapacity renders an expectation unreasonable. Most tend to focus on the particular, 
personal capacities of the agent (e.g. his ability to feel empathy with others). 
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resources we have, to prevent future instances of reckless (drunk) driving on behalf of this 
agent.  
Even when an agent permanently lacks the personal capacity to comply with a 
demand, I am not convinced that it follows that it is pointless to hold her to it. Though we 
may sometimes permanently lack the personal capacity to comply with a demand, we may 
often be able to compensate for this lack of capacity in ways that allow us (eventually, with 
the help of others) to bring it about that we not violate the demand. Consider Carol again. 
Imagine that Carol’s brain malfunction cannot be treated through therapy, surgery, or drugs.  
She will always, unavoidably respond to the perception that she or others are in serious 
danger by freezing in terror. We might nevertheless demand that Carol do something in 
response to perceived danger. For example, we might (gently) reprove her. “Look Carol, I 
know it’s not your fault that you freeze in these types of situations. But this can’t go on. It’s 
not safe for you or others. You need to be able to do something to help yourself or other 
victims in an emergency. You can’t just stand there and watch it happen!” I am not 
convinced that this is pointless. While Carol might not be able to change the fact that she 
freezes in the presence of perceived danger, she might be able to bring it about in other ways 
that she can do something to secure her own safety and the safety of others (e.g. she might 
be able to wear an alert bracelet that she only needs to push in order to get assistance). It is 
at least possible that our reproof will prevent Carol’s future infraction of the demand that she 
do something to help when she or others are in danger. It is therefore not pointless to hold 
her to this demand by taking measures to guard against her future infractions of it. 
There may be some cases in which it is pointless to hold an agent to a demand, 
insofar as the agent in question entirely lacks the capacity to bring it about (even at some 
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distant point in the future, even with assistance from others) that she comply with the 
demand. Such cases would be very rare. However, they do exist. E.g. we ordinarily hold 
agents to the demand that the recall important facts about family members. It would be 
pointless to hold an agent with advanced Alzheimer’s disease to this demand if he 
permanently lacks the capacity to do so, and there is nothing he could do, even with the 
assistance of others, to bring it about that he do so. But, again, such cases are rare, and they 
are not typically what philosophers have in mind when arguing that an expectation is 
unreasonable insofar as an agent lacks the capacity to fulfill it.78 
Alternatively, one might think there is something unfair about having an expectation 
of an agent that they cannot meet, and that for this reason expectations are reasonable only if 
the agents to whom they are directed have the personal capacity to meet them. Having an 
expectation of an agent amounts to holding her to a demand, which in turn involves 
threatening and imposing negative consequences upon a person aimed at preventing her 
from violating the demand. One might think it is unfair to threaten and impose negative 
consequences upon an individual for something she lacks the capacity to avoid. However, I 
think this depends on the purpose of imposing the consequences. It is plausible that it is 
unfair to impose negative consequences, for retributive purposes, upon an agent for violating 
a demand with which she lacked the capacity to comply. Negative consequences that are 
imposed for retributive purposes are justified, in part, by the fault of the agent in question. If 
                                                 
78 Most philosophers who endorse the capacity claim do not have in mind agents who 
lack the capacity to bring it about (sometime in the future, with the help of others) that they 
comply with the demand. Instead, they have in mind agents who face significant challenges 
in doing so.  E.g. Wolf (1986) argues that agents with very poor formative circumstances 
might lack the capacity to comply with a demand (232). Ciurria (2014) argues along similar 
lines, that given his terrible childhood, and the fact that he may have been suffering from 
mental illness, Robert Alton Harris lacked the capacity to comply with the moral demand 
that he not murder others (9-10). 
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there is no fault, these consequences are not justified. Negative consequences imposed for 
the purpose of preventing infractions of a demand are justified by the worthiness of this aim. 
If we assume this aim is justified, then in most cases, the fact that an agent lacked the 
capacity to comply with the demand in question, does not render it unfair to nevertheless 
hold her to the demand. Again, if it is impossible for the agent, even with time and the 
assistance of others, to ever comply with the demand, then holding him to it would be 
pointless. In such cases, we would be unjustified in holding the agent to the demand insofar 
as we are not justified in imposing pointless negative consequences upon others. But, again, 
in most cases the fact that an agent lacked the capacity to comply with a demand does not 
entail that she cannot bring it about that she eventually does not violate the demand. In these 
cases, it is not unfair, at least for this reason, to impose negative consequences upon an agent 
in order to prevent future infractions of the demand.   
 
Philosophers who endorse (ii) typically understand an agent to have a fair 
opportunity to exercise her capacities to fulfill an expectation as long as she does not face 
significant obstacles in doing so. E.g. FitzPatrick (2008) suggests that agents have a fair 
opportunity to exercise their capacities (with respect to avoiding moral ignorance) as long as 
they do not face personal or societal limitations that would make doing so exceptionally 
difficult (605).79 Ciurria (2014) argues that agents who suffer poor formative or cultural 
circumstances lack the fair opportunity to exercise their capacities to fulfill relevant moral 
                                                 
79 FitzPatrick (2008) argues that Potter (from It’s a Wonderful Life) faced no “relevant 
limitations in his social context or in his capabilities that should have made the necessary 
broader reflection and information gathering impossible or unreasonably difficult for him,” 
he could have been reasonably expected to avoid his moral ignorance (605). 
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expectations.80 For this reason, I think (ii) is best understood either as the claim that in order 
for an expectation to be reasonable, it must not be too difficult for an agent to fulfill it, or it 
must not be unfair, as opposed to understanding it to be a claim that is focused on the 
capacities of the agent in question.  
 
Difficulty and Reasonable Expectations 
 Let’s turn to the claim that the reasonableness of an expectation depends on the 
difficulty one faces in fulfilling it.81 One might understand this claim to amount to the claim 
that an expectation is reasonable only if one would not face significant difficulty in 
complying with it.  I argue that this claim is implausible.  
 The fact that it would be significantly difficult for an agent to meet an expectation 
does not, by itself, entail that the expectation is unreasonable. It may be significantly 
difficult for an agent to fulfill an expectation given the physical or psychological effort he 
would have to exert in order to fulfill it (e.g. withstanding torture, resisting an addictive 
urge), or given the costs he would endure in order to do so (e.g. by sacrificing relationships 
or giving up a lot of valuable time). For example, it may be very difficult (psychologically 
and physically) for a doctor to be alert and careful after a 48 hour shift, but it is plausible 
that her patient and others could still reasonably expect her to be. It would not be 
inappropriate for the patient, or others, to impose negative consequences upon the doctor in 
                                                 
80 Cuirria (2014) argues that a sexist man living in the 1950s in the USA could be 
understood as lacking the fair opportunity to exercise his capacities in order to avoid sexist 
attitudes, insofar as he lacks “epistemic alternatives” in his sociohistorical setting (7). She 
also argues that extenuating circumstances such as “duress, severe childhood abuse, and the 
inaccessibility of requisite ethical resources,” can deprive an agent of the relevant capacities 
or the fair opportunity to exercise his capacities to meet an expectation (9). 
81 Benson (2001), FitzPatrick (2008), and Fricker (2016) can all be interpreted as 
endorsing this view.  
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order to prevent her from violating this demand. E.g., it would certainly be appropriate for 
another physician to reprove the doctor if she is being careless, “I know you’re exhausted, 
but you must wake up and pay attention to what you are doing!” It is also plausible that 
others could reasonably expect a physician to be honest about a mistake she made, even if 
she might lose her job as a result. E.g. upon hearing her plan to cover up her mistake, her 
friend might justifiably rebuke her, “You can’t lie! Who could trust you again if you do? 
Your integrity is more important than your job, and the board and your patient are entitled to 
the truth. You are better than this.” Similarly, it is plausible that an agent who is seriously 
injured on the side of the road could reasonably expect me to help him, even if doing so 
would require me to forgo an exceptional and rare opportunity. Imagine I tell the agent that I 
am not sure I can help. It would require me to miss an interview that I worked very hard to 
get, and that I will not likely be offered again. It would not plausibly be inappropriate for the 
injured agent to reprove me, “What do you mean you cannot help? You might miss a job 
interview? I am badly hurt! Look at my leg. I need your help!” 
 Given these examples, one might think that it is the difficulty of fulfilling an 
expectation, balanced against the degree to which others need us to fulfill it, that bears on its 
reasonableness. Perhaps an expectation is unreasonable if an agent would face great 
difficulty in fulfilling it, and the need for her to fulfill it does not outweigh this difficulty. 
However, this too is implausible. Imagine, e.g., that Samantha suffers from kleptomania.82 
She experiences intense urges to steal items that she could easily afford, and for which she 
has no need or particular desire. She often throws the stolen objects in the trash, and isn’t 
                                                 
82 This description is based on the clinical characteristics of kleptomania, and reports of 
case studies in Grant and Kim (2002). Kleptomania is no longer considered to be an 
individual disorder, but is instead considered to be a type of impulse control disorder. 
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sure why she steals them in the first place, except that it is the only way to relieve the 
tension she feels just prior to stealing. She is ashamed of her behavior, and has tried many 
times to resist her urges to steal. She has even considered suicide to stop the urges.  But, 
whenever she tries to resist the urges, they get stronger. It is obviously very difficult for 
Samantha to comply with the demand that she not steal. However, it is at least not obvious 
that a shopkeeper could not reasonably expect her not to steal small items from his store, 
even if this would have only a minor negative impact on him and his business. There is at 
least nothing obviously inappropriate about him holding her to the demand that she not steal 
small items from his store. He might tell her sternly, “I have my eye on you.” Or, he might 
respond to her theft through verbal rebukes, or by calling the police. Even if he is well aware 
of her disorder, it is not plausible that it would be unreasonable for him to hold her to the 
demand that she not steal from his store. In response to her theft, it would still be appropriate 
for him, e.g., to reprove her, “It is not okay to steal, no matter how ill you are!” It is 
implausible that the shopkeeper just has to tolerate that Samantha is going to steal from his 
store, and give up holding her to the demand that she not do so. 
 It is highly plausible that the reasonableness of an expectation is sometimes sensitive 
to the difficulty an agent faces in meeting it. E.g. if it is very easy for me to get medicine 
that would help my sick husband who is too ill to fetch it himself, it is plausible that he 
could reasonable expect me to do this. If, on the other hand, I would have to travel the 
Amazon rainforest in search of a rare plant, he could not reasonably expect me to do it 
(under normal circumstances).  What I have said above does not deny that the 
reasonableness of our expectations is sometimes sensitive to the difficulty an agent would 
face in meeting them, but rather that the relationship between this difficulty and the 
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reasonableness of an expectation cannot be spelled out in terms of the former being a 
condition on the latter. In section the following section (4.4) I argue that the relationship 
between the difficulty an agent faces in meeting an expectation and the reasonableness of 
the expectation is indirect; sometimes the former impacts whether or not an expectation 
meets a different condition for reasonableness.  
 
Reasonable Expectations and Fairness 
Finally, one might think that the fairness of an expectation is a necessary and/or 
sufficient condition for its reasonableness.83 We sometimes do, in fact, use the terms 
interchangeably. We might, for example, describe the prices at a store as “reasonable” or 
“fair”. We might describe a professor’s expectations of her students, or parents’ expectations 
of their children as “reasonable” or “fair.” A law might be called “reasonable” or “fair,” and 
so on. There are three main ways a moral expectation might be thought to be unfair: (1) 
agents may not have an equal opportunity to fulfill it, (2) it may impose a disproportionate 
burden upon one agent as compared to others, or (3) it may not treat like cases alike. I argue 
that (1) suggests only that a state of affairs is unfair, and not that an expectation is unfair. 
With respect to (2), I argue that some expectations may involve imposing a disproportionate 
burden upon an agent, but it is not clear that this, alone, entails that the expectation is unfair. 
Expectations would be unfair if (3) they fail to treat like cases alike, but it isn’t readily 
apparent how an expectation might do so. 
                                                 
83 I am not convinced that anyone holds this view, although some hold the reverse, that 
the reasonableness of an expectation is a necessary and/or sufficient condition for its 
fairness. E.g. FitzPatrick (2008) argues that whether or not agents are culpable for their 
moral ignorance turns on what, if anything, the agent could “reasonably (and hence fairly) 
have been expected to have done in the past to avoid or to remedy that ignorance” (603).  
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One might think that an expectation is unfair if the agents to whom it is directed do 
not have an equal opportunity to fulfill it. However, while it may be unfair that agents lack 
equal opportunity to fulfill an expectation, this consideration (alone) does not suggest that 
the expectation itself is unfair. For example, an algebra teacher’s expectation that students 
be able to solve basic equations is not rendered unfair by the fact that his students lack equal 
opportunity to fulfill it. It may be unfair that some of his students lack parental support, 
financial resources, or lots of free time to spend on their homework, while other students 
have ample support, resources for outside tutors, and no obligations that compete with their 
school work. But, this does not render the expectation that students learn basic equations in 
an algebra class, unfair. E.g. it does not make it the case that it is unfair for the teacher to 
test their algebra skills, and to base their grades in part on this, or to reprove them for being 
lackadaisical about learning algebra, with the purpose of preventing them from violating the 
demand that they learn it.  
A closely related claim is that expectations can be unfair, and thereby unreasonable, 
if they impose a disproportionate burden upon some agents in comparison to others. There 
are two ways having an expectation of an agent might be thought to impose a burden on that 
agent. When we have an expectation of an agent, we hold her to a demand by guarding 
against her infraction of it. We do the latter by threatening and imposing negative 
consequences upon an agent for infractions, with the aim of preventing them (or future 
ones). This practice might be thought to impose a burden upon the agent insofar as, in order 
to avoid negative consequences, the agent must comply with the demand. Alternatively, this 
practice might be thought to impose a burden upon an agent in the sense that it involves 
imposing negative consequences for infractions of the demand—these negative 
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consequences may themselves be thought to be burdens. I’ll focus on the first sense in which 
an expectation imposes a burden upon an agent.84  
On this suggestion, the burden imposed by an expectation is arguably comprised by 
the effort the agent must exert in order to comply with the demand (and thereby avoid the 
negative consequences). If this is right, then even if having an expectation of an agent is not 
unreasonable or unjustified in other ways (e.g. the agent issuing the demand does not fail to 
treat like cases alike, holding the agent to the demand is not pointless, the demand itself is 
justified), the expectation may impose a disproportionate burden upon the agent who is held 
to the demand. However, it is not plausible that the expectation is unfair for this reason; it is 
implausible that an expectation is fair only if it imposes equal burdens upon all agents who 
are subject to it.  
If an expectation is otherwise justified, it is not rendered unfair by the fact that it 
imposes disproportionate burdens upon an agent, as long as this imposition is not intended 
by the issuer of the expectation. 85 To see this, consider the following example. An employer 
                                                 
84 Expectations may impose a disproportionate burden upon an agent in the second sense 
if the individual issuing the demand imposes harsher consequences upon one agent for 
failing to comply with a demand than she does with respect to others who fail to do so. In 
some cases, this might be unfair. But, this concerns the fairness of the means through which 
an agent holds an agent to a demand. And, as noted above, I am concerned with the 
reasonableness of holding an agent to the demand at all. 
85 There are many complicated cases in which agents are disproportionately burdened by 
an expectation, not intentionally, but due to undetected racism or sexism. In such cases, the 
expectation is arguably unjustified. I do not discuss such cases above for two main reasons. I 
think in these cases, if the expectation is unjustified, this will often not be due to the fact that 
it imposes a disproportionate burden upon some agents, but because it holds them to an 
unjustifiable demand.  E.g. an employer might have the expectation that employees must ask 
for a raise in order to get one. This expectation arguably places a disproportionate burden 
upon women, who tend to find asking for a raise to be intimidating and scary [see Ludden’s 
(2011) discussion of Linda Babcock’s research on this matter]. This result may be 
unintended by the employer, but may nevertheless seem to render the expectation unfair. I 
agree that the expectation is unjustified, but I am not convinced this is because it 
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expects all of their employees to arrive at work on time. She runs a stock brokerage firm, 
and because the market is only open during set hours, it is important that her employees are 
present at work during these hours. She holds her employees to this demand by having a 
policy that anyone who is frequently late will be subject to termination. It is much less 
difficult for some agents to meet this demand than it is for others. For example, agents who 
have no children, and have reliable transportation face far fewer obstacles in arriving at 
work on time than individuals who have to get their children ready for school or childcare, 
and then take public transportation to work. However, if the fact that some employees are 
disproportionately burdened by this expectation in not an outcome intended by the 
employer, but instead an accidental result of the agents’ circumstances, it is not clear why it 
alone would render the expectation that agents arrive at work on time, unfair.86  
                                                                                                                                                      
(unintentionally) places a disproportionate burden upon women, but because the demand 
that employees must ask for a raise in order to get one, is arguably unjustified. Raises ought 
to be based on performance, and not on the act of asking for one. Similarly, one might think 
that holding students to the demand that they do well on the SAT is unjustified insofar as it 
(hopefully unintentionally) places a disproportionate burden upon underprivileged black 
students. Santelices and Wilson (2010) argue that some questions on the verbal section of 
the SAT favor white students insofar as they involve words commonly used in middle class 
white communities that are not commonly used in underprivileged black communities. 
These words may have contextual meaning that is well understood by middle class white 
students, but not by underprivileged black students. If this is right, then the expectation that 
they do well on the SAT arguably imposes a disproportionate burden upon underprivileged 
black students who must learn the contextual meaning of words as they are used in 
privileged white communities in order to meet this demand. I am sympathetic to the thought 
that holding students to the demand that they do well on the SAT (e.g. by making 
scholarships and college admissions contingent upon this) is unjustified. However, again I 
am not convinced that this is because it places a disproportionate burden upon some 
students, but instead because there is something unjustified about the demand itself (i.e. that 
all students do well on an exam that tests the contextual meaning of words as they are used 
in privileged white communities). 
86If instead, the employer hopes to “encourage” poor, working parents to leave its 
workforce by imposing greater burdens upon them than those faced by their richer, non-
parent counter-parts, this would be unfair.  I am not convinced that we should characterize 
such actions as instances of holding a group of agents to a demand, since negative 
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 One might worry that if an expectation places an agent under a very significant 
burden while not doing so with respect to other agents who are subject to it, it is unfair. 
However, I am also not convinced that this, alone, entails that an expectation is unfair. 
Imagine, e.g., that in order to arrive at work on time at 9am, Gloria must get up at 4 am each 
weekday, and pay for early morning childcare. In the morning, she wakes up, gets herself 
ready, and then wakes her toddler, who is very cranky due to having to wake up so early. 
She gets him ready, feeds him breakfast, and then they take the bus to his childcare provider. 
Her toddler cries as she drops him off, and Gloria feels very guilty. This feeling sticks with 
her as she rides three different buses to work, which takes two hours total. George, on the 
other hand, has no children, and lives close to the office. He obviously does not have to pay 
for supplemental childcare, and he gets up each day at 7am, gets ready, and then makes the 
10 minute walk to work. The expectation that employees arrive at work on time imposes a 
much greater burden upon Gloria than it does upon George. But, it is not clear that it is 
thereby unfair, for this reason alone, especially since the employer has very good reasons for 
expecting her employees to be at work on time—her the success of her brokerage firm 
depends on this.87 One might worry that if the burden is great enough, the expectation will 
seem unjustified. I think this is a version of the view that an expectation is unreasonable if it 
would be significantly difficult for an agent to meet it. As noted above, I am sympathetic to 
                                                                                                                                                      
consequences imposed for violations of the demand are not intended to prevent future 
violations of it, but instead have more insidious purposes. E.g. in the case under 
consideration, the employer imposes penalties for infractions of demands, but they do not do 
so with the intention of preventing future in fractions, but with the intention of forcing or 
“encouraging” some individuals to find different employment.  
87 This is not to suggest that society at large should not make an effort to make the daily 
lives of single working-parents easier (e.g. by providing high-quality, subsidized, local 
childcare, or by making public transportation more efficient). It is also not to suggest that it 
would not be good or kind of Gloria’s employer to be lenient with her if she is late. 
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the idea that the reasonableness of an expectation is sensitive to the difficulty agents would 
face in meeting it, though I do not think the difficulty of meeting an expectation is a 
condition on its reasonableness. 
Finally, one might think that an expectation is unfair if it fails to treat like cases 
alike. It is not readily apparent how an expectation can be unfair for this reason, though it 
may create an unfair state of affairs. For example, I would treat my ten-year-old daughter 
unfairly by holding her to the demand that she clean her room if I do not also hold her twin 
sister to this demand, assuming I have no good reason for treating the children differently. 
However, while this is unfair, it is not clear that this is because it is unfair to hold my 
daughter to the demand that she clean her room. We can see this by the fact that I could 
remedy the unfairness of this situation by holding both girls to this demand. As will become 
apparent in the following section, I think expectations can fail to treat like cases alike, and 
thereby become unfair. Moreover, if a moral expectation is unreasonable, it will also be 
unfair in this sense. However, it is not the unfairness of the moral expectation that explains 
its unreasonableness.88 
 
4.4 Reasonable Moral Expectations: A New Approach 
In the previous section, I argued that the capacity of the agent to whom an 
expectation is directed, the difficulty this agent would face in meeting the expectation, and 
the fairness of an expectation are not conditions on the reasonableness of an expectation. 
Therefore, the typical approaches to reasonable expectations in the literature do not offer an 
                                                 
88 More specifically, I think unreasonable moral expectations fail to treat like cases alike, 
and are thereby unfair. So, if a moral expectation is unfair insofar as it fails to treat like 
cases alike, it is also unreasonable.  
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account of the conditions under which a moral expectation is reasonable. However, they do 
offer some guidance. As we saw, holding an agent to a demand, by threatening and 
imposing negative consequences aimed at preventing future infractions of it, is unjustified if 
pointless (i.e. if the agent lacks the capacity to ever bring it about, even with help from 
others, that she meet the expectation). Additionally, the reasonableness of an expectation 
must sometimes be sensitive to the difficulty an agent would face in meeting it, and, if moral 
expectations sometimes treat like cases unalike, they would be unfair and unreasonable due 
to this. An account of reasonable moral expectations should be able to accommodate and 
explain these claims. 
In this section, I argue for an account of the conditions under which a moral 
expectation is reasonable or unreasonable. In particular, I argue that a moral expectation is 
reasonable if it meets one of the following individually sufficient conditions. It is reasonable 
if it requires an agent to (i) to refrain from acting in ways that treat other agents as lacking 
inherent or equal value, and (iii) it is not pointless, or if it requires an agent to (ii) to refrain 
from acting in ways that treat their interests as lacking or being of less relative importance 
compared to the interests of others and (iii) is not pointless. A moral expectation is 
unreasonable if it meets neither (i) nor (iii), or fails to meet (iii).   
I develop this account by arguing that it is reasonable or unreasonable to expect 
things of others insofar as we stand in certain relationships with them. I examine two types 
of relationships in which we stand to others: “responsibility-based relationships,” and 
“participation-based relationships.” In responsibility-based relationships, we voluntarily 
assume responsibilities in virtue of entering the relationship. We thereby make it the case 
that it is reasonable for others to hold us to demands that we fulfill these responsibilities. In 
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participation-based relationships, by continuing to voluntarily participate in a relationship, 
we render it reasonable for others to hold us to demands which, if met, enable the 
relationship to continue to exist. I argue that the “moral relationship” is plausibly 
characterized as a participation-based relationship, and as a relationship of mutual regard. In 
virtue of our voluntary participation in this relationship, others can reasonably hold us to 
moral demands that we (i) or (ii) [that also meet (iii)], and cannot reasonably hold us to 
moral demands that require us to neither (i) nor (ii), or that do not meet (iii).  
In section 4.5, I discuss possible objections to my account of the conditions under 
which a moral expectation is reasonable, and in particular, the objection that this account 
commits me to an overly demanding view of morality.  In section 4.6 I discuss how the 
reasonableness of a moral expectation, on my view, is sometimes related to the culpability 
of an agent. 
 
Reasonable Expectations and Relationships 
 The expectations we have of others are calibrated to the relationships in which we 
stand to them. For example, while I might expect my friend to console me after a difficult 
day, I certainly would not expect a stranger to do so. I expect my parents to make an effort 
to see me and my family, but do not expect distant cousins to do so. My children expect me 
to feed them dinner, but do not expect my neighbor to do so. Whether or not a particular 
expectation is reasonable also depends on the relationship that is its context. For example, it 
is reasonable of Sheila to expect her friend (qua friend) to offer her emotional support 
through a difficult illness. It is not reasonable of Sheila to expect her friend (all things equal) 
to donate his kidney to help her heal from the illness. Similarly, it is reasonable for Andy to 
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expect his spouse to perform his fair share of the housework. It is not reasonable for Andy to 
expect his spouse (all things equal) to throw over-the-top celebrations that far outreach their 
financial means, for his birthday each year. 
We can begin to make sense of this phenomenon by considering why standing in a 
particular relationship with others makes it reasonable for them to expect certain things of 
us.  In the most straight-forward cases, this is because in entering some relationships, we 
voluntarily assume a set of responsibilities. In doing so, we make it reasonable for others to 
hold us to demands that we fulfill these responsibilities. I’ll call these responsibility-based 
relationships. Within the context of responsibility-based relationships, an expectation is 
reasonable if in holding it, we hold the agent in question to the demand that she fulfill the 
responsibilities she voluntarily assumed. An expectation is unreasonable if it in holding it, 
we hold the agent to demands she fulfill responsibilities has not voluntarily assumed. 
One example of a responsibility-based relationship is the one an instructor stands in 
with her students. When an instructor agrees to teach a class, she voluntarily assumes the 
responsibilities associated with doing so. She thereby makes it reasonable for others to 
expect that she fulfill these responsibilities. Imagine, e.g., that the instructor regularly fails 
to show up to teach (without a good explanation). Her students could reasonably demand 
that she show up. It would be appropriate, e.g., for them to rebuke her for her absences with 
the aim of preventing her future absences, “Get your act together! We are here, where are 
you? You can’t keep skipping class.” If she were to question the reasonableness of them 
holding her to this demand, it would be appropriate for them to respond, “But you chose to 
teach the class. You took on this responsibility!” It would be unreasonable of her students to 
expect her to fulfill responsibilities she did not voluntarily assume in virtue of agreeing to 
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teach the course. E.g., it would be unreasonable for one of her students to expect her (qua 
instructor) to listen to the details of his most recent break-up.  
In other cases, our voluntary actions within the contexts of our relationships make it 
reasonable for others to expect certain things of us. In particular, in some cases our 
continued voluntary participation in the relationship makes it reasonable for others parties to 
expect us to meet what Shoemaker (2011) calls “relationship-defining demands,” or 
demands which, when met, “make the very existence of the relationship itself possible” 
(623).  I’ll call these participation-based relationships. Within the context of participation-
based relationships, an expectation is reasonable insofar as in holding it, we hold 
participants to the relationship-defining demands of relationship in question. An expectation 
is unreasonable if in holding it, we hold participants to non-relationship defining demands. 
Consider, for example, the relationship of friendship. Our friends can expect things from us 
that others cannot. This is plausibly explained by the fact that in voluntarily continuing to 
participate in the friendship, we make it reasonable for our friends to expect us to meet the 
relationship-defining demands of friendship.89 Friendship is a relationship marked by 
                                                 
89 We voluntarily continue to participate in a friendship in virtue of voluntarily engaging 
in the characteristic activities of friendship (e.g. seeking out the company of our friend, 
confiding in our friend, seeking advice and comfort from our friend, and so on).  
In addition to being influenced by Shoemaker (2011), my thoughts here are heavily 
influenced by Jeske’s (1998) account of how personal relationships give rise to special 
obligations. Her view is that although most personal relationships are not cases in which we 
voluntary assume responsibilities, these relationships do come about through our voluntary 
choices (e.g. the intimacy of friendship develops slowly, through a number of voluntary 
choices). Once a personal relationship is formed the parties now have a shared project—
maintaining the relationship. This shared project is a source of obligations. She writes: 
 So after a friendship is established, each friend has a project that essentially involves  
the other and demands her continued participation. Whereas other projects  
sometimes create moral permissions, but not moral requirements, for agents to 
pursue the projects at the cost of the general interest, friendship creates obligations, 
types of moral requirements, to continue to care and to sustain intimacy, because of 
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intimacy and a resulting special, non-romantically and non-familial based regard.90 The 
corresponding relationship-defining demands of friendship are that (a) we not act in ways 
that are inimical to this intimacy and regard (e.g. betraying confidences, reacting with 
indifference to exciting news), and (b) that we sometimes act in ways that support its 
continued existence (e.g. sharing personal details about our lives, emotions, and thoughts, , 
spending time together, and so on). In virtue of their continued voluntary participation in our 
friendship, we can reasonably hold our friends to demands that they (a) and/or (b). This is 
all that we can reasonably expect of our friends, qua friends. If an expectation falls outside 
the scope of (a) and (b), it will be unreasonable when addressed to friends, qua friends. For 
example, it would be unreasonable to expect that friends donate kidneys when we need 
them, loan us large sums of money, watch our children for free on numerous occasions, or 
quit their jobs to travel the globe with us. These demands fall outside the scope of (a) and 
(b); they demand that the agent do things that go beyond refraining from acting in ways that 
are inimical to the bonds of friendship, or in ways necessary for maintaining these bonds. 
We stand in many different types of relationships with other human beings, some of 
which cannot be properly characterized as responsibility-based relationships or 
participation-based relationships. It is highly plausible that in some cases, the fact that other 
agents can reasonably expect things of us in virtue of our standing in a relationship with 
                                                                                                                                                      
its essentially shared character… while the voluntary nature of the friendship renders 
the demands placed on the parties in conformity with the requirement of voluntarism 
[the view that we only have special obligations or choices as the result of our 
voluntary choices], it is the shared character of the project of an intimate relationship 
that creates the demands to continue to care and tosustain the project (Jeske, 1998, p. 
540).   
90 Nothing in particular hangs on this particular of this analysis of friendship being 
correct. What is important is that one accepts that participation-based relationships exist, and 
that they follow the above scheme. 
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them, will have nothing to do with our voluntary actions or assumptions of responsibility.91  
However, we need not explore this possibility here. I think it is highly plausible that we can 
understand the “moral relationship”—the relationship in which we stand to other agents qua 
moral agents—as a practice-based relationship, and that we can glean a partial account of 
the conditions under which moral expectations are reasonable or unreasonable, by exploring 
its status as such.  
We voluntarily participate in the moral relationship by voluntarily engaging in the 
practices of morality (i.e. blaming others, praising others, demanding fair or just treatment 
for ourselves and others, and so on). The moral relationship is plausibly construed as one of 
mutual regard; it is one in which all parties are recognized to be of inherent and equal value, 
and their interests to be of equal relative importance compared to the interests of other 
agents. The corresponding relationship-defining demand of the moral relationship is that 
agents maintain this regard by not acting in ways inimical to it—i.e. by refraining from 
actions that treat other agents as lacking inherent or equal value, or that treat their interests 
as lacking or being of less relative importance compared to the interests of others.92 In virtue 
                                                 
91 The relationship in which we stand to fellow citizens or to our government might be 
an example of such relationship. 
92 One might wonder if we should not also include in the relationship-defining demand 
of the moral relationship that agents not hold beliefs or attitudes that are inconsistent with 
the equal standing of other moral agents. Isn’t refraining from holding such beliefs and 
attitudes a way of respecting agents’ equal moral standing? While the latter may be true, I do 
not think we can demand that others hold certain beliefs or attitudes, but only that they act 
so as to bring it about that they do so. Believing is not something we can do on demand; it 
makes no sense to demand that we do so (or to hold others to demands that they do so). We 
can act to bring it about that we believe something (e.g. by examining evidence, listening to 
other views, reflecting, and so on), and the relationship-defining demand of the moral 
relationship will sometimes require us to act so as to bring it about that we hold certain 
beliefs. Holding an attitude (e.g. caring, valuing), I think, often involves having a number of 
different beliefs and dispositions. For this reason, holding an attitude is also not something 
we can do on demand. Although, again, we can bring it about that we hold an attitude, and 
  124 
of their continued participation in the moral relationship, we can reasonably expect other 
moral agents to meet this demand. This is all we can reasonably expect of other agents in 
virtue of their voluntary participation in it. 
A natural question to ask here is whether or not the set of reasonable moral 
expectations is larger than the set of those made reasonable in virtue of an agent’s continued 
voluntary participation in the moral relationship. I think it is not. I will not offer a full 
argument for this claim here, but I will explain my main motivation for believing this, which 
is two-fold. (1) I think it is highly plausible that other types of expectations (e.g. 
expectations we have of friends, landlords, employers, coworkers, and so on) are rendered 
reasonable or unreasonable almost exclusively in reference to the relationships that are their 
contexts.93 It would be odd if moral expectations were notable exceptions to this rule. (2) To 
claim that it is reasonable to expect something of P is to claim that we’re entitled to hold P 
to some demand, or if you prefer, that it is appropriate for us to do so. The question, then, is 
what else, besides P’s continued voluntary participation in the moral relationship, could be 
the source of this entitlement or appropriateness. Though there are many other potential 
sources of this entitlement, I do not think any of them are plausible sources of it. Initial 
candidates include our inherent value (or the inherent value of others), the admirable content 
of the demand to which an agent is held, or the fact that rational agents would consent to 
being held to the demand in question. But, our entitlement (or lack thereof) to hold an agent 
to a demand often has nothing to do with the value of any of the agents who it concerns, or 
the admirable content of the demand it involves. For example, it is highly plausible that it is 
                                                                                                                                                      
sometimes the relationship-defining demand of the moral relationship will require that we 
do so. 
93 As noted previously, I think that a condition on any type of expectation being 
reasonable is that it is not pointless.  
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unreasonable to expect Billie Mac (from Chapter 3) to care about the human being who fell 
to his death and splattered on the ground below him. However, this does not plausibly have 
anything to do with the value of the agent issuing the demand, Billie Mac, or the deceased. 
Nor does it have anything to do with the content of the demand that he care (which is quite 
admirable). And, I at least hope that our entitlement to hold an agent to a moral demand does 
not depend on whether or not rational agents would consent to being held to it. It is 
sometimes very unclear whether or not this is the case—e.g. it is unclear whether or not 
rational agents would consent to being held to the demand that they do something they ought 
to do, but which is irrational from their own perspectives. 
As I said, I recognize that this is not a sufficient argument for the claim that the set of 
reasonable moral expectations is comprised only of those rendered reasonable (almost 
exclusively) in virtue of an agent’s voluntary participation in the moral relationship. 
Hopefully what I have said motivates this claim. If I am right about this, then we can shape 
an account of reasonable moral expectations based on the description of the moral 
relationship offered above.94 The above description suggests two individually sufficient 
conditions for the reasonableness of a moral expectation. It suggests that a moral expectation 
will be reasonable if it requires an agent (i) to refrain from acting in ways that treat other 
agents as lacking inherent or equal value, or (ii) to refrain from acting in ways that treat their 
                                                 
94 One might worry that if I am right, and we can reasonably expect things of moral 
agents only in virtue of their voluntary participation of the moral relationship, then we 
cannot reasonably hold agents to moral demands who are not voluntary participants of it. 
This may seem very unintuitive. But, we voluntarily participate in the moral relationship in 
virtue of engaging in the practices of morality—e.g. blaming, praising, demanding fair 
treatment, expressing our reactive attitudes. It will be very rare that a fully functioning adult 
human being does not voluntarily participate in any of these activities, and if he does not, it 
does not seem to me to be so odd to think that we cannot reasonably hold him to moral 
demands.  
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interests as lacking or being of less relative importance compared to the interests of others.95 
We must add to this account the condition on the reasonableness of any expectation, 
uncovered in the previous section: an expectation is reasonable only if (iii) it is not pointless. 
Combining (iii) with (i) and (ii) above, we arrive at the following account of the conditions 
under which a moral expectation is reasonable or unreasonable. A moral expectation is 
reasonable if it meets (i) and (iii) or if it meets (ii) and (iii).  A moral expectation is 
unreasonable if it meets neither (i) nor (ii), or if it fails to meet (iii). 
Although I do not think it is the case, it is possible that our voluntary participation in 
the moral relationship commits us to more than (i) and (ii), in which case it may be a source 
of further sufficient conditions for the reasonableness of a moral expectation that I have not 
considered here.96 It is also possible that there are necessary conditions for the 
                                                 
95 We can treat an agent as lacking inherent or equal value, or her interests as lacking or 
being of less relative importance in both active and passive ways. We do so actively if we 
treat her as if she has less dignity or worth than other moral agents or as being less deserving 
of certain treatment, or by actively assigning her interests less relative weight in our 
deliberations about what to do. We do so passively if we fail to allow an agent’s inherent 
equal value, or the equal relative importance of her interests to act as appropriate limits on 
our actions. For example, Mr. S (discussed in Chapter 3) actively treats women as lacking 
equal dignity and worth as men; he treats them as financial assets and sources of free labor, 
rather than dignified, autonomous beings. A company would passively treat women as 
lacking equal value compared to men if they allow their managers to consistently offer much 
higher salaries to men than women, without justification. They would fail to allow the equal 
value of women to limit their actions. An agent would actively treat the interests others have 
in not being involved in a car accident as if they are of less relative importance than his 
interests in not angering his boss by being late, if he actively considers these interest while 
deliberating about whether or not to drive recklessly fast to work, and assigns the interests 
others have in not being involved in an accident less weight than his own interest in not 
being late to work. He would passively do so if he does not include their interests in his 
deliberations and drives recklessly fast; he would fail to allow their interests to limit his 
actions. On my view, an agent could be reasonably expected to refrain from all of these 
actions. 
 
96 And thereby further additions to the sufficient condition for the unreasonableness of a 
moral expectation. 
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reasonableness of expectations in general [like (iii)] that I have not considered. However, as 
I’ll argue in section 4.6, even in its potentially incomplete state, my account can still be 
helpfully applied to the moral ignorance debate.  
 There are many concerns one might have with this account, which I will address 
shortly, in section 4.5. However, I do want to address one concern here. One might worry 
that this account suggests that many expectations are unreasonable which are not plausibly 
construed as such. E.g. one might worry that it suggests that expectations that an agent 
remember to clock out at the end of each shift, or that an agent remain seated while others 
toast him, are unreasonable insofar as they meet neither (i) nor (ii). But, these expectations 
are not obviously unreasonable. Fortunately, my account does not suggest that they are. My 
account applies only to moral expectations—i.e. to expectations addressed to moral agents 
qua moral agents, which are taken to be supported by distinctly moral reasons. The above 
expectations are not moral expectations; in order to determine if they are reasonable, we 
would need to consider them within the relationships that are their contexts.            
  Moreover, it is highly intuitive that most moral expectations that meet neither (i) nor 
(ii), are unreasonable. Moral expectations typically either require us to act in ways that treat 
others and their interests as being of inherent and equal value and importance, or in ways 
that treat them as lacking or being of unequal inherent value and importance.97 If an 
                                                 
97 For example, expectations that concern lying, stealing, unjustifiably harming others, 
and acting so as to avoid holding certain objectionable moral attitudes and beliefs are 
plausibly construed as doing so. I am aware that the very least, there will be cases that do 
not neatly fit this description. For example, imagine that while Peggy does not realize this, 
whenever she passes a black man on the street, she clutches her purse and scurries quickly 
past him. Greg, a black man who knows Peggy, holds her to the demand that she stop doing 
this. I think this is plausibly construed as a moral expectation. But, it does not obviously 
require Peggy to act in ways that treat others and their interests as being of inherent and 
equal value and importance, or in ways that treat them as being of unequal inherent value 
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expectation requires the former, it will be reasonable insofar as it meets (i) or (ii) and also 
(iii). If it requires the latter, it will be unreasonable because it will meet neither (i) nor (ii).98 
However, I take it that this is quite intuitive. Another way of putting this is that in most 
cases, moral expectations that meet neither (i) nor (ii) will require the opposite of either (i) 
or (ii).99 And, expectations that require the opposite of (i) or (ii) are intuitively unreasonable 
moral expectations. To see what I have in mind here, consider the following example. 
Felicity confides in Georgina that her husband is regularly physically abusive towards her 
and their children. Felicity expects Georgina to respect her privacy and to tell no one. It is 
plausible that this is a moral expectation, and it is one that meets neither (i) nor (ii). Instead, 
as I claim will most often be the case, it requires the opposite of (i) or (ii). It requires the 
opposite of (ii); it requires Georgina act in a way that treats the interests of some (i.e. 
Felicity’s interest in privacy) as if they are of greater relative importance than the interests of 
others (i.e. the interests her children have in being protected). This expectation is 
unreasonable on my view, and I take it that this is intuitively plausible. Something similar 
                                                                                                                                                      
and importance. However, I think Greg could be understood as a holding Peggy to the 
demand that she not have this fear; i.e. that she act so as to bring it about that she no longer 
has this fear (now that she is aware of it). She might do this, e.g., by educating herself and 
being cognizant of this fear, and being vigilant against it. Understood in these terms, I think 
Greg’s expectation is one that requires Peggy (ii) to refrain from acting in a way that treat 
the interests of others as if they are of less relative importance compared to the interests of 
others. It is an expectation that she not act with complacency with respect to her fear, and 
thereby that she not treat the considerable interests others have in not being met with 
unjustified fear and suspicion as if they are of less relative importance than the (minimal) 
interests she has in not confronting and remedying this fear.  
98 If an expectation requires the opposite of (i) or (ii), it cannot also meet the other 
conditions [e.g. it cannot be that an expectation requires ~(i), but meets (ii)].  
99 I leave open that there may be exceptions to this rule, though I do not think there will 
be many. If there are exceptions, I will be committed to saying that these expectations are 
unreasonable even if they are not intuitively so.  
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will be true with respect to most moral expectations that are unreasonable insofar as they 
meet neither (i) nor (ii). 
 
As noted at the beginning of this section, a view of reasonable moral expectations 
should also be able to accommodate and explain the other lessons learned from my 
consideration of typical philosophical approaches to reasonable moral expectations: if an 
expectation fails to treat like cases alike, it is unfair and thereby unreasonable, and the 
reasonableness of a moral expectation is at least sometimes sensitive to the difficulty an 
agent would face in meeting the expectation. My account can accommodate and explain 
both lessons.  
My account offers some insight into the way in which a moral expectation might fail 
to treat like case alike. If I am right, and the majority of the moral expectations that are 
unreasonable on my view, insofar as they meet neither (i) nor (ii), will also require the 
opposite of (i) or (ii), then many unreasonable moral expectations will also fail to treat like 
cases alike. An expectation that requires an agent to act in ways that treat some agents as if 
they lack inherent or equal value, or in ways that treat their interests as if they lack or are of 
unequal moral importance, will fail to treat like cases alike. Such expectations will not only 
be unreasonable because they extend beyond what can be reasonably expected of an agent, 
given her voluntary participation in the moral relationship [i.e. because they meet neither (i) 
nor (ii)], but also because they are unfair. However, in determining whether or not a moral 
expectation is unreasonable, we can focus exclusively on whether or not an expectation 
meets neither (i) nor (ii). It happens that most moral expectations that fall out of out of the 
scope of the relationship-defining demands of the moral relationship are also typically unfair 
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because they fail to treat like cases alike. But it is the latter, and not the unfairness of the 
expectation, that serves as the primary explanation of its unreasonableness. 
My account can also explain why the reasonableness of a moral expectation is 
sometimes sensitive to the difficulty an agent faces in meeting it. The difficulty an agent 
faces in meeting an expectation sometimes impacts the reasonableness of the expectation, 
insofar as it sometimes makes it the case that the expectation will meet neither (i) nor (ii), 
and that it instead requires the opposite of (ii). In particular, it sometimes makes it the case 
that an expectation requires an agent to treat the interests of others as if they are of greater 
relative importance than her own. E.g. if my husband expects me to spend months traveling 
the Amazon rain forest in search of a rare plant that will eradicate the minor seasonal 
allergies he experiences, he holds me to a demand that meets neither (i) nor (ii), and which 
instead requires me to treat his interests as if they are of greater relative importance than my 
own. His expectation is thereby unreasonable. We can see this by considering how 
inappropriate it would be for him to reprove me if I refuse, “Don’t you care about my 
watery, itchy eyes? Your other obligations can wait.”  
In other cases, the difficulty an agent faces in meeting a moral expectation does not 
affect its reasonableness in this way. Recall, for example, Samantha, who suffers from 
kleptomania. I argued that the shopkeeper’s expectation that she not steal from his store is 
not rendered unreasonable by the fact that it would be very difficult for her to meet this 
expectation. The shopkeeper has significant interests in Samantha not stealing from his 
store. E.g. he has interests in not losing inventory, in having his property rights respected, in 
not devoting time and energy to preventing or punishing her theft, and so on. These interests 
are plausibly of greater relative importance than the interests Samantha has in stealing—e.g. 
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it relieves the great tension she feels prior to stealing, and seeking treatment or avoiding 
situations that trigger her urge to steal might be costly and burdensome. Therefore, although 
it is very difficult for Samantha to meet the expectation that she not steal, the expectation is 
reasonable on my view; it requires Samantha to (ii) refrain from acting in ways that treat 
agents’ interests as lacking or being of less relative importance compared to the interests of 
others. 
 
4.5 Defending my account against objections 
 There are two main worries one might have about the account I have offered of the 
conditions under which a moral expectation is reasonable or unreasonable. (1) One might 
worry that it is not anymore helpful than an intuitive approach to what can be reasonably 
expected of a moral agent. And, (2) one might worry that my account of reasonable moral 
expectations commits me to an overly demanding, impartial view of morality. In response to 
(1), I argue that my account is no more difficult to apply than an intuitive approach to 
reasonable moral expectations. In response to (2), I argue that my account does not commit 
me to an overly demanding, impartial view of morality, and that even if it does involve some 
revision to ordinary moral views, these revisions are not as drastic as they may at first seem. 
 (1) 
 One might worry that my account of reasonable moral expectations is not any more 
helpful than an intuitive approach to reasonable moral expectations. In the last two chapters, 
I argued that, in part, we need a general account of reasonable moral expectations, due to the 
fact that intuitions are often divided regarding the claim that an expectation is unreasonable. 
E.g. some find the claim that agents cannot be reasonably expected to do something they see 
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no reason to do, to be highly plausible, while others do not. My hope has been that a general 
account of the conditions under which a moral expectation is reasonable or unreasonable 
would settle debates like this. However, one might think that my account is just as difficult 
to apply. In particular, one might think that it is difficult to determine whether or not an 
expectation meets the second disjunct of (ii), which holds that an expectation is reasonable if 
it requires an agent to refrain from acting in ways that treat the interest of some agents as if 
they are of unequal relative importance compared to the interests of others. Determining this 
requires one to determine the general importance of the interests at sake, and whether or not 
one agent’s interests are, in fact, of greater relative importance than another agent’s 
interests. Our judgment about the latter may be no clearer than our intuitions about particular 
cases.100 
In fact, I think our judgments about the relative importance of interests are clearer. 
We are highly practiced at weighing interests. In ordering our own lives, we regularly weigh 
our own interests against each other, as well as against the interests of our loved ones, 
acquaintances, and strangers. While it may be difficult to determine the relative importance 
of interests in some cases, this is not typically a difficult task. Moreover, our judgments 
regarding the relative importance of interests are not clouded in the ways that our intuitions 
regarding the reasonableness of moral expectations are clouded. The latter are often 
muddled by our intuitions concerning whether or not an agent is to blame for the act in 
question, or whether or not he had a moral obligation to perform it. The former are not 
clouded by these concerns. 
 
                                                 
100 I thank Matt King for raising this worry at the 2015 meeting of the Alabama 
Philosophical Society. 
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(2) 
Perhaps of greater concern is the worry that according to my view, and in particular, 
according to the second disjunct of (ii), we can be reasonably expected to refrain from acting 
in ways that treat the interests of some as if they are of unequal relative importance 
compared to the interests of others. One might worry that this entails that it is reasonable to 
expect us to be impartial towards the interests of others, and even towards our own interests. 
But, this seems to entail a view of morality that is too demanding.  However, I do not think 
my account entails this view. 
Let’s first consider the worry that the second disjunct of (ii) entails that we can be 
reasonably expected to refrain from treating the interests of others partially. I think this 
worry is misguided, and arises out of the mistaken thought that in treating one agent’s 
interests partially for a good reason, we thereby treat her interests as if they are of greater 
relative importance than the interests of others, or in the mistaken belief that reasons for 
acting partially must be grounded in the supposed greater importance of the interests of the 
individual to whom we’re partial. However, neither is true. In virtue of treating their 
interests partially, we treat the interests of some as being of greater relative importance than 
the interests of others, only if we do so without good reason, or we intentionally harm the 
interests of others so as to benefit the interests of those to whom we are partial. Consider the 
following example. I worry about and tend to my daughter’s nutrition and emotional 
wellbeing. I do not (generally) worry about and tend to the nutrition and emotional 
wellbeing of other children. I have good reasons for this. My daughter can reasonably expect 
me to do this, given our relationship of mother to young child. Doing so is an integral 
expression of my love for her. Doing so promotes my own interests; I am emotionally 
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rewarded by her doing well (because I love her and am emotionally invested in her 
wellbeing), and I have an interest in this monumental project of parenthood going well. In 
light of these reasons, I think it is implausible that in treating her interests partially, I thereby 
treat them as if they are of greater relative importance than the interests of other children. I 
would plausibly do so if I intentionally harmed other children in order to promote the 
interests of my daughter (e.g. stole their food to give to my daughter), or if I promoted her 
interests but not theirs without legitimate reasons for doing so. Moreover, notice that my 
reasons for treating my daughter partially are not grounded in the supposed greater 
importance of her interests. Of course it is more important to me that she do well; I am 
personally invested in this. But, this does not entail that I hold that her interests in doing well 
are objectively more important than the interests other children have in doing well. If 
treating an agent’s interests partially, with good reason (and without intentionally harming 
others in order to do so), does not involve treating their interests as if they are of greater 
relative importance compared to the interests of others, then the second disjunct of (ii) does 
not entail that we can be reasonably expected to refrain from doing this.  
This same line of reasoning can be used to address the worry that the second disjunct 
of (ii) requires that we not act in ways that treat our own interests partially. All the second 
disjunct of (ii) requires is that we not treat the interests of some agents partially without 
good reason, and that we not intentionally harm the interests of some to promote the 
interests of others to whom we are partial. This does not entail that we can be reasonably 
expected to act in ways that treat our own interests impartially. We arguably often have 
good reasons for treating our interests as such; at the very least, doing so is often integral to 
the success of our projects, and something in which we are deeply emotionally invested.  
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However, one might worry that we often preference our interests and the interests of 
others without good reason, and do not typically think we thereby act in a way that others 
could reasonably demand we not. E.g. I buy my children pretty shoes and dresses that they 
clearly do not need, even though I know that many children in the Lake Chad region of 
Nigeria are on the brink of starvation, and my money could instead be used to help save 
them. Many of us engage in similarly frivolously purchases, with the same knowledge that 
our money could be put to (much) better use. In doing so, aren’t we treating the interests of 
some partially, without good (or at least sufficiently good) reason? Doesn’t this suggest that 
we often, many times a day even, act in ways that, on my account (by the second disjunct of 
(ii)), other agents could reasonably expect we do not? Isn’t this at odds with ordinary moral 
thinking? 
Fully addressing this worry is difficult in that it requires an account what constitutes 
a good reason for being partial. I have offered some examples of potential good reasons for 
being partial—e.g. that others could reasonably expect us to be partial to particular interest 
of theirs in virtue of another relationship in which we stand with them, that being partial is 
an integral expression of our love, that being partial is integral to the success of projects that 
are important to us. There may be other good reasons for being partial as well. But, even if 
my account suggests that we can be reasonably expected not to, e.g., make utterly frivolous 
purchases when we could instead devote that money to save another agent’s life, I do not 
think this involves as radical a revision to our ordinary moral thinking as it may at first 
seem. Our resistance to the claim that we could be reasonably expected to refrain from such 
actions is rooted, I think, in the mistaken assumption that the mere fact that we can be 
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reasonably expected to X entails that we have an obligation to X, or that we can be blamed 
for failing to X. But neither is true. 
In the following section I will argue that in many cases, blaming an agent for X is 
justified only if the agent could have been reasonably expected to avoid X at the time she 
performed it. However, that an agent could have been reasonably expected to X is not a 
sufficient condition for the justification of blame. To claim that it is reasonable to expect an 
agent to X means that it is appropriate for other agents to hold him to the demand that he X, 
by guarding against his infractions of X through threatening or imposing negative 
consequences aimed at doing so. Nothing about this claim entails that the agent is 
blameworthy for failing to do what he could have been reasonably expected to do. In order 
for an agent to be culpable for failing to X other things must also be true. E.g. it is plausible 
that it must also be true that in failing to X the agent in question also wronged another 
person, failed to fulfill his moral obligations, or that his actions manifested a character vice 
or objectionable moral attitude. None of these conditions are necessarily met in virtue of an 
agent failing to do what he could be reasonably expected to do.101 For example, I think it is 
highly plausible that a starving child could reasonably hold me to the demand that I not buy 
a $4 coffee drink and instead offer him life-saving aid. It would be appropriate, e.g., for him 
to reprove me for buying the coffee, in the hopes of preventing my future infractions of his 
demand. “You’re choosing a latte over the life of a child? Please donate to Oxfam instead. 
Surely my life is more important than a coffee!” However, it does not follow from this that I 
am blameworthy for instead buying the latte if doing so does not manifest a character vice 
(e.g. greed, callousness or selfishness), does not violate any moral obligations I have to help 
                                                 
101 They often are met, insofar as agents can reasonably expect us to fulfill our moral 
obligations and to refrain from harming them. 
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the child, does not otherwise wrong the child, and does not manifest an objectionable moral 
attitude (e.g. a lack of respect for the value of his life).  
It is also not the case that the fact that we could be reasonably expected to X entails 
that we have an obligation to X. Again, to claim that we could be reasonably expected to X, 
is to claim that it would be appropriate for other agents to hold us to the demand that we X, 
by imposing and threatening negative consequences aimed at preventing our future 
infractions of this demand. Whatever one’s view is about the origins of our moral 
obligations, it is hopefully clear that we do not have them simply insofar as other moral 
agents can reasonably expect certain things of us in virtue of the moral relationship in which 
we stand to each other. 
Once we realize that the fact that an agent can reasonably expect us to X does not 
entail that we are obligated to X, or that we are culpable for failing to X, the idea that we can 
be reasonably expected to not treat our own interests or the interests of other partially, 
without good reasons, is more palatable. Most of us do think, e.g., that even though we do 
not violate our obligations or do something blameworthy when we spend money on utterly 
frivolous items with the knowledge that the money could be used for much better causes, 
there is something morally “off” about doing so. My account can explain this “offness.” In 
doing so, even though we don’t violate our obligations or act in ways that are blameworthy, 
we act in ways that other moral agents could reasonably expect we do not. 
 
4.6 Reasonable Moral Expectations and Culpability 
Now that I have an account of the conditions under which a moral expectation is 
reasonable or unreasonable, I can explain how the reasonableness of a moral expectation is 
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sometimes related to whether or not we are justified in blaming an agent for failing to meet 
it. As I argued in section 4.4, most moral expectations are unreasonable insofar as they meet 
neither (i) nor (ii). Such expectations most often also require the opposite of (i) or (ii), and 
thereby fail to treat like cases alike. When an expectation is unreasonable in this sense—i.e. 
when meets neither (i) nor (ii) and treats like cases unalike—we would be unjustified in 
blaming an agent for failing to meet it. To put this in slightly different terms, if it would 
have been unreasonable, in this sense, to expect an agent to avoid X at the time she 
performed X, then we would be unjustified in blaming her for X. This is because when we 
blame an agent in virtue of her having failed to meet some demand, we at least implicitly 
endorse this demand. E.g. when I blame Fred for lying to me, I implicitly endorse the 
demand that he not lie. But if a demand fails to treat like cases alike, in endorsing it—in 
blaming the agent for failing to meet it—we fail to treat like cases alike. If I am right that 
most moral expectations are unreasonable insofar as they meet neither (i) nor (ii), and I am 
right that in virtue of this, most expectations fail to treat like cases alike, then in most cases, 
we would be unjustified in blaming an agent for failing to X if she could not have been 
reasonably expected to avoid X, because in doing so, we would fail to treat like cases alike.  
Although this explanation of the relationship the reasonableness of an expectation 
sometimes bears to the justification of blame is a bit clunky, I think it is fairly intuitive. We 
often think that we are unjustified in blaming an agent for that which she could not have 
been reasonably expected to avoid, insofar as in doing so, we either endorse an unfair moral 
demand, or treat the agent herself unfairly. On my view, in blaming an agent for failing to 
meet a demand that would have required her to treat others or their interests as if they lack 
or are of unequal value or relative importance, we endorse an unfair moral demand. In 
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blaming an agent for failing to meet a demand that would have required her to treat herself 
as if she lacks or is of unequal value, or her interests as if they lack or are of less relative 
importance, we treat her unfairly. In support of this, consider the following examples. Recall 
Felicity and Georgina. Felicity expects Georgina to refrain from reporting to others that 
Felicity and her children are being physically abused by Felicity’s husband. It is 
unreasonable to expect Georgina to refrain from reporting this; this expectation neither 
requires Georgina (i) to refrain from acting in ways that treat other agents as lacking 
inherent or equal value, nor (ii) to refrain from acting in ways that treat their interests as 
lacking or being of less relative importance compared to the interests of others. Moreover, 
this expectation requires Georgina to do the opposite of the second disjunct of (ii). In doing 
so, it fails to treat like cases alike. If Georgina were to report the abuse (to the proper 
authorities), we would not be justified in blaming her for doing so. In blaming her, we would 
implicitly endorse the demand that she not do so; we would endorse an unfair demand. This 
seems to me to be in line with our intuitions. If someone blamed Georgina for reporting the 
abuse, we would like speak up by pointing out that she was right to have done so, that she 
had to protect the children. In pointing this out, I think we would be pointing out that the 
demand that Georgina not report the abuse misrepresents the balance of interests at stake; it 
misrepresents the interests Felicity has in not having the abuse reported as being of greater 
importance than the children’s interests in being protected. It thereby treats the children 
unfairly, and is not a demand that we should implicitly endorse, via blaming Georgina for 
failing to meet it.  
Alternatively, imagine that Sally has promised Fred that she will be at his party 
tonight. However, while getting dressed for his party, Sally trips, falls, and breaks her ankle. 
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She is in intense pain, and needs medical care. Her only option is to go to the emergency 
room, where she’ll have to wait many hours, and therefore will miss Fred’s party. Sally 
regrets breaking her promise, but goes to the E.R. We could not have reasonably expected 
Sally to keep her promise to Fred. This expectation would meet neither (i) nor (ii), and 
would require the opposite of the second disjunct of (ii); it would require Sally to treat 
Fred’s interests in her attending the party/keeping her promise, as if they are of greater 
relative importance than her own interests in being healthy, and free from pain. In blaming 
Sally for failing to keep her promise to Fred, we endorse the expectation that she do so. 
However, in endorsing this unreasonable moral expectation, we treat Fred’s interests as if 
they are of more weight than Sally’s. We thereby treat Sally unfairly. Again, I think this is in 
line with our intuitions. Were someone to blame Sally for failing to keep her promise, we 
would likely speak up by pointing out that it is not fair to expect her to keep a promise if 
nothing very important depends on her doing so, and doing so would require her to endure 
intense physical pain and possibly exacerbate her injury. 
 
4.7 Reasonable Moral Expectations, Culpability, and the Moral Ignorance Debate 
I am finally in a position to return to the discussion of the moral ignorance debate. In 
this section, I apply my partial account of reasonable moral expectations first to the skeptical 
argument, and then to the culpability views. In this section, I apply my view of reasonable 
moral expectations first to the skeptical argument, and then to the culpability views. I argue 
that it suggests we ought to reject the skeptical argument, and accept only revised versions 
of culpability views.  
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Reasonable Moral Expectations and the Skeptical Argument 
The success of the skeptical argument depends on the defensibility of its premise that 
agents are only culpable for their moral ignorance if it is the result of a knowing 
mismanagement of their moral beliefs. Proponents of the skeptical argument depend on this 
premise in order to reach the conclusion that agents are almost never culpable for their moral 
ignorance insofar as they very rarely knowingly mismanage their moral beliefs. In order to 
defend this premise, they must defend the further claim that agents can only be reasonably 
expected to avoid their moral ignorance if it is the result of a knowing mismanagement of 
their moral beliefs. However, using my account of reasonable moral expectations, I argue 
that this further claim is mistaken. The skeptical argument is therefore indefensible. 
In Chapter 2, I discussed two objections to the claim that agents are only culpable for 
their moral ignorance, if it is the result of a knowing mismanagement of their moral beliefs. 
One is offered by Smith (2015), and the other by FitzPatrick (2008). Smith (2015) argues 
that we need not trace culpability for objectionable moral attitudes (like moral ignorance) to 
culpability for some past actions. As I explained in Chapter 2, her view is that,  
We trace only in order to “find a judgment-sensitive  
locus of responsibility that links the agent to the thing 
 for which he is being morally criticized” (Smith, 2015,  
pg. 124). E.g. in the case of a drunk driver, we hold the  
agent to be culpable because her action of getting drunk in 
 the first place (without a plan to get home safely) reflects  
an objectionable attitude. Smith (2015) argues that this 
 justification for tracing does not apply to attitudes. Attitudes, 
 “by their very nature, are judgment-sensitive states, so there  
is no need to try to ‘trace back’ to some other judgment-sensitive  
locus of responsibility” (124) (Zinn, 2016, p. 34).  
 
Because moral ignorance constitutes an objectionable moral attitude, on Smith’s view, 
we need not trace culpability for it to some past action; we can be directly culpable for it.   
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 In chapter 2, I argued that proponents of the skeptical argument might respond to 
Smith by offering a different account of tracing, according to which we trace culpability for 
moral ignorance to culpability for some past action in order to determine whether or not an 
agent could have been reasonably expected to avoid her moral ignorance. However, in order 
for this response to act as a defense of their claim that agents are only culpable for their 
moral ignorance if it is the result of a knowing mismanagement of their moral beliefs, they 
must also argue that agents can only be reasonably expected to avoid their moral ignorance 
if the latter is true. 
 FitzPatrick (2008) argues that the claim that agents are only culpable for their moral 
ignorance if it is the result of a knowing mismanagement of their moral beliefs is too strong. 
Instead, he suggests, moral ignorance is culpable if (and only if) the agent could have been 
reasonably expected to avoid it. He argues that there is no reason to endorse the stronger 
claim, and that his alternate view explains our intuitive reactions to particular cases. 
The success of this objection also depends on the truth of the claim that agents can 
only be reasonably expected to avoid their moral ignorance, if it is the result of a knowing 
mismanagement of their moral beliefs. If the former is true, then FitzPatrick’s (2008) claim 
that agents are culpable for their moral ignorance if they can be reasonably expected to 
avoid it, does not challenge the claim that agents are culpable for their moral ignorance only 
if it is the result of a knowing mismanagement of their moral beliefs.  
Rosen (2004) and Levy (2009) argue that agents cannot be reasonably expected to 
avoid their moral ignorance, unless it is the result of a knowing mismanagement of their 
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moral beliefs. 102 They hold that as long as an agent has not knowingly mismanaged her 
moral beliefs she does not do anything she believes to be morally wrong when managing her 
moral beliefs, nor does she fail to do anything she believes she ought to do with respect to 
them. Instead, she manages her moral beliefs in exactly the way she believes she ought. In 
order to avoid developing her moral ignorance, she would either have to act against her own 
best judgment, or she would have to do something she sees no reason to do. It is 
unreasonable to expect an agent to act in either manner, and therefore it is unreasonable to 
expect an agent to avoid her moral ignorance, if she developed it unwittingly.  
An expectation that an agent take steps to remedy his moral ignorance, or to avoid it 
in the first place, is plausibly construed as a moral expectation. E.g. the expectation that an 
agent stop and consider counter-evidence, not make a hasty-generalization, or refrain from 
being overconfident in order to bring it about that she has true moral beliefs or remedies 
false ones, is plausibly construed as an expectation issued to a moral agent qua moral agent, 
and one which is taken to be supported by distinctly moral reasons. In order to determine if 
Rosen and Levy are right that it is always unreasonable to expect agents to act in ways 
through which they could remedy or avoid their moral ignorance, but which appear 
irrational from their perspectives, we need to determine if it is always the case that such 
expectations meet neither (i) nor (ii), or that they never meet (iii). It is not plausible that such 
expectations never meet (iii). Agents who are morally ignorant are in the grip of a false 
moral view, and may see no reason to act so as to remedy this fact, but it is not the case that 
they lack the capacity (at any relevant time) to ever bring it about (even with the help of 
others) that they hold true moral beliefs (or at least lack false ones). It is also not plausible 
                                                 
102 See Rosen (2004), pgs. 602-603. Levy (2009) argues for these claims at length, in 
response to FitzPatrick’s (2008) argument. 
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that it is always the case that such expectations meet neither (i) nor (ii). In fact, I think in 
many cases, they will meet the second disjunct of (ii); they will require an agent to refrain 
from acting in ways that treat his interests as if they are of greater relative importance than 
the interests of others.  
To see this, consider the following example. Bill owns and runs a plant where 
employees are regularly exposed to chemicals known to cause serious forms of cancer. He 
does only what the law requires him to do in order to protect his employees from exposure 
to these chemicals, even though he has good reason to believe these measures are inadequate 
and he could easily expand them without much expense. He sees no problem with his 
actions. On his view, as a business owner, his only responsibility is to turn as high a profit as 
possible, and to obey the law. It is the government’s responsibility to protect workers. Bill is 
morally ignorant, but let’s stipulate that this is not because he has knowingly mismanaged 
his moral beliefs. He is aware that others disagree with his views, but thinks that they are too 
soft, and simply cannot understand what it is like to own a successful business. He was 
raised with these values by his parents, who owned his company before him, and they have 
been reinforced by other business owners he knows. It has never occurred to him to doubt 
their judgment, especially since no one else he knows and respects, questions it. 
 According to Levy’s and Rosen’s view, it would have been unreasonable to expect 
Bill to avoid his moral ignorance. In order to do so, he would have had to act in a manner 
that was irrational from his own perspective, or for no reason at all. For example, he may 
have avoided his moral ignorance if he had seriously questioned the positions of his father or 
his own positions once they were developed. However he saw no reason to do so. Perhaps 
this, in turn, is due to overconfidence on his part, and could have been avoided if he had 
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doubted his own ability to evaluate moral claims. However, he did not know that he was 
overconfident. In order to correct this fault, Bill would have had to question his own moral 
reasoning abilities, despite judging that there is no reason to do so. 
Is it true that we could not have reasonably expected Bill to question the views of his 
parents, or his own positions once they were developed (or even his own abilities), given the 
fact that he saw no reason to do so? I think it is not. In failing to question these views, 
especially in light of the fact the he was aware that others disagreed with them, Bill is guilty 
of moral complacency. He adopted the dominant moral view of his community because he 
saw good reason to do so, and no good reason not to do so. He then settled into this view, 
and refrained from subjecting it to serious scrutiny. Instead, he used it to dismiss the views 
of its opponents as overly soft or sentimental. I think we could have reasonably expected 
him not to do this. We could have reasonably expected him to question his adopted moral 
beliefs and to scrutinize them in response to disagreement, even though he saw no reason to 
do so. That is, we could have reasonably expected him to have done so as standard practice, 
not because he saw any particular reason to do so, but because, in order to guard against the 
possibility of holding false moral beliefs (and being morally complacent), we have to reflect 
on our own moral beliefs from time to time, and scrutinize them in response to conflicting 
views that are not based on obviously terrible premises.103 We typically can reasonably 
                                                 
103 By “obviously terrible” I have in mind views that largely depart from our shared 
sense of morality—e.g. views that it is permissible to round up and murder large groups of 
individuals in order to “purify” a particular race. Of course, we could offer a more refined 
view of when agents act complacently, but I think it is at least plausible that they do so when 
they fail to scrutinize their own moral views in response to conflicting views held by 
segments of their own communities, or when they unreflectively adopt the dominant moral 
view of their community. I take it that complacency does not involve a knowing negligence 
or wrongdoing. So, in expecting agents to avoid complacency, we expect them to act in 
ways that seem irrational from their own perspectives. 
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expect this of any moral agent. We certainly have interests in being complacent. It is easier 
than regularly scrutinizing our moral beliefs in response to disagreement. Thinking about 
morality takes time and effort. There is comfort in complacency. There may be an 
uncomfortable cognitive dissonance in doing something we believe we either have no reason 
to do, or have good reason not to do (e.g. like seriously considering a view we believe to be 
false). But, I think it is plausible that in many cases these interests are not of greater relative 
importance than the interests others have in us refraining from moral complacency, and 
thereby avoiding or remedying our moral ignorance.104  The expectation that others not be 
complacent with respect to their moral beliefs is therefore often reasonable; it often meets 
the second disjunct of (ii) by requiring that agents refrain from acting in a way that treats the 
interests of others as if they are of less relative importance than their own. 
As further support for this argument, notice that we regularly expect that agents 
avoid complacency in other arenas as well. Imagine, for example, that Eleanor has been an 
airplane mechanic for 25 years. She has performed hundreds of thousands of pre-departure 
safety checks on aircrafts. She has never made a mistake, and by this point in her career, she 
is so familiar with airplanes that she is 100% confident in her ability to spot a safety issue by 
quickly glancing a plane over. She sees no reason to painstakingly check each wire 
connection, or to look at each and every bolt on the wing of the plane. However, I think very 
few would agree that it would thereby be unreasonable to expect her to do these things (as 
                                                 
104 I grant that some agents may have significant interests that are served by being 
morally complacent. E.g. agents who would face serous alienation, hostility or aggression if 
they were to reject the dominant moral view of their community plausibly have serious 
interests in being morally complacent. Whether or not it is reasonable to expect such agents 
to refrain from being complacent will depend on what interests others have in them avoiding 
or remedying their false moral beliefs. 
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part of a pre-departure safety check).105 Even if she does not believe it possible, there is a 
chance she could miss something this time. Others have serious interests in her not missing 
anything, and no significant interest of Eleanor’s is served by not checking the plane 
carefully. We could reasonably expect her to do it; we could reasonably expect her not to be 
complacent with respect to our safety.106 Similarly, no matter how confident we are that our 
moral beliefs are accurate, there is a chance we could be wrong (any cursory exploration of 
human history indicates that we often are). We often have no serious interests in being 
morally complacent. Others often have serious interests in us holding true moral beliefs. We 
can therefore be reasonably expected to avoid moral complacency; we can be reasonably 
                                                 
105 One might argue that this isn’t a moral expectation, but rather a role-expectation. 
However, I think it is plausible that we could expect Eleanor to perform the safety check 
carefully either based on her role, or simply as a moral agent. Moreover, we could swap this 
example with one of an agent who is 100% confident in his ability to drive safely while 
texting. I unfortunately know someone who suffers from this delusion. He is aware that 
research from reputable sources indicates that individuals who text while driving are much 
more likely to cause an accident than those who do not. He believes he is an exception to 
this rule (and has some evidence to support this). He therefore sees no reason to refrain from 
texting while driving, and has many reasons to text while driving. But, it would be 
implausible to suggest that we could not reasonably expect him to refrain from doing so 
because this is irrational from his perspective.  
106 One might be tempted to think that we could reasonably expect Eleanor to carefully 
check the plane only if she were aware, on some level, that it was possible that she might 
make a mistake. Only if she recognized this could it be said that she should have known 
better, and that she should have carefully checked the plane. I take the reasoning here to be 
that if she is aware that she could miss something, then it is not in fact internally irrational 
for her to carefully check the plane; at some level, even she knows she ought to do so. I see 
no reason to grant that we could reasonably expect Eleanor to carefully check the plane only 
if she is aware, on some level, that it was possible that she might make a mistake in glancing 
it over. But, notice that even if we do grant this, and then apply this lesson to the moral 
ignorance cases, we would still have an argument against Levy and Rosen. We would not be 
able to argue that they are wrong in holding that agents cannot be reasonably expected to do 
what would be irrational from their own perspective, but we could argue that it is extremely 
rare for it to be the case that it is internally irrational for agents to avoid moral complacency 
insofar as it is very rare (does it ever happen?) that agents are not aware that it is possible 
that their moral beliefs are mistaken. 
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expected to reflect upon and question our moral beliefs, and to scrutinize them in response 
to disagreement, even if we so no reason to do so.   
 
One might worry that in claiming that we can be reasonably expected to do this, I am 
claiming that we can all be reasonably expected to be moral philosophers. This would be too 
demanding. But, I am claiming no such thing. An agent does not have to be a moral 
philosopher in order to seriously question and scrutinize his moral beliefs. In fact, I think 
most people do a fairly good job of this. E.g. they might not see any reason to believe that 
there is something wrong about buying antibacterial hand soap, but they are willing to listen 
to, and really consider why someone else does (and perhaps even change their mind). It may 
have never occurred to them that it could be immoral to buy wine that is grown in 
California, given the State’s water crisis, and indeed  they might find the idea preposterous, 
but they don’t dismiss the claim outright. They listen, and think about it, and reconsider their 
own views. We don’t need to be moral philosophers to do these things; we just have to be 
reflective and open-minded.107 
I also do not mean to suggest that all moral ignorance is due to moral complacency, 
or that by reflecting on our moral views, and scrutinizing them in response to criticism (even 
if we see no reason to do so), we will always arrive at true moral beliefs (or remedy false 
ones). I only mean to argue against Levy and Rosen’s view that we can never reasonably 
expect agents to take actions through which they could remedy or avoid their moral 
ignorance, if such actions would be irrational from their own perspectives.  
                                                 
107 One might worry more about the claim that agents need to question their core moral 
beliefs. I don’t think we must necessarily do this directly; by questioning the implications of 
our core moral beliefs, we question these core beliefs themselves. 
  149 
If I am right, then proponents of the skeptical argument cannot successfully defend 
the claim that agents are culpable for their moral ignorance only if it is the result of a 
knowing mismanagement of their moral beliefs against Smith’s and FitzPatrick’s objections. 
It is implausible that we must trace culpability for moral ignorance to a past knowing 
mismanagement of her moral beliefs, in order to determine whether or not the agent could 
have been reasonably expected to avoid it. This doesn’t establish that Smith (2015) is right, 
and that we need not trace at all in order to determine if an agent is culpable for her moral 
ignorance.108 But, so far there is no reason to think that we must trace culpability for it to a 
past, knowing mismanagement of one’s moral beliefs. And, without the claim that agents 
can only be reasonably expected to avoid their moral ignorance if it is the result of a 
knowing mismanagement of their moral beliefs, they cannot defend their view against 
FitzPatrick’s suggestion that the weaker requirement that agents are culpable for their moral 
ignorance if they could have been reasonably expected to avoid it, is preferable. 
Given the fact that proponents of the skeptical argument cannot defend the premise 
that agents are only culpable for their moral ignorance if it is the result of a knowing 
mismanagement of their moral beliefs, and the fact that this premise leads to the highly 
implausible conclusion that agents are very rarely culpable for their moral ignorance, we 
ought to reject it. We ought to reject the skeptical argument. 
 
One might think that proponents of the skeptical argument could defend their 
premise on other grounds. One might think that because it is true that agents are only 
                                                 
108I discuss Smith’s non-volitional view in the following section. While nothing I have to 
say in the dissertation confirms the non-volitionalists’ claim that agents are directly culpable 
for their moral ignorance, nothing disconfirms it either. For my part, I find it highly 
plausible. 
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culpable for their factual ignorance, if it is a result of a knowing mismanagement of their 
factual beliefs, this is true with respect to moral ignorance as well. Alternatively one might 
think that if moral ignorance cannot be traced to a knowing mismanagement of one’s moral 
beliefs, we will face an infinite regress, and be unable to determine if the agent is culpable 
for her moral ignorance. Neither claim is plausible. 
It is not plausible that we must trace culpability for factual ignorance to a knowing 
mismanagement of one’s moral beliefs. Imagine, for example, that Greg does not know that 
the substance he is adding to the soup is rat poison, and not salt. He stores both the rat 
poison and the salt in clear plastic containers near the stove. In doing so, he acts negligently, 
and is thereby culpable for the fact that he does not know he is adding rat poison to the soup. 
It need not also be the case that he was aware that he ought not to store the poison next to 
the salt, in an indistinguishable container. It is plausibly enough that he should have known 
this, i.e. that he could have been reasonably expected to know this.  
It is also not plausible that we face an infinite regress if an agents’ culpability for 
their moral ignorance is not traced to a knowing mismanagement of their moral beliefs. 
Proponents of the skeptical argument argue for this claim in the following manner. 
Culpability for moral ignorance must be traced to culpability for some past act or omission. 
Moral ignorance is either the result of a knowing or unknowing mismanagement of one’s 
moral beliefs. Because agents are only culpable for their acts/omissions performed from 
moral ignorance if they are also culpable for their ignorance, agents are only culpable for an 
unknowing mismanagement of their moral beliefs if they are also culpable for this bit of 
ignorance. So, culpability for moral ignorance can only be traced to culpability for some 
past, unknowing mismanagement of one’s moral beliefs, if one is culpable for the ignorance 
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from which she mismanaged her beliefs. Otherwise, the mismanagement would not be 
culpable. In order to be culpable for the ignorance from which she mismanaged her moral 
beliefs, it must be traced to a past, culpable act or omission, i.e. a knowing mismanagement 
of one’s moral beliefs. If it is instead the result of an unwitting mismanagement, in order to 
determine if this mismanagement is culpable, we must determine if the agent is culpable for 
this further bit of ignorance. This pattern continues unless the agent’s original moral 
ignorance “bottoms out” in a knowing mismanagement of her moral beliefs. 
This argument rests on two main claims. (1) Agents are only indirectly culpable for 
their moral ignorance; they are only culpable for it by way of being culpable for something 
else. (2) Agents are only culpable for actions performed from moral ignorance if they are 
also culpable for their ignorance. Arguing against (1) would require us to take a position 
concerning whether or not agents are directly or indirectly culpable for their moral beliefs, 
which requires us to take a position concerning responsibility for beliefs in general. This 
would take us far afield from the discussion of culpability for moral ignorance. Fortunately, 
we need not tackle this project. If (2) is implausible, this would show that the above 
argument is mistaken.  
Many simply assume that (2) is true.109 However, I am not convinced this is right. 
Zimmerman (1997, 2008) and Rosen (2004) offer a defense of (2). But, neither defense is 
                                                 
109 The only exception of which I am aware is Harman (2011, 2014).  Harman’s (2011) 
denies “that that the blameworthiness for the wrong action is derivative from the 
blameworthiness for the belief,” but grants that “the action is blameworthy only if the belief 
is blameworthy as well” (459). Actions performed from culpable moral ignorance are 
culpable for the same reason that moral ignorance is culpable: they constitute a failure to 
fulfill our obligation to care sufficiently about something of moral significance. Non-
culpable moral ignorance (i.e. that rooted in non-culpable factual ignorance) does not reflect 
this, and neither do actions performed from non-culpable factual ignorance. Therefore, 
“While both the beliefs and the actions are blameworthy, the actions are not blameworthy 
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successful, and no other defense of it is clearly available. Zimmerman (1997, 2008 Ch. 4) 
holds that agents are only culpable for their actions performed from moral ignorance if they 
are also culpable for their ignorance because, lack of ignorance is a “root requirement” for 
responsibility (424, 177). He supports the latter claim by pointing to cases of factual 
ignorance, in which we judge that agents are only culpable for their action performed from 
ignorance if they are also culpable for their ignorance. Rosen (2004) defends (2) by arguing 
that it would be unreasonable to expect an agent to act in a way that she (blamelessly) 
believes to be acceptable, and therefore that agents are not culpable for their actions 
performed from moral ignorance unless they are also culpable for their ignorance (302-303). 
While it is true that we hold that agents are not culpable for their actions performed 
from factual ignorance, unless they are also culpable for their ignorance, this does not 
ground the claim that lack of (culpable) ignorance is a root requirement for responsibility. 
There are many possible reasons we hold the former to be true. For example, we may hold 
this to be true insofar as, if an agent is not culpable for her factual ignorance, her action 
performed from factual ignorance (all things equal) does not reflect an objectionable moral 
attitude. E.g. If Frank non-culpably believes you are not allergic to anchovies, his act of 
serving them to you in homemade salad dressing does not (all things equal) reflect an 
objectionable moral attitude. If this is the explanation of the fact that agents are only 
culpable for actions performed from moral ignorance, if they are culpable for their moral 
ignorance, then not only does it not support the claim that lack of culpable ignorance is a 
root requirement for culpability (lack of an objectionable moral attitude would be), it also 
does not extend to moral ignorance. 
                                                                                                                                                      
because the beliefs are blameworthy. Rather, the actions and the beliefs are blameworthy for 
similar reasons” (Harman, 2011, pp. 459).  
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Rosen’s (2004) defense of the claim that agents are only culpable for their actions 
performed from moral ignorance if they are also culpable for their moral ignorance is also 
unsuccessful. We can reasonably expect agents to act in ways that they blamelessly, falsely 
believe to be permissible. Even if we stipulate that an agent is non-culpable for his moral 
ignorance, it does not follow that we cannot reasonably expect him to avoid acting on it. 
This would, of course, require him to act in a manner that appears irrational from his own 
perspective, but as we saw above, this is not necessarily unreasonable to expect. Imagine, 
for example, that Stan is non-culpable for his racist beliefs, insofar as we could not 
reasonably expect him to avoid them. Even if this is true, one could reasonably expect him 
not to make comments he recognizes to be racist to persons of color, even if he non-culpably 
believes this to be permissible. In expecting him to do so, we would be requiring him to 
refrain from acting in a way that treats his interests in making the comments (whatever these 
may be) as if they are of greater relative importance than the interests persons of color have 
in not being exposed to racist comments.  
It’s not clear how else we could defend the claim that agents are only culpable for 
their actions performed from moral ignorance if they are also culpable for their moral 
ignorance.110 Without this claim, it is not true that *we must either trace culpability for 
                                                 
110 Note that there are also positive reasons to reject this claim. Without it, we can better 
explain our intuitive reactions to some cases. In some cases, we tend to think that an agent is 
not culpable for his moral ignorance, insofar as he could not be reasonably expected to avoid 
it, but is culpable for acting from this ignorance. E.g. we might think that, given the horribly 
abusive condition of an agent’s upbringing, he could not be reasonably expected to avoid 
forming the false moral belief that human life is fairly worthless, and is therefore not 
culpable for doing so. However, this does not suggest that he could not be reasonably 
expected to avoid acting from this ignorance, by murdering another individual, and thereby 
be non-culpable for doing so. On my view, there will very rarely (never?) be an instance in 
which expecting an agent to refrain from murdering another agent would require him to treat 
their interests as if they are of greater weight than his own. It will therefore very rarely or 
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moral ignorance to culpability for some past, knowing mismanagement of one’s moral 
beliefs, or face an infinite regress. Without *, there is no reason to think that an agent cannot 
be culpable for mismanaging his moral beliefs, even if he did so unknowingly. If this is 
right, then even if we grant that agents are only culpable for their moral ignorance if it is the 
result of a past culpable act or omission, we need not also grant that agents are only culpable 
for their moral ignorance if it is the result of past, knowing mismanagement of their moral 
beliefs. Again, I conclude that we ought to reject the latter, and thereby the skeptical 
argument. 
 
Reasonable Moral Expectations and Culpability Views 
 My account of reasonable moral expectations impacts culpability views less 
forcefully. However, it does suggest that we should accept them only if they are 
significantly revised. Proponents of culpability views argue that agents are always culpable 
for their moral ignorance insofar as it always manifests an insufficient care for things of 
moral significance, or objectionable moral attitudes. In Chapter 3, I argued that it is not 
plausible that moral ignorance always manifests insufficient moral care or objectionable 
moral attitudes. Moreover, I argued there is good reason to doubt the weaker claim that 
agents are always culpable for their moral ignorance insofar as it manifests insufficient 
moral care or objectionable moral attitudes. I considered two objections to this weaker 
claim: (1) some agents are not in an epistemic position to form true moral beliefs, and 
therefore are not culpable for their resulting moral ignorance, and (2) in some cases, agents 
cannot be reasonably expected to care sufficiently, or to avoiding holding objectionable 
                                                                                                                                                      
never be unreasonable to expect him to refrain from murdering an agent. This is true 
regardless of what he (blamelessly) believes about the permissibility of doing so. 
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moral attitudes, and thereby the beliefs that manifest them. I argued that a full evaluation of 
(1) and (2) requires an account of the conditions under which an agent can be reasonably 
expected to X (and would therefore have to wait until this chapter). I now have such an 
account, and so can fully evaluate (1) and (2). I argue that (1) is sometimes plausible, and 
that it also sometimes plausible that agents cannot be reasonably expected to form true 
moral beliefs, given the cultural circumstances in which they find themselves. I argue that 
(2) is correct.  
In light of these objections, culpability views 0ought to be modified to hold that 
agents are always culpable for their moral ignorance insofar as it manifests insufficient 
moral care or objectionable moral attitudes, and they could have been reasonably expected 
to avoid their moral ignorance, and to avoid the insufficient care or objectionable moral 
attitudes it manifests. I argue proponents of culpability views ought to accept this 
modification of their view as a welcome amendment; it allows them to offer a more 
plausible view of culpability for moral ignorance, without sacrificing the main aims and 
characteristics of their views. 
(1) 
 
 The objection that some agents are not in the position to form true epistemic beliefs 
is offered by Wieland (2015). I described this objection in Chapter 3: 
  Wieland (2015) argues that some agents are not in a  
position to hold epistemically justified true moral beliefs 
insofar as agents do not always have access to evidence that  
would enable them to form justified true moral beliefs. He  
argues that there are three potential sources of evidence supporting 
true moral beliefs: testimony, mere reflection, and direct experience 
(Wieland, 2015, p. 9). It is not always the case that agents have  
access to evidence via these sources. Testimony does not always  
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provide one with evidence that tells against the morality of a  
practice. E.g it may not do so in cases in which an immoral practice  
is widely accepted (Wieland, 2015, p. 10).  Some agents simply lack  
the capacity to conclude, through mere reflection, that a practice is 
wrong (10). Wieland (2015) holds, e.g. that not everyone has the  
capacity to see “by mere reflection that the suffering of slaves  
outweighs the benefits of slavery for a given society (such as Athens)” (11). 
This is because not everyone “is in a position to make such rather 
philosophical inferences” (Wieland, 2015, p. 11). Finally, not everyone will 
have access to direct experience that provides evidence for true moral beliefs 
(e.g. not all Athenians will have direct contact with slaves) (Zinn, 2016, p. 
68). 
  
 I argued in Chapter 3 that while some agents may lack access to testimony or direct 
experience that would provide them with evidence for true moral beliefs, it is implausible 
that fully-abled, normally functioning adult agents lack access to evidence for true moral 
beliefs via reflection. However, I granted the possibility that some agents, through no fault 
of their own, may not be very good at accessing evidence for true moral beliefs through 
mere reflection, and therefore if they also lack access to evidence for them via testimony and 
direct experience, it seems like they could not be reasonably expected to form true moral 
beliefs. I offered the following fictionalized example of a potential such agent, and the 
following analysis.111 
 Mr. S is from a rural pocket of Malawi. He falsely believes that  
women and girls are of less moral value than men and boys.  
His belief is similar to the rather widely held belief that 
non-human animals have less moral value in virtue of being  
members of a different species; Mr. S believes that women and  
girls have less moral value in virtue of being a different sex.  
This is the prevailing belief in Mr. S’s community, where women  
and girls are widely accepted to be similar in value to livestock.  
Some men in Mr. S’s community treat their wives and daughters  
with great love and respect, but Mr. S and other men in his  
community do not take this to be evidence that they are equals.  
                                                 
111 As noted in Chapter 3, this example is based on an actual agent, Mr. Simbeye, 
discussed by LaFrainere (2005).  
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Instead they understand these men to have a particularly strong  
emotional attachment to their wives and daughters, similar to the 
attachment that some individuals have to pets. Mr. S isn’t very 
empathetic or imaginative, and therefore is not very good at  
arriving at moral truths via mere reflection. 
 
One might argue that Mr. S could not be reasonably expected to  
avoid holding his false moral belief that women and girls are of  
less moral value than men and boys. Testimony confirms this belief. 
Direct experience arguably does not provide evidence for or against  
it. Just as there is not much evidence via direct experience that counts 
for or against a view that moral value depends on one’s species 
membership, there is not much that counts for or against a view  
on which moral value depends on one’s sex. If Mr. S is poor at  
arriving at moral truths via mere reflection, due to his diminished 
capacities, one might argue that Mr. S cannot be reasonably  
expected to avoid his false moral belief about the moral value  
of women and girls.  (Zinn, 2016, p. 70). 
 
We are now in a position to determine if this is right—if Mr. S and agents relevantly 
like him could not be reasonably expected to form true moral beliefs in virtue of lacking 
evidence for them via testimony or direct experience, and insofar as they have diminished 
capacities, through no fault of their own, to access evidence for them through mere 
reflection. While I do not think this is true with respect to Mr. S in particular, it is plausible 
that it is sometimes the case that we cannot reasonably expect agents in this type of 
epistemic situation to form true moral beliefs. Agents with diminished capacities for moral 
reflection will have to go to greater lengths in order to bring it about that they have true 
moral beliefs. Whether or not we can reasonably expect them to do this depends on the 
interests other agents have in them forming true moral beliefs. 
Consider Mr. S in particular. It would have been more difficult for Mr. S to form true 
moral beliefs than it would have been for someone with greater capacities for reflection. E.g. 
let’s say that when Mr. S reflected on whether or not women and girls have equal moral 
value, he tried to consider the matter from their perspective, but all he came up with was that 
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it would be bad to be a woman or girl and to be treated as if one were livestock. If he were a 
woman or girl, he would not want to be treated this way. But, livestock don’t particularly 
like being made to perform labor, or having their movement otherwise constrained, and 
many do not thereby conclude that they are of equal moral value as human beings. Mr. S 
reasoned that from the mere fact that he would not like to be treated as women and girls are 
treated in his community, it does not follow from that women and girls have equal moral 
value. For Mr. S to have seen that they do, he may have needed to “supplement” his 
reflection. E.g. he may have needed to ask women and girls what it is like to be them, and 
how they experience the treatment to which they are subjected. He may have needed to talk 
to them about whether or not they think they have equal moral value. Alternatively, he may 
have needed to seek out other men in his community who believe women to have equal 
moral value and ask them their reasons for believing this.  
I think that in this particular case, given the very significant interests women and 
girls in Mr. S’s community have in him forming true moral beliefs about their value, Mr. S. 
could have been reasonably expected to perform the above tasks in order to remedy his false 
moral beliefs. I think that in this particular case, given the very significant interests women 
and girls in Mr. S’s community have in him forming true moral beliefs about their value, 
Mr. S. could have been reasonably expected to perform the above tasks in order to remedy 
his false moral beliefs. One might think that in reflecting upon the issue at all, Mr. S did all 
he could have been reasonably expected to do in order to bring it about that he had true 
moral beliefs. Moreover, he saw no reason to do more than this, so we could not have 
reasonably expected him to do more. While efforts like Mr. S’s may be all that we can 
reasonably expect of moral agents in ordinary cases, I think it is highly plausible that we can 
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reasonably expect agents to go to extraordinary lengths to ensure that moral beliefs are 
accurate when these moral beliefs seriously affect the lives of many other individuals. We 
can reasonably expect them to subject their moral beliefs to a higher level of scrutiny, even 
if they see no reason to do so. In many cases, even if the agents in question have interests in 
not doing so, these interests will not plausibly be of greater relative importance than the 
interests others have in them arriving at true moral beliefs. In expecting them to refrain from 
exposing their moral beliefs to only an ordinary level of scrutiny, we expect them to refrain 
from acting in a way that treats the interests of others as if they are of less relative 
importance than their own. Returning to Mr. S, in expecting him to have refrained from 
settling for ordinary efforts at arriving at true moral beliefs, we would have expected him to 
refrain from acting in a way that treats the interests of women and girls in his community as 
if they are of less relative importance than his own interests in not submitting his moral 
beliefs to a high level of scrutiny. This would have been a reasonable moral expectation. The 
moral gravity of his situation called for more serious efforts on his part to arrive at true 
moral beliefs. 
But, it is not plausible that it is always true that agents can be reasonably expected to 
form true moral beliefs, despite lacking evidence for such beliefs via testimony and direct 
experience, and having diminished capacity for reflection. It may not be true when nothing 
very significant depends on an agent having true moral beliefs, and the agent would have to 
go great lengths to develop them. In expecting an agent to do this, we would not plausible be 
holding her to a demand that requires (i) or (ii).  
Moreover, it is plausible that sometimes, given their cultural situation, it may be 
unreasonable to expect agents to form true moral beliefs or to remedy their false moral 
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beliefs, insofar as doing so requires them to treat the interests of others as if they are of 
greater relative importance than their own. I.e. in expecting this, we would hold them to a 
demand that meets neither (i) nor (ii), and instead requires the opposite of the second 
disjunct of (ii). For example, it might be unreasonable for this reason to expect an agent who 
is raised in an isolated, misogynistic culture, to avoid having false moral beliefs concerning 
the place and value of women for reasons unrelated to the efforts he would have to exert in 
order to bring this about. Imagine, instead, that this agent faces a number of different 
challenges in overcoming the moral ignorance perpetuated by his culture. Breaking with the 
misogynistic values of his culture may come at great costs. E.g. he might be rejected by his 
family and/or religious community, may face persecution and bodily harm, and may be 
barred from certain educational and employment opportunities. In such cases, where much is 
at stake should the agent form true moral beliefs that are at odds with the dominant views of 
his culture, it is plausible that demanding that he nevertheless do so may, in some cases, 
require that he treat the interests of others as if they are of greater moral importance than his 
own. Whether or not this is true must be determined on a case-by-case basis, and involves an 
analysis of what is at stake for other agents, should he not avoid or remedy his false moral 
beliefs, in comparison to what is at stake for him if he does.  
 
(2) 
It is also unreasonable, in some cases to expect agents to avoid the insufficient care or 
objectionable moral attitudes manifested by their moral ignorance. When this is true, it is not 
plausible that they are culpable for their insufficient moral care or objectionable moral 
attitudes, or for their moral ignorance, insofar as it manifests them. In Chapter 3, in support 
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of the claim that it is sometimes unreasonable to expect agents to avoid caring insufficiently 
about things of moral importance, or to avoid holding objectionable moral attitudes, I 
pointed out that psychologists have found that in response to traumatic events, some agents 
engage in “emotional numbing” (Zinn, 2016, p. 72-73). They suppress the normal emotions 
they might feel about actions or events in self-defense; allowing themselves to feel these 
feelings would be too painful. The practice of “emotional numbing” can become habitual, 
and as a result, can lead to a “withdrawal of empathy and the cultivation of callousness 
toward others” (Kerig et. al, 2012, p. 277). It can lead to what can be properly characterized 
as insufficient moral care or objectionable moral attitudes. I considered the following 
specific examples of this (Zinn, 2016, p.72-73):  
…the following self-report from a veteran, Billie Mac, cited in Gilliand 
and James (2013).  
  Looking back on it, I cannot believe how callous 
I have become. SOP [standard operating procedure] 
was “It don’t mean nothin’, screw it, drive on.” This 
would be right after a B-40 round had blown your  
buddy’s brains all over you. You had to put it behind 
you to survive. A guy fell off the construction site 
I was working on last fall and splattered himself all 
over the pavement. I sat on a steel beam about 30  
feet above the guy and just kept eating my lunch. No 
   big deal (160)! 
 
Consider also the following report of a young woman, charged with assault,  
who has a history of trauma. 
Sadhanna is a 22-year-old woman mandated to outpatient  
mental health and substance abuse treatment as the alternative 
to incarceration. She was arrested and charged with assault  
after arguing and fighting with another woman on the street.  
At intake, Sadhanna reported a 7-year history of alcohol abuse 
and one depressive episode at age 18. She was surprised that  
she got into a fight but admitted that she was drinking at the  
time of the incident. She also reported severe physical abuse at  
the hands of her mother’s boyfriend between ages 4 and 15. Of 
particular note to the intake worker was Sadhanna’s matter-of-fact 
way of presenting the abuse history. During the interview, she clearly 
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indicated that she did not want to attend group therapy and hear other 
people talk about their feelings, saying, “I learned long ago not to 
wear emotions on my sleeve.” 
Sadhanna reported dropping out of 10th grade, saying she never                   
liked school. She didn’t expect much from life. In Sadhanna’s                   
first weeks in treatment, she reported feeling disconnected from           
other group members and questioned the purpose of the group.            
When asked about her own history, she denied that she had any  
difficulties and did not understand why she was mandated to        
treatment. She further denied having feelings about her abuse                
and did not believe that it affected her life now. Group members                
often commented that she did not show much empathy and            
maintained a flat affect, even when group discussions were             
emotionally charged (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration, 2014, p. 62). 
 
I argued in Chapter 3 that it is plausible that Billie Mac and Sadhanna could not be 
have been reasonably expected to avoid their insufficient moral care or objectionable moral 
attitudes insofar as they are the products of emotional numbing, and they could not have 
been reasonably expected to avoid engaging in this practice. I am now in a better position to 
support these claims.In many cases, expecting agents like Billie Mac and Sadhanna to have 
refrained from engaging in emotional numbing, and to thereby avoid their insufficient moral 
care or objectionable moral attitudes, would not have plausibly required them to (i) or (ii). In 
fact, I think it would have required them to do the opposite of the second disjunct of (ii); it 
would have required them to treat the interests of others as if they are of greater weight than 
their own. If this is right, then they are not plausibly culpable for engaging in emotional 
numbing, their resulting insufficient moral care or objectionable moral attitudes, or their 
moral ignorance insofar as it manifests them.112 
                                                 
112 It is possible that agents like Billie Mac and Sadhanna could have been reasonably 
expected to refrain from emotional numbing on non-moral grounds. E.g. perhaps their 
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Consider Billie Mac in particular. In holding Billie Mac to the demand that he care 
sufficiently about the loss of a human life (or that he not lack regard for it), we would expect 
to have not engaged in the practice that gave rise to this insufficient care or objectionable 
moral attitude—i.e. we expect him to have not engaged in emotional numbing. I do not think 
we could have reasonably expected him to have done so. Others do have significant interests 
in Billie Mac caring sufficiently about the loss of a human life. E.g. they have interests in 
him caring enough about it that he would prevent it if he could, or that he react appropriately 
to others who are distressed by the loss of a human life.113 However, it is not clear that these 
interests are of greater relative importance than the interests that Billie Mac had in engaging 
in emotional numbing, which resulted in his failure to care sufficiently about the loss of 
human life. He suggests that doing so was (is?) necessary for his emotional survival, and I 
see no reason to doubt this. The interests Billie Mac had in engaging in emotional numbing 
are plausibly of greater relative importance than the interests others have in him caring care 
sufficiently about the loss of human life.114 It would have been unreasonable of us to expect 
him to refrain from engaging in the practice of moral numbing insofar as it would have 
required the opposite of the second disjunct of (ii); it would have required him to treat the 
interests of others as if they are of greater relative importance than his own. He is therefore 
                                                                                                                                                      
spouses or children could have reasonably expected them to do so. If this is right, they may 
be culpable as a spouse or parent, while not also being morally culpable. 
113 The description of Billie Mac offered above gives no indication that his lack of care 
about the loss of a human life would lead to more result in him actively harming another, so 
we need not include preventing such actions in the interests others have in him caring 
sufficiently about the loss of human life. 
114 Again, this analysis depends on the particular features of this case, which do not 
indicate that Billie Mac was inclined to harm others in virtue of his lack of sufficient moral 
care. 
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not plausibly culpable for not doing so, or for the insufficient care that resulted from this 
practice. 
I think many cases like Billie Mac’s and Sadhanna’s will follow this pattern. Unless 
the interests other agents have in them not caring insufficiently or not holding objectionable 
moral attitudes are very compelling, it will be unreasonable to expect agents who engage in 
emotional numbing in response to traumatic events to refrain from doing so, and to thereby 
avoid or remedy their relevant insufficient care or objectionable moral attitudes. If this is 
right, then in some cases, we cannot justifiably blame agents for caring insufficiently about 
things of moral importance or for holding objectionable moral attitudes, and therefore 
cannot blame them or their moral ignorance in virtue of the fact that it manifests these 
things. 
 
Application to culpability views 
If what I have argued is right, it has significant implications for culpability views. It 
would be unreasonable to expect some agents to avoid their moral ignorance because, given 
their epistemic or cultural circumstances, doing so would not require them to (i) or (ii), but 
instead would require the opposite of the second disjunct of (ii). It would require them to 
treat the interests of others as if they are greater relative importance than their own. It would 
be unreasonable to expect other agents to care sufficiently about specific things of moral 
significance, or to not hold specific objectionable moral attitudes insofar as this would have 
required them to have not engaged in emotional numbing, which in turn would also have 
required the opposite of the second disjunct of (ii); it would have required them to treat the 
interests of others as if they are greater relative importance than their own. In these cases, 
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agents cannot be justifiably blamed for their moral ignorance. In blaming them for their 
moral ignorance, we would endorse a demand that they treat the interests of others as if they 
of greater relative importance than their own. We would thereby treat their interests as 
such—we would treat them unfairly.  
 
Application to Harman’s View 
These observations suggest that Harman is mistaken in holding that agents are always 
culpable for their moral ignorance, as long as it manifests a failure to care sufficiently about 
things of moral significance. Her view ought to be amended (at least) to hold that agents are 
culpable for their moral ignorance insofar as it manifests insufficient care and it is the case 
that they could have been reasonably expected to avoid their moral ignorance and the 
insufficient care it manifests. But I do not think this amendment threatens the core elements 
or aims of Harman’s culpability view. Harman develops her view primarily in response to 
the skeptical argument; she develops it in response to the claim that in order to be culpable, 
moral ignorance must be traced to a past, knowing mismanagement of one’s moral beliefs. 
She rejects this claim, arguing that agents can be directly culpable for their moral ignorance 
insofar as it manifests a failure to care sufficiently about things of moral significance. For 
everything I have said, it may be true that agents have an obligation to care sufficiently 
about things of moral significance, and to hold moral beliefs that manifest this care. What I 
have added is that they are only culpable for failing to do so if they could have been 
reasonably expected to care sufficiently about specific things of moral significance, and to 
avoid moral ignorance that manifests insufficient care. In order to accommodate this 
modification, Harman need only give up the claim that agents are always culpable for their 
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moral ignorance insofar as it manifests a failure to care sufficiently about things of moral 
significance. She can do this without giving up the claim that agents are directly, and most 
often culpable for their moral ignorance. 
 
Applications to non-volitional culpability views 
 In light of these objections, proponents of non-volitional culpability views must also 
revise their views that agents are always culpable for their moral ignorance insofar as it 
manifests objectionable moral attitudes. They ought to instead hold that agents are always 
culpable for their moral ignorance insofar as it manifests objectionable moral attitudes, and 
they could have been reasonably expected to avoid their moral ignorance and the attitudes it 
manifests. This will require proponents of non-culpability views to modify the non-
volitional views of blame that motivate their views. But, again, I do not think this requires 
proponents of culpability views to give up the main elements or aims of their views. 
As noted previously, non-volitional culpability views are motivated by non-
volitional views of blame. Proponents of non-volitional views of blame take issue with their 
counter-parts, volitional views of blame, which hold that agents are only culpable for X if is 
the product of their voluntary choices. As I explained in Chapter 3,  
according to some non-volitional views, blame consists of a  
judgment that an agent has or has displayed an objectionable  
moral attitude, and as is the case with any judgment, it is justified  
as long as this judgment is accurate, and we are justified in reaching  
it, given our evidence. E.g. when we blame someone for driving 
recklessly, we judge him to have displayed a lack of respect for the  
lives and safety of others. This judgment is justified if he in fact  
displayed a lack of respect, and we have sufficient evidence for  
judging him to have done so. According to other non-volitional  
views of blame, when we blame someone for X, we implicitly  
demand that she justify X; in doing so we demand that she justify the 
moral attitudes reflected by X, and if she cannot, we blame her for  
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them. For example, when I blame Sam for cheating on an exam in 
my class, I demand that Sam justify this action. To do so, he must  
defend his evaluation of the reasons for cheating. If he can do so (e.g. 
perhaps he had good reason to believe his life depended on passing  
this exam, and rightfully judged his life to be more valuable than  
being honest in this particular scenario), then I ought to rescind my 
blame. Alternatively, if he cannot do so (e.g. because he knows he 
behaved badly, or because he falsely believes that his grades are  
more valuable that being honest), my blame is justified (Zinn, 2016, 
p.75). 
 
I neither defend, nor object to the conditions under which proponents of non-volitional 
culpability views hold agents are culpable for their moral ignorance. However, in light of the 
objections discussed in this section, I think they ought to amend these conditions. They 
ought to hold the following revised views. (A) An agent is culpable for X if X is, or 
manifests an objectionable moral attitude, our judgment that X is or has done so is justified, 
and the agent could have been reasonably expect to avoid X or the objectionable moral 
attitude it manifests. (B) An agent is culpable for X if X is, or manifests an attitude for 
which the agent lacks an adequate defense, and she could have been reasonably expect to 
avoid X and/or the objectionable moral attitude it manifests. If proponents of culpability 
views refuse these modifications, they will, on my view, be committed to unjustifiably 
blaming agents insofar as they will hold that agents can be culpable for that which they 
could not be reasonably expected to avoid.115  
But, as was the case with Harman’s view, I do not think these modifications alter the 
spirit or aims of non-volitional culpability views. In particular, they do not commit them to 
                                                 
115 In Chapter 3, I discussed Hieronymi’s (2004) argument that the that fact that it would 
be unreasonable to expect an agent to X does not make it unfair to blame her for X. 
Hieronymi (2004) argues that this is because blame is only unfair if the judgment involved 
in blame is false. I hope it is clear how, on my view, blame can be unfair in another sense. It 
can be unfair if it fails to treat like cases alike by blaming agents for failing to meet 
unreasonable expectations. 
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volitional views of blame. This would be true only if, in granting that agents are culpable for 
X only if it was not unreasonable to expect them to avoid X, they also grant that an agent is 
culpable for X only if it is the result of her voluntary choices. However, there is no reason 
that they must do so. There is no reason, on my view, to think that whether or not an 
expectation is unreasonable is necessarily related to an agent’s voluntary choices. Moreover, 
accepting the modifications I have suggested will allow proponents of non-volitional 
culpability views (and of non-volitional views of blame more generally) to avoid the less 
savory implications of their views, e.g. that agents are culpable for actions that manifest 
objectionable moral attitudes even if such actions are the result of severe brain injuries or 
implantation.116 
 
4.8 A Moderate and Intuitive Approach to Culpability for Moral Ignorance 
 I have argued for an account of reasonable moral expectations, and their relationship 
to culpability, which I hope will be both practically and theoretically useful. Many of our 
practical judgments and their consequences rely on the further judgment that an agent could 
have been reasonably expected to avoid X. My account is hopefully of use in clarifying and 
sharpening these judgments, and also usefully applied to other debates in the literature on 
moral responsibility. 
I have also provided what amounts to a moderate and intuitive approach to agents’ 
culpability for their moral ignorance. We have no reason to accept the skeptical argument’s 
conclusion that they are almost never culpable for it, or the culpability views’ claim that 
                                                 
116 Levy (2005) and Miller (2014) argue that Angela Smith is committed to this view, 
despite her (weak) efforts to avoid it. Scanlon (1998) openly embraces this view, arguing 
that even if a shift in attitudes was due to a brain injury, if the shift is permanent, the agent 
will be culpable for these attitudes (279). 
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they are almost always culpable for it. Instead, because agents sometimes cannot be 
reasonably expected to avoid their moral ignorance, they sometimes are not culpable for it. 
This must be determined on a case-by-case basis, and it may turn out to be quite rare. It 
depends both on how costly it would be for the agent to avoid moral ignorance, and the 
likely affects that the agents’ ignorance may have on other agents. While we can reasonably 
expect an agent to assume high costs in order to avoid moral ignorance that is likely to lead 
to severe consequences for other agents (e.g. a belief that human life is worthless), we 
cannot expect agents to assume high costs in order to avoid moral ignorance that will likely 
only have minor effects on other agents (e.g. a belief that people cannot be trusted with their 
jewelry). This tracks our intuitions concerning the matter. We tend to think that agents most 
often are culpable for their moral ignorance, although there are exceptions, particularly 
when it is the result of unfortunate formative or cultural circumstances (in which case, the 
agent must endure high costs to avoid moral ignorance).  
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